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The violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has generated an increased need 
for public policy responses. Nigerian authorities and community stakeholders have 
attempted myriad responses to the challenges created by Boko Haram. However, there is 
a poor understanding of policy frameworks for handling the Boko Haram violence on the 
immediate, medium-term, and long-term dimensions. The purpose of this qualitative case 
study was to improve the understanding of the public policy measures that may help to 
address the Boko Haram challenge. John Burton’s theory of human needs provided a 
theoretical foundation for the study. Purposive sampling technique was used, which 
emphasized the relevance of participants’ experiences and knowledge to the study. Rich 
data were obtained from archival documents and participant interviews from 12 public 
policy experts. Eight themes emerged from the analysis process of hand coding, 
categorization, patterning, detailed description, and interpretation of the data. The 
deductive thematic analysis approach for analyzing data was used. Key findings from this 
study revealed that a collaborative approach to public policy making and implementation 
by authorities in Nigeria is important for a successful counterinsurgency fight against 
Boko Haram. Recommendations include the need to mainstream research and 
intelligence in all counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram and having a 
properly articulated counterinsurgency policy for Nigeria with a conceptual clarity that 
involves both the use of security and peacebuilding components at the political, legal, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The violence arising from the Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in deaths, 
severe population displacement, disruption of livelihoods, and acute food insecurity in 
Nigeria (Akpan, 2013; Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). In addition to the colossal loss of 
human lives and destruction of property suffered by especially people in the northern part 
of the country, the Boko Haram insurgency is having a crumbling effect on the economy 
of Nigeria. This violent disposition of Boko Haram has resulted in wanton destruction of 
innocent lives, and government efforts to address the situation do not appear to be 
yielding positive results (Aderonke, 2015; Botha, Ewi, Salifu, & Abdile, 2017). The 
Boko Haram violence is one of the greatest threats to the internal security of Nigeria 
(Onuoha, 2014). Boko Haram is guided by extreme ideology and is focused on 
establishing an absolute Islamic state in some parts of the northern states of Nigeria 
(Osuji, 2013). The Boko Haram’s key objective is to destroy Nigeria’s democratic 
institutions and impose sharia law on the citizens, using violence as its modus operandi 
(Onouha, 2013). Boko Haram opposes Nigeria as a secular nation, calling it dagut (evil) 
and not worthy of any loyalty (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). 
With Boko Haram, Nigeria has witnessed high incidences of violence and 
turbulence that have posed serious challenges to peace and security (Madau & Madu, 
2013). People in Nigeria no longer feel secure and safe in their homes. They fear walking 
the streets even in their immediate neighborhoods. They fear that their children may be 
attacked, kidnapped or abducted by Boko Haram on their way to or from school. The 
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Boko Haram assaults and molestations of innocent people and the bomb blasts have been 
palpable (Madu & Madu, 2013, p.157). This study is an effort to improve the 
understanding of the public policy measures that will most effectively address the Boko 
Haram challenge. The study fills an important void in the responses to the Boko Haram 
crisis given the extent of the violence and its far-reaching implications for Nigeria’s 
continuous existence as one indivisible sovereign nation. This chapter provides 
contextual information on the subject of this study, the problem statement and purpose of 
the study, and the research questions and the theoretical framework used for the study. 
Also included are the nature or design for the study, definition of terms, philosophical 
and practical assumptions for the study, and delimitations and limitations and the 
significance of the study. 
Background 
No single group has inflicted more violence on Nigerians than Boko Haram since 
the country’s civil war of 1967 to 1970 (Botha et al., 2017; Madu & Madu, 2013). Boko 
Haram has been waging a sophisticated insurgency that initially targeted security 
personnel and then expanded to others (Onuoha, 2013). The insurgency has had a 
devastating impact on Nigerians’ daily lives. Public safety has been challenged 
fundamentally and peaceful intercommunity relations have broken down (International 
Crisis Group, 2011). 
With its violent escapades, Boko Haram was ranked by the Institute of Economics 
and Peace Global Terrorism Index (2015) as the world’s deadliest terrorist group; attacks 
in 2014 alone caused about 6,644 deaths, compared to the 6,073 deaths caused by the 
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Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Another report indicated that Nigeria experienced 
the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever to be recorded in a given year: 7,512 deaths in 
2014 compared to 1,850 deaths recorded in 2013, representing an increase of about 300% 
(Nigeria Security Tracker, 2014). The Boko Haram is believed to have killed between 
20,000 and 35,000 people since its emergence in 2002; most of these deaths occurring 
after 2009 (CNN Library, Boko Haram Fast Facts, 2014). Because of the associated 
bombings and its other violent activities, the Boko Haram insurgency has stood out as a 
unique and ominous challenge. The April 14, 2014, abduction of about 200 girls from 
Chibok Secondary School near Maiduguri in Borno State—some of whom have still not 
be released—is one act by the Boko Haram that has drawn national and international 
outrage. 
Violence by terrorist groups like Boko Haram have constituted a major security 
challenge to all countries, and in response, many international organizations and 
countries adopted a counterterrorism strategy (CTS) as a response to prevent and reduce 
its threats (Udeh, 2013). On November 30, 2005, the European Union (EU) developed a 
CTS based on four pillars—prevention, protection, pursuance, and response—to resolve 
the challenge of terrorism in the region (Council of European Union, 2005). Similarly, on 
September 8, 2006, the United Nations adopted a CTS designed to enhance national, 
regional, and international efforts to counter terrorism (United Nations, 2006). This 
included measures to prevent the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. After 
the 9/11 attacks on the United States, U.S. authorities enacted the Patriot Act and other 
legislation and established the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate 
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antiterrorism functions (Udeh, 2013). To prevent terrorist acts on U.S. soil, in June 2011, 
the United States developed a National Strategy for Counterterrorism to build 
partnerships over security issues (Udeh, 2013, p. 307). 
Udeh (2013) also noted that Morocco has a multipronged CTS to combat 
terrorism and thwart the efforts of the Algerian-based Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. The Moroccan strategy gave the 
country victory over terrorism in North Africa because of its comprehensive nature with 
multiple objectives of achieving regional cooperation and eradicating slum (Udeh, 2013, 
p. 307). The political authorities and elites in Nigeria have been largely unable to curtail 
the violence of Boko Haram, and many people have viewed this as a failure of Nigeria’s 
counterterrorism policies (Ojelade, 2018). National institutions and state and nonstate 
actors in Nigeria have yet to leverage collaboration, partnerships, and synergistic 
relationships (Institute for Peace & Conflict Resolution [IPCR], 2012) at policy 
formulation and implementation levels for maximum results. 
Policy serves as the most potent political, legal, and administrative context and 
framework, within which organizations, governments, and other stakeholders can interact 
to achieve sustained peace and security (Mato & Olasupo, 2014). The security of people 
is endangered by violence (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2016). As 
noted by Ojelade, (2018), the spiral of domestic and societal violence in Nigeria needs to 
be stemmed through public policy that envisages a comprehensive multi-actor 
engagement framework. The more a society is able to control the spiral of violence, the 
higher the level of peace, social harmony, and development (IPCR, 2016b). Public policy 
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is expected to balance the objectives of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity to ensure 
harmonious coexistence and socioeconomic and political advancement. Quality policy 
decisions require planning (Fwa, 2011, p. 189) to achieve desirable outcomes for 
preventing violence in society. Providing security in a violence-prone society like Nigeria 
requires a locale-specific definition and understanding of policies that guarantee security 
and address the fears, anxieties, and aspirations of the people (IPCR, 2016b). 
Problem Statement 
The violence arising from the Boko Haram insurgency underscores the need to 
understand the public policy interventions that can address the root causes of the 
insurgency and to ameliorate its consequences and impact on citizens. Nigerian citizens 
are suffering the menace of violence from various episodes like ethnoreligious conflicts 
(IPCR, 2016b), extrajudicial killings, and indiscriminate shootings by Nigerian security 
forces (Elaigwu, 2014). Other forms of violence are Fulani pastoralist attacks, cultism 
and armed robbery episodes, kidnappings, and clashes by tribal or ethnic communities. 
The Boko Haram violence is widespread and is affecting the progress and peaceful 
coexistence of the people of Nigeria (Akpan, 2013; Elaigwu, 2014; Fafowora, 2013;). 
The Boko Haram violence is deepening poverty, especially in the north, as 
schools close, factories shut down, and investors and traders leave (Ishaku, 2012). Also, 
the activities of the Boko Haram have had a negative effect on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Nigeria. Rene (2012) found that the World Investment Report (WIR) of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development indicated that 2009–2010, when 
Boko Haram intensified its violent attacks, the FDI revenue to Nigeria fell to $6.1 billion 
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(N933.3 billion) in 2010, with close to a 30% drop from $8.65 billion (N1.33 trillion) in 
2009, causing the Nigerian economy to lose N1.33 trillion FDI. The level of violence and 
insecurity caused by the Boko Haram insurgency is giving rise to palpable fear for the 
disintegration of the Nigerian federation. The insurgency has deepened social divisions 
not only in the north but across Nigeria (Elaigwu, 2014). 
Although available literature reveals that most Nigerians believe that Boko Haram 
is best addressed at the community or local level, rather than at the national or federal 
level (Botha et al., 2017), many more people are divided on the public policy measures 
that best address the Boko Haram insurgency and its consequences. The use of data and 
analysis to make effective public policy decisions has not been well researched. 
Insufficient attention has been paid to understanding the public policy measures that can 
be adopted to stop the Boko Haram violence and reduce its impact on citizens. In 
conducting this research, I adopted qualitative case study approach to provide the 
Nigerian government and policy makers with useful analysis to improve the 
understanding of public policy measures to address the Boko Haram insurgency. 
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study was to improve the understanding of the public policy 
measures that will prevent insurgent groups like Boko Haram from emerging and 
wreaking violence on the Nigerian people. The violence of the Boko Haram insurgency 
has generated an increased need for public policy directions (Barkindo, 2016; Okene & 
Olawale, 2013), and the central focus of this study is the impact such public policy 
measures will have regarding the protection of citizens and the guarantee of their 
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fundamental rights and privileges under the law. In this research, I examined the policy 
strategies or measures that have been adopted by Nigerian government or authorities to 
address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. 
I held interviewing sessions with public policy experts with guided and open-
ended questions. Interview participants for this study were mostly retired personnel who 
have been involved in making various policies pertaining to security, peace, conflict 
management and resolution, and good governance issues from organizations like IPCR, 
National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, and the Institute for Security Studies. 
Other organizations include National Assembly, Victim Support Fund, the North East 
Development Commission (NEDC), Africa Institute of Public Policy, and the Nigerian 
Institute for Social and Economic Research. Ten of the 12 participants lived in Abuja and 
the other two lived in Jos, the Plateau state capital. The results of this study can improve 
the understanding of which policy measures will best promote the security and welfare of 
people in Nigeria and help to sensitize the authorities on the importance of taking 
concrete steps in the area of formulating and implementing appropriate policies (Kpessa, 
2011; Ozumba, 2014). 
Research Questions 
The central research question that guided the study is:  
RQ1: What public policy measures are a solution to deal with Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria? 
Successfully answering the stated research question will produce important 
lessons that will improve the understanding of the policy measures that can be taken to 
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stop the violent activities of Boko Haram and ameliorate the negative effects or impacts 
of the insurgency on the citizens. The following subquestions were used to help answer 
the overarching research question: 
SQ1: What public policy strategies or measures have been adopted by Nigerian 
government or authorities to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria? 
SQ2: Why has Boko Haram violence continued despite public policy initiatives 
meant to curtail it? 
SQ3: How can/might future public policy initiatives mitigate the impact of Boko 
Haram violence on the people in Nigeria? 
Theoretical Framework 
Nigeria has witnessed large-scale violence since gaining independence in 1960. 
Some analysts believe that the central factors in all the cases of violence have been 
fallouts from the contradictions inherent in forging together different sectional interests 
into one united nation (Agbede, 2010, p. 63). Osuji (2013) noted that Nigeria is 
experiencing a new phase in its political system where there is emergence of violent 
extremist groups with strong feelings about how they should live their lives, relate with 
others, and what they think is a fulfilling existence. Perhaps this explains why Boko 
Haram has embarked on violence and destruction to satisfy its selfish aspirations (Akpan, 
2013). For humans, violence is not natural, but rather a construct arising from social 
proclivities (Danielsen, 2005). So, given Nigeria’s experience, the study of violence and 
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how it is managed should be the central focus of social change efforts within the 
framework of society. 
For this study, I used John Burton’s (1990a) theory of human needs to ground the 
research. Burton’s theory provides a common understanding of the strategies in public 
policies that could be used to discourage individuals or groups from using violence to 
express their grievances or to satisfy their needs within the context of a social and 
political setting. For Burton, violent conflicts arise due to the inability of people to meet 
their needs. Applying the human needs theory (HNT) to political conflict situations, 
Burton observed that groups resort to violence as a means of seeking a redress when their 
efforts to meet their needs are frustrated. Burton believed that conflicts could be resolved 
when the system focuses on meeting the needs of the people in conflict. Burton (1990b) 
argued that the political system must have the capacity to cope or respond to the conflicts, 
strains, and violent episodes emerging from the environment. 
This research on public policy measures to address the Boko Haram crisis took 
advantage of Burton’s theoretical underpinnings to identify potential solutions for the 
problem in Nigeria. As with most terrorist groups, Boko Haram has been adept at 
evolving its strategies and developing justifications for its actions. The group continues to 
kill and maim, and its actions have shattered communities, displaced thousands, and 
caused mass migration, putting areas with limited resources under immense pressure. A 
genuine foundation for effective public policy must therefore seek to facilitate and sustain 
a culture with a proactive alert system that is a veritable tool to proactively sensitize, 
caution, and protect the people (Ozumba, 2014). Public policies must subsequently alter 
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the environment and the demands generated therein, as well as the character of the 
political system itself. Eneanya (2013, p. 233) found this environment to “consist of all 
those conditions and events external to the boundaries of the political system and the 
demands are the claims made by individuals and groups on the political system.” 
However, the extent to which the environment, whether internal or external, is said to 
have an influence on the policy-making process is determined by the values and 
ideologies held by the decision-makers in the system (Ekong, 2016). 
Nature of Study 
In research there is always the need to provide explanation and to do so with less 
ambiguity (Creswell, 2009). The explanation provided must give rise to some form of 
evidence consistent with the theoretical framework adopted for conducting the research. 
But this cannot happen unless there is a “plan or proposal to conduct research” and 
usually this would include “the intersection of philosophy; strategies of inquiry and 
specific methods” (Creswell, 2009, p. 5). 
To conduct a study to improve the understanding of how public policy making 
and implementation can be used to address the incidences of violence arising from the 
Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the qualitative method was most appropriate. 
Rudestam and Newton (2007) observed that “qualitative methods are linked to 
constructivist theory of knowledge because they focus on understanding experiences 
from the point of view of those who live them” (p. 35). Understanding the Boko Haram 
counterinsurgency policy development and implementation will provide a lead to policy 
direction that can facilitate better approaches for dealing with the Boko Haram 
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insurgency in Nigeria. This qualitative case study involved stating the questions and 
procedures, collecting data, analyzing the data, and interpreting or giving meaning to the 
data analyzed. The study was designed to improve the understanding of how public 
policy making and implementation will discourage violence and promote cohesion and 
harmony between decisions and actions on peace and security for all people living or 
residing in Nigeria (IPCR, 2016a). 
Definition of Terms 
Boko Haram: As used in this dissertation, refers to the description adopted by 
residents of Maiduguri where the group was believed to have been formed. Boko is a 
Hausa word meaning Western education, and Haram is an Arabic word figuratively 
meaning sin but literally meaning forbidden. Boko Haram has therefore been commonly 
translated as Western education is sacrilege or Western education is a sin. Some scholars 
believe that such interpretation will be more of a transliteration of the two words, which 
would be incapable of capturing the essence of what the original coiners had in mind 
(Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013; Unumen, 2014;). The group earned its name due to its 
strong opposition to anything Western, which it believes has a corrupting influence on 
Muslims (Chotia, 2012). Ioannis Mantzikos, a Greek researcher on Islamic movements, 
observed that what the users of the word Boko Haram meant to convey is that “Western 
civilization” is forbidden and not that “Western education” is forbidden or a sacrilege. 
Mantzikos (2010) believed that when Boko Haram is translated as Western civilization is 
forbidden, it stresses the belief of the sect in the supremacy of Islamic culture over 
Western civilization (p. 58). 
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Counterinsurgency: Strategies or measures that are taken to prevent, deter, 
preempt, and respond to insurgency attacks; techniques used by stakeholders for denying 
the insurgents the opportunity of using their tactics (Ewa, 2017). 
Extremism: Rooted in faith-based tenets and carried out by groups or individuals. 
As used in this dissertation, it defines an individual’s or a group’s view or interpretation 
of teachings of a belief system. Terrorist acts have been carried out on religious grounds 
by extremists with the hope to either spreading or enforcing a system of belief. 
Insurgency: A state of violent rebellion against any authority or leadership of a 
country through various acts of disruption and molestation in order to undermine its 
authority. In the Nigerian constitutional context, insurgency refers to the definition 
adopted by Okene and Olawale (2013) as “attack on defenseless civilians resulting in the 
massive loss of lives and properties, prevention of the flourishing domestic and foreign 
investments and investors and its linkages to murder, genocide and indeed treasonable 
felony” (p. 325). 
Peace: Societal conditions that ensure relative social stability and order through 
the dispensation of justice, fairness, and opportunities for accommodation by formal and 
informal institutions, practices, and norms. Usually, peace is not the absence of conflicts 
but is about how conflicts are managed to ensure relative stability and law and order so as 
to enable human beings carry out their daily activities. 
Policy: Guidance for action; may take the form of a declaration of goals or a 
course of action. It may also include a declaration of general purpose and as well as 
making declaration on authoritative decision. Mato and Olasupo (2014) refer to policy 
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“as a purposive course of action taken or adopted by those in power in pursuit of certain 
goals or objectives” (p. 45). 
Public policy: A guide government has designed for direction and practice in 
certain problem areas. It is a relatively stable purposive course of action followed by 
government in dealing with some problem or matter of concern. 
Security: Protection against internal and external threats and preserving 
sovereignty over territory. Once a government cannot guarantee security, rebellious 
armed groups or criminal gangs may use violence to exploit the security gaps. 
Violence: The use of physical force, usually with the purpose of injuring or 
damaging the object of violence. It is the use or threat of physical act carried out by an 
individual or group of individuals against another individual or individuals and or 
property with the intent to cause injury or death to persons and or damage or destruction 
to property. Violence in this study includes various acts of killings, bombings, 
insurgency, terrorism, kidnappings, destruction or damage to properties, ethnoreligious 
violent uprisings, and conflicts. 
Philosophical and Practical Assumptions 
Within the context of the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency, Nigeria’s 
active participation in policy making toward commitment to human values and societal 
peace is a critical perspective that can be better confirmed through study, rather than 
through assumptions (Merriam, 2014). However, the philosophical elements and the 
meaning I attach to this research determines the methodological assumptions for the 
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research (Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Ponterotto, 2005;). Based on this, the following 
philosophical assumptions underlay this research: 
 The negative image Nigeria has attracted both locally and internationally as a 
result of the violence of Boko Haram is a compelling reason that Nigeria must 
understand and develop strategies that maximize prospects for safety, peace, and 
security of lives and property. 
 Improving the understanding of formulation and implementation of public policy 
measures to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is 
necessary for safety, peace, and security of lives and property in Nigeria. 
 Given the continuous threats from Boko Haram, the philosophy that sees peace as 
a factor of progress and development should be promoted through the adoption of 
policy of dialogue based on factual experience and reason. 
 The use of Burton’s (1990) HNT is an appropriate theoretical framework to 
ground the study and underscore that efforts to address the Boko Haram crisis will 
benefit from the HNT principle of mediation in violent conflicts, reconciliation 
efforts, and nonviolent communication used in restorative justice structures across 
the world (Danielsen, 2005). 
In terms of practical assumptions, it was assumed that by formulating and 
implementing relevant public policies, Nigerians will feel happy and be mobilized to 
contribute to violent conflict prevention, diversity management, and sustainable peace 
building. It was further assumed that the qualitative case study approach was the best 
suited method for investigating the public policies that will address the challenges of 
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Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Also, I assumed that the target participants for this 
research were Nigerians and public policy experts who would be able to provide useful 
information and insight on how policy making and implementation can be used to 
address the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria. Lastly, I assumed that the participants 
would answer the research questions openly, honestly, and in great detail. 
Scope and Delimitations 
This study was primarily concerned with how to improve the understanding of 
public policy making and implementation in order to effectively address the Boko Haram 
violence. The study addressed the gap in the formulation and implementation of public 
policies targeted at resolving the menace of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The 
study was bounded and limited to the types of public policies that may be considered for 
design and implementation given the context of efforts or attempts already made to 
resolve the Boko Haram crisis. 
Interview participants were selected through purposive sampling limited to 
persons with relevant knowledge of the subject. This was to provide opportunity for a 
vigorous and exhaustive discussion with the participants. Saturation was attained as a 
result of the quality of the participants who were identified and sampled for the study. 
These participants comprised retired officials of institutions (both private and public) 
charged with tasks of policy advisory, policy think tank and policy formulation, and 
implementation on matters of peace, violence, and conflict resolution. Ten of the 12 
participants lived in Abuja, and the other two lived in Jos, the Plateau state capital. 
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Limitations of the Study 
Wilson-Genderson and Pruchno (2015) noted that there are limitations for all 
research. One clear limitation to this study was sample size. The sample size used was 
small because it was not feasible to engage the entire population of public policy experts 
across various agencies, establishments, and universities in Nigeria. Findings could only 
be generalized in view of the sample population. The target participants for this study 
were selected from peace and conflict resolution establishments; policy and strategic 
studies agencies, and reintegration agencies like the Victim Support Fund. 
A second limitation was the lack of access to some information regarded as 
classified policy measures. The policy measures were regarded as intelligence or security 
issues. I could not access such information due to the sensitive nature of the research. 
However, I depended on open source information relevant to the study. 
There was danger of potential bias because of the nature of the study. The study is 
a qualitative case study, which made the researcher the primary instrument for data 
collection, analysis, and interpretation (Creswell, 2013) The researcher must endeavor to 
remain neutral throughout the study (Apori-Nkansah, 2008). I ensured that the entire 
process of the research was rigorous, credible, and reliable. 
Significance of the Study 
This study filled an important gap in the search for solutions to the Boko Haram 
insurgency by offering empirically informed public policy recommendations to the 
Nigerian government and other stakeholders who have been involved in the fight against 
Boko Haram. The research will help policy makers in Nigeria develop alternative courses 
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of action conducive to peaceful resolution of conflicts involving terrorist violence (; 
Eneanya, 2016; Golwa & Alozieuwa 2012; Ogbeide, 2007). 
The findings of the study may be useful to government ministries, agencies, and 
departments and nongovernmental and civil society organizations and resource 
individuals whose services could be complementary to national security efforts. Through 
a well-informed public policy effort, Nigeria’s national security strategy should be able to 
achieve the coordination and utilization of all the available efforts and services for the 
attainment of national security goals. Lessons from the study will improve understanding 
of a public policy approach that will deepen and strengthen knowledge and insights for 
increased engagements of people in intercultural dialogues, conflict resolution, and 
postconflict peace building. 
The UNDP in its 2014 Human Development Report (HDR) averred that “a core 
aspect of human development is having the freedom to live a life that one values” (p. 24). 
Nigeria must determine the policies and other related response measures that can help in 
addressing the seemingly unending spate of violence. Public policies in the form of rules, 
norms, strategies, and collective action can influence and determine the scope and 
efficacy of national responses to the unfortunate experience of the Boko Haram violence. 
Summary 
This chapter provides the introductory aspects to this study. I explained the case 
study approach adopted for the study, the background to the study, the research questions, 
as well as the design and approach to answering the research questions. Also included in 
this chapter were the limitations and significance of the study. The Boko Haram 
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insurgency started as a weak, disorganized, loosely coordinated, and inchoate movement 
(Akpan, 2013). Several versions existed at the emergence of the Boko Haram Islamist 
sect in Nigeria. Some people claimed the group was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 
Maiduguri during the controversy over the introduction of Sharia in some northern states 
in 2002, and others have argued that the group predated Mohammed Yusuf (Onyebuchi 
& Chigozie, 2013; Usoji, 2013). Regardless of its origins, the Boko Haram sect is a group 
that has emerged by the new wave of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria. The official 
name of the sect is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’wati Wal-Jihad, which means “people 
committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (Unumen, 2014, p. 
238). 
The Boko Haram violence has taken a heavy toll on many Nigerians and many 
people residing in Nigeria. The colossal loss of human lives and destruction of property 
suffered, especially by people in the northern part of the country, and the crumbling 
effect of the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria’s economy is peaking (Ibrahim et al., 
2015; Nigeria Security Tracker, 2014;). The safety of the citizens in the affected areas 
remains uncertain and it appears that security forces are struggling to quell the insurgency 
(Ewa, 2017). 
The subsequent chapters follow a general layout. In Chapter 2, I examine, 
analyze, and synthesize literature on issues related to security and the threats to lives and 
property posed by Boko Haram violence. In Chapter 3, I discuss the methodology 
adopted for the study and outline the methods employed in data collection and analysis. 
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Chapter 4 includes the results of the study and Chapter 5 contains conclusions, 
recommendations, and social change implications from the results of the study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine, analyze, and synthesize literature on issues relating to 
security and the threats to lives and property posed by violence, including their various 
sources, such as the Boko Haram insurgency and the challenges they pose to peace and 
stability, particularly in Nigeria. I also analyze the place of public policy in addressing 
societal problems. Included in this chapter are sections on the literature search strategy, 
the theoretical foundation for the study, an extensive review of literature on key concepts 
and variables relevant to the study, and a summary and conclusion for the chapter. 
The Boko Haram Islamist sect has engaged in fearsome insurgency that has 
claimed the lives of thousands of people, displaced millions more, and destroyed 
properties worth billions of naira (Institute of Economics and Peace Global Terrorism 
Index, 2015). The insurgency is an expression of violence and destruction that has been 
orchestrated to satisfy selfish aspirations (Akpan, 2013). The Boko Haram insurgency is 
characterized by mindless violence that undermines the freedom and way of life of 
Nigerians and the sovereignty of Nigeria. Unfortunately, the government of Nigeria has 
been criticized for its lack of a coherent policy to fight Boko Haram (Ojelade, 2018). The 
authorities in Nigeria are struggling to quell the Boko Haram violence (Ewa, 2017). The 
safety of citizens in the affected areas remains uncertain, resulting in severe humanitarian 
crises circumstances and producing millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 
thousands of refugees (Ibrahim et al., 2015). The purpose of this study was to improve 
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the understanding of public policy making and implementation in order to effectively 
address Boko Haram violence. 
Synopsis of Current Literature on the Problem 
The Institute for Economics and Peace’s (2015) Global Terrorism Index ranked 
Boko Haram as the world’s deadliest terrorist group in 2014. Boko Haram’s attacks in 
2014 accounted for 6,644 deaths, against the 6,073 deaths caused by ISIS. These deaths 
were attributed to 453 Boko Haram attacks in Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria (Institute for 
Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index, 2015). The report also shows that Nigeria 
experienced the largest increase in terrorist deaths within 1 year: 7,512 deaths in 2014 
compared to 1,850 deaths in 2013. This shows an increase of about 300% (Institute for 
Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index, 2015). In a 2016 report, the United 
Nations Children’s Fund highlighted the impact of Boko Haram attacks on children, 
given the high-profile kidnapping of Chibok school girls. The report estimated that in 
2015, 1.3 million children from Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon were displaced, an 
increase of over 60% from the previous year. The report also profiled 44 incidents of 
children used in suicide attacks in 2015 (United Nations Children’s Fund, 2016). 
The use of suicide bombers and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
and vehicle-borne IEDs byBoko Haram reflects the magnitude of violence unleashed on 
the Nigerian people. Such dramatic violence generates widespread fear and is carried out 
at random (Enwere, 2013). Usually, major targets include buildings or locations that are 
important economic and political symbols, such as embassies, night clubs, restaurants, 
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media houses, churches, mosques, schools, and bus stations (Enwere, 2013, p. 239; 
Ishiaku, 2012, p. 144). 
Agbiboa (2014) noted that Boko Haram carried out brave attacks on many public 
places like schools, prisons, police stations, religious houses, media offices, and the 
United Nations office in Abuja. Maiangwa et al. (2012) reported that the attack on the 
headquarters of the Nigerian police in Abuja by Boko Haram was the first suicide attack 
in Nigeria. Some other prominent attacks by Boko Haram include the 2011 Madalla 
Christmas day bombing that killed 45 people, and the January 2012 coordinated attacks 
on three government offices in Kano, where over 185 people were reported killed 
(Maiangwa, 2013, p. 96). 
The insurgency started with fearsome intensity in 2010, when Boko Haram split 
into factions, changed its operational tactics, and steadily resisted a comprehensive 
attenuation of its capacity to cause violence. Congressional Research Service (CRS, 
2019), for example, reported that it was the Al-Barnawi faction, Islamic State of West 
Africa that was responsible for the kidnapping of over 100 school girls from Dapchi 
village in northeast Nigeria in February 2018. A series of devastating attacks on the 
Nigerian military bases in 2018—in which over 100 soldiers were reportedly killed—has 
been attributed to the Al-Barnawi-led faction (CRS, 2019, p. 10). 
CRS (2019) further stated that the State Department designated both Boko Haram 
and Islamic State of West Africa as foreign terrorist organizations under Section 219 of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and as specially designated global 
terrorists under Executive Order 13224.52. The foreign terrorist organization 
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designations, according to CRS (2019), aim “to assist U.S. and other law enforcement 
agencies in efforts to investigate and prosecute suspects associated with the group” (p. 
10). 
The CRS noted that in June 2012 the State Department had designated three 
individuals—Khalid Al-Barnawi, Abubakar Adam Kambar (both said to have links with 
AQIM), and Shekau—as specially designated global terrorists and in 2013 issued a $7 
million reward for information on the location of Shekau through its Rewards for Justice 
program (CRS, 2019). In 2013, the government of Nigeria formally declared Boko 
Haram and Ansaru as terrorist organizations. CRS reported that the British government in 
2012 declared Ansaru as a proscribed terrorist organization and called the Boko Haram 
such in 2013. Boko Haram was added to the United Nations Al-Qaeda sanctions list in 
May 2014, and in December 2015, the State Department designated two more senior 
Boko Haram leaders as specially designated global terrorists, and the leader of Islamic 
State of West Africa, Barnawi, was added in February 2018 (CRS, 2019, p.10). 
Boko Haram has been a major concern for policy experts in Nigeria. Policy 
should dictate security, political, religious, and economic and development considerations 
for the peace, stability, and progress of Nigeria (Ekong, 2016; Ojelade, 2018). 
Anyaegbunam (2012) stated that policy is a tool through which a state is steered. The 
violence of the Boko Haram insurgency underscores the objective basis for Nigeria to 
evolve a public policy response that addresses the root causes of violent extremism. 
Policy serves as the most potent political, legal, and administrative context and 
framework, within which organizations and governmental functionaries and other 
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stakeholders can interact together to achieve sustained peace and security (Ozumba, 
2014). The spiral of domestic and societal violence needs to be stemmed through public 
policy thrust. The more a society is able to control the spiral of violence, the higher the 
level of peace, social harmony, and development (IPCR, 2016a). Public policy thrust 
therefore is expected to balance the objectives of efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in 
order to ensure harmonious coexistence and socioeconomic and political advancement 
(IPCR, 2016a). 
Many problems affecting the vitality of a nation can be effectively tackled 
through sound policymaking involving both planning and implementation (Ogbeide, 
2007, 2013; Ozumba, 2014). However, dealing with problems in a haphazard and 
unsystematic manner has proved ineffective and costly. There is consequently need to 
systematize policymaking to improve the quality of policy decisions (Fwa, 2011, p. 189). 
Quality policy decisions require that policy makers detect faulty reasoning and identify 
the worthiness of policy inputs as well as being able to suggest plausible policy 
alternatives. Screening policy inputs and the ability to foresee their prospective desirable 
and undesirable outcomes are important aspects of capacity in public policy response 
(Ozumba, 2014). 
Literature Search Strategy 
Given the required depth and focus of analysis on the problem of the Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria and the increased need for public policy directions to ensure that 
the violence and other threats to peace and security are addressed, an interdisciplinary 
approach to the review of available literature was adopted. Literature from several 
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disciplines, such as policy, religion, government, political science, public administration, 
terrorism, and violent extremism, was reviewed. Relevant materials from databases such 
as ProQuest, Sage and Academic Research Premier, were searched. Books, monographs, 
conference proceedings, magazines, and related publications were also consulted. 
Literature key search terms included terrorism, violence, violent extremism, Boko Haram, 
insurgency, public policy, policy implementation, policy formulation, policy failure, 
religious radicalization, insecurity, terrorism financing, militancy, violent conflicts, 
conflict resolution, poverty, good governance, peace building, Islamic fundamentalism, 
clash of civilizations, Islamic revivalism, and frustration-aggression theory. 
Theoretical Foundation 
The theory used for this study is HNT. Among one of the key theorists who 
propounded the HNT was John Burton. Burton (1990) argued that human conflicts 
emerge when people’s efforts to meet their fundamental needs are frustrated. Burton 
(1990) listed such needs as (a) distributive justice, (b) safety and security, (c) 
belongingness, (d) self-esteem, (e) personal fulfilment, (f) identity, (g) cultural security, 
and (h) freedom. Danielsen (2005) reported that another HNT scholar, Rosenberg, stated 
that “violence is a tragic expression of unmet human needs, implying that all actions 
undertaken by human beings are attempts to satisfy their needs” (p. 6). This suggests that 
violence occurs when certain people do not see other ways to meet their needs or when 
they feel they are not receiving the understanding and respect for what they consider to 
be their needs. 
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Human needs theorists maintain that one of the primary causes of protracted 
violence is people’s drive to meet their unmet needs, and when such needs are 
continuously not met, frustration sets in which eventually results in aggression (Adibe, 
2012). Reflecting on earlier works of Gurr (1970), Davies (1973), and Margolin (1977) 
on the relative derivation hypothesis, Nweze (2012) posited that every frustration leads to 
some aggression and every act of aggression results from prior frustration and that any 
feeling of frustration is perceptual and such a frustration must have reached a clinical 
point before overt manifestation of aggression (pp. 282–283). Nweze (2012) further 
argued that “much terrorist behavior is a response to the frustration of failure to meet 
various social, economic and personal needs and objectives” (p. 283). Agbiboa (2014) 
argued that the HNT of social conflicts holds that all human beings have basic needs they 
seek to fulfill and that failure to meet these needs could lead to an outbreak of violent 
conflict. 
This explains why, in the context of Nigeria’s experience of bad governance, 
sustained economic hardship and rising inequality have resulted in social frustration, and 
Boko Haram has been able to peddle the idea of Muslim revivalism, which has now 
become a serious challenge to all Nigerians, particularly northern traditional, religious, 
and political elites (International Crisis Group, 2014, p. 2). For some people, Boko 
Haram provides a ready answer to the poverty, injustice, and corruption in Nigeria 
(Gowon, 2012; Shettima, 2012; World Council of Churches, 2012; Zenn et al., 2018). 
The rise of Boko Haram with its violent disposition to western values is a 
counterresponse to western civilization, which has fast eclipsed other civilizations, 
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including Islamic civilization (Ibrahim et al., 2015; Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). The 
trend that most world civilizations are adopting western values has infuriated Islamic 
fundamentalists. The Boko Haram has a sole motivation to overthrow the Nigerian state 
with its western values and then impose strict Islamic sharia law on the entire country 
(Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013; Zenn et al., 2018). 
The efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as 
universal values are unacceptable to Boko Haram and motivates them to engage in 
violence and other terrorist acts against the state (Bagaji, Etila, Ogbadu, & Sule, 2012). 
Academic consensus identified these motivations to include seeking revenge for alleged 
grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution and the 
promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and 
objectives (Alemika, 2012, p.186). 
Onyebuchi and Chigozie (2013) noted that U.S. historian Ira Lapidus called 
Islamic fundamentalism “an umbrella designation for a very wide variety of movements” 
(p. 207). Lapidus stated that among these movements, some are intolerant and exclusivist, 
some are pluralistic, some are favorable to science and some are antiscience, some are 
primarily devotional, and some are political. The others, Lapidus said, are democratic or 
authoritarian, and some others are pacific or violent. Lapidus concluded that the 
difference between a mainstream Islamist and a fundamentalist is “a political individual 
in search of a more original Islam” (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013, p. 207). Like Boko 
Haram, it is the extremist individual Muslims who employ physical force to defend 
Islam; today, they are referred to as Islamic fundamentalists. Boko Haram finds 
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justification for their acts of violence on the grounds that they are deprived of their needs 
for true and undiluted worship. 
Applying the HNT will be useful to the assessment of the claims of the Boko 
Haram and help to identify what their needs truly are, behind their positions or desired 
strategies (Danielsen, 2005). The flexibility of the HNT and its advantage of applicability 
in all the levels of the society, for intra and interpersonal conflict, intergroup conflict and 
in an international setting will help policy makers on how best to handle the challenges of 
the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. In the view of Danielsen (2005), “in a world 
context where differences are accentuated, HNT attempts to unify human beings from 
different regions and cultures, creating a common understanding of who we are and how 
others need and feel the same way we do” (p.6). 
The study on how to improve the understanding of public policy measures that are 
likely to prevent insurgent gangs like the Boko Haram group from emerging and 
wrecking violence on the Nigerian people will benefit from the HNT principle of 
mediation in violent conflicts, reconciliation efforts and nonviolent communication used 
in restorative justice structures in some countries of the world (Danielsen, 2005). 
Through the use of the theoretical framework of case study approach which offers the 
researcher the opportunity to gather or generate rich data (Creswell, 2013), attempts were 
made to answer the research question relating to public policy measures that are a 




The conceptual framework for this study is that operative and efficient public 
policy response mechanism for violence redress and reduction has the potential to end the 
mayhem of the Boko Haram insurgency and other related violence witnessed in Nigeria. 
Therefore, concerted efforts must be made to improve the understanding of the various 
measures that are put in place to halt the violence on the Nigerian public and as well as 
effectively ameliorate the dangerous impacts of the violence. 
To effectively conduct this research, I used a qualitative case study approach to 
explore and describe the concepts found in the public policy response to violence, with a 
focus on the Boko Haram insurgency. The process of the research was based on data 
collected through an open-ended interview procedure (Creswell, 2013). 
The Concept 
Violence, mass deaths and injuries caused by terrorist attacks are often geared 
towards achieving a particular goal (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 2013). The rationale for 
improving the understanding of public policy measures that will end the Boko Haram 
violence is to be able to articulate security policies that will take all aspects of the 
national lives of Nigerians into consideration. There is need to look beyond the usual 
state-centric approach to a more holistic approach that includes human security, where 
the people are put at the center of national security policy (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 
2013; Ewa, 2017). The public policy response mechanism for violence redress and 
reduction has the potential to end the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. 
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The Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria, has been one of the most 
active conflicts in the world when considered in terms of the frequency of attacks, scale 
of killings and destruction of lives and property (; Botha et al., 2017; Ibrahim et al., 2015; 
Nigeria Security Tracker, 2014). The Boko Haram metamorphosed from a group of 
radical Salafi proselytizers to a terrorist organization that have engaged in a fearsome 
insurgency that has claimed the lives of thousands of people, displaced millions more, 
and destroyed properties worth billions of naira in local currency (Ibrahim et al., 2015). 
Boko Haram’s ideology is part of a global Salafist Islamic ideological movement that 
seeks the imposition of its own interpretation of Islamic law. 
Onuoha (2013), observed that Salafism seeks to purge Islam of outside influences 
and strives for a return to the Islam practiced by the “pious ancestors” of the early Islamic 
community. Onuoha stated that Salafism stresses adherence to a rigorist interpretation of 
the Quran and the Hadith and aims at reforming the personal behavior of every Muslim. 
He further stated that Salafism believes that it is the duty of every Muslim to advise other 
believers to change their ways of life, and they could use violence to bring about such 
radical change (Onuoha, 2013, p. 409). 
With this goal in view, Boko Haram acquired military training from within and 
outside Nigeria and obtained such weapons like the General Purpose Machine Guns, 
Rocket Propelled Grenades, rocket launchers, AK47 rifles, SAM-7 anti-aircraft and anti-
tank missiles and bombs It also acquired the rudimentary technology of Improvised 
Explosive Devices (Alade, 2016; Ewa, 2017). Boko Haram used these weapons to launch 
a most ferocious, savage and terrorist war against Nigeria and its citizens, mapping out 
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the entire north eastern Nigeria as its immediate base and area of operation, and by 
middle of 2014, it had, in what seemed like lightening operations, conquered and brought 
under its control about 21,545 square kilometer of territory in north eastern Nigeria (Ewa, 
2017). Ewa noted that Boko Haram’s ultimate goal was to establish by means of a jihad, 
an Islamic state in the north east, and then use it as a base to conquer the rest of Nigeria 
and the West African sub-region. The subjugated territory was to be designated as 
Islamic State West African Province – an area to be developed as a province of ISIS 
(Ewa, 2017). 
It has therefore become necessary that authorities and stakeholders in Nigeria 
make efforts to improve the understanding of the various policy measures that will 
constitute appropriate and adequate responses to the Boko Haram violence (Aghedo & 
Osunmah, 2012; Omale, 2013). Yoroms (2013) observed that the institutional responses 
to sensitive security issues like that of Boko Haram are not only weak but thwarted by 
established primordial inclination to cleavages that are sharply divided. That as a result of 
this sharp contradiction, state institutions only react to security issues based on policy 
impulse and not by rational or systematic policy approach (Yoroms, 2013). 
Public policy response to Boko Haram violence must provide a holistic 
framework that includes both the soft and hard power approaches, and these approaches 
must be synchronized in a way that will spell out the duty and responsibilities of agencies 
and individuals involved in the counter insurgency efforts (Ojelade, 2018). 
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Review and Synthesis of Studies Related to the Concept 
Obafemi and Galadima (2013) examined the natures, types and dynamics of 
insurgencies in Nigeria as well as the diagnostic review of the insurgencies, including 
their sources, causes and remedies. They observed that insurgency is a strategy adopted 
by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means, but 
by protracted asymmetric violence; ambiguity; the use of complex terrain (jungles, 
mountains and densely populated urban centers); psychological warfare and political 
mobilization. Obafemi and Galadima posited that the insurgent groups use insurgency to 
express real or perceived discontent, and mainly with the aim “to subvert and alter the 
balance of power in their favor” (p. 2). 
Obafemi and Galadima (2013) wrote that insurgent groups have emerged at 
different points in Nigeria’s political history. They listed some of the groups to include: 
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND); the Odua Peoples. 
Congress (OPC); Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra 
(MASSOB); and the Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda’awati wal-Jihad” (meaning People 
Committed to the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad) commonly referred to as Boko Haram. 
Ewa (2017) stressed the necessity for Nigeria’s national security efforts to be 
more dynamic and responsive to a certain range of problems and the issues in the counter 
insurgency operation. The author argued that it is against this background that national 
security would have to be repositioned and refocused in certain aspects, without 
necessarily making any fundamental shift away from its traditional approach to the 
management of threats to national interests by Boko Haram. In his view, counter 
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insurgency (COIN) should either be to defeat, persuade or humble insurgents to an 
agreement or compromise favorable to national interest, return the territory and 
population under contention to safety and normal life, and provide a sustained enabling 
environment for the government to carry out its obligations to the people (Ewa, 2017). 
Ewa therefore advocated for the shift of emphasis from a militarily focused 
security oriented national strategy to a human need focused national security, being 
canvassed by the UN and the US as unsuitable for Nigeria, as it could produce dangerous 
contradictions to the nation. He argued that national security should not continue to focus 
on the use of military and security forces in the safekeeping of the nation (Ewa, 2017, p. 
55). 
Agbiboa (2014) provided a brief literature that offers an insight to understanding 
the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It assessed the Boko Haram insurgency and 
identified the factors that gave rise to its emergence, and the ideology, demands and 
external links of the Sect. Agbiboa also made a critical examination of the responses of 
the Nigerian government thus far and the opinion of Nigerians on the responses by 
government. For instance, in the Muslim north where the Boko Haram has been most 
active, there has been a demand for dialogue with the Sect, while in the south, the 
prevailing opinion is that there cannot be negotiation with terrorists until they end the 
violence that has killed thousands of innocent people (Agbiboa, 2014). 
Agbiboa posited that a significant aspect of the campaign of violence in the north 
is the rigidity of the Nigerian military in dealing with the Boko Haram. He noted that 
resolving the crisis is not an easy task, but “resorting to the unidirectional tactics of 
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military crackdowns can only further complicate matters by militarizing the polity and 
escalating the violence” (Agbiboa, 2014, p. 44). He emphasized that there should be 
efforts to know which choices are strategic and sustainable enough to address the core 
factors that make Nigeria vulnerable to terrorism and to Boko Haram violence (p.48). 
Okene and Olawale (2013) did a critique of the federal government’s counter 
insurgency strategies against Boko Haram and MEND. They examined the counter 
insurgency strategies adopted by the federal government of Nigeria in dealing with the 
insurgencies, with a view to ascertaining their efficacy or otherwise. They noted the 
inconsistency that characterized government’s attitude toward the insurgencies waged by 
Boko Haram and MEND. In the case of Boko Haram, for example, after what appears to 
be a successful crackdown on the Sect in 2009, the Nigerian federal government ‘went to 
rest’ and Boko Haram resurged with violent attacks in 2010. They stated that by the time 
the Boko Haram began to launch deadly attacks again, the federal government was 
caught unawares and had no immediate counter strategy to contain the sect. 
Consequently, and sadly, the government adopted a policy of denial by which it 
pretended that the attacks were not by Boko Haram since the Sect had been destroyed 
(Okene & Olawale, 2013, p. 327). 
Okene and Olawale further noted that as the attacks became more overwhelming, 
audacious and recurrent, the federal government had to accept the fact that the Sect had 
once again become a threat to national security. They reported that it became clear to the 
federal government that the use of military force alone will not contain the sect and as a 
result, the government adopted a carrot and stick approach (Okene & Olawale, 2013) 
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However, Okene and Olawale argued that while the carrot and stick approach of 
the federal government cannot be faulted, its implementation had many flaws—there was 
so much disregard for human rights by the security forces, as during the counter 
insurgency operations, many innocent citizens were killed, many maimed and private 
properties destroyed. They observed that the excesses of the security forces cost them the 
cooperation and goodwill of the people and as a result the military were just groping in 
the dark in their operation against the Boko Haram (Okene & Olawale, 2013). They 
suggested that military and security tactics should be revised and reenacted to suit the 
environment and the strategies to be adopted should take into consideration the 
possibility for enduring peace and rehabilitation. This way, the military will win the 
hearts and minds of the civil populace (p. 338). 
Akpan, Ekanem, and Olofu-Adeoye (2014) argued that the federal government’s 
response to the Boko Haram insurgency which started in 2009 had not been pre-emptive 
or comprehensive, but instead a reactionary approach of always deploying security forces 
– an approach that often achieves little success. Consequently, Boko Haram gained 
advantage through the use of guerrilla warfare tactics of hit and run. They maintained that 
Boko Haram continued to attack innocent Nigerians by using improvised explosive 
devices, kidnapping and shootings. 
Akpan et al. (2014) stated that the factors responsible for the limited performance 
of the Nigerian government in fighting Boko Haram was due to institutions of state that 
are usually weak. They listed such factors to include political instability, the brutal nature 
of security operations, poverty, economic disparity and porosity of the country’s borders 
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(Akpan et al., 2014). They concluded that the federal government should undertake an 
assessment of its counter insurgency strategies in order to know the things that should 
inform government policies and how to effectively develop proactive strategies to 
counter Boko Haram insurgency (Akpan et al., 2014). They also suggested the need to 
discover errors in these responses and to strengthen the institutions of state so as to make 
them work effectively by formulating better counter insurgency policies (Akpan et al., 
2014). 
Justification From Literature for Selection of Concept 
Violence caused by Boko Haram have remained the most conspicuous feature of 
contemporary Nigeria (Babalola & Ayuba, 2015). The Boko Haram have not only killed, 
maimed and abducted innocent citizens, it has also caused the destruction of a hitherto 
thriving socioeconomic life through its method of asymmetric warfare (Babalola & 
Ayuba, 2015). The Boko Haram has been attacking churches, mosques, motor parks, 
schools, markets, prisons, police and military installations, killing and displacing 
hundreds of thousands of people (Gwaza, 2015). 
This magnitude of violence and its attendant threats to security of lives and 
properties have raised serious social and political concerns in Nigeria more than ever 
before (Madu & Madu, 2013), and this is the justification for this study. It is imperative 
that authorities in Nigeria and all stakeholders understand better the public policy 
measures that will end the Boko Haram violence. There is need to look beyond the usual 
state-centric approach to a more holistic approach that includes human security, where 
the people are put at the center of national security policy (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 
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2013; Ewa, 2017). The responses to terrorism have taken various dimensions at the 
national, regional and international levels (Ojelade, 2018; Okafor, 2015;). At the 
international level, for example, the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy, 
contained in General Assembly resolution 60/288, and its review, resolutions 62/272 and 
64/297, provided the strategic framework and policy guidance in the collective efforts of 
the United Nations System on countering terrorist violence (Okafor, 2015). 
In the World Health Organization (WHO) Global status report on violence 
prevention 2014, a key step for effective prevention of violence is to develop a national 
action plan. This way, countries will be able to articulate their priorities in line with how 
violence has negatively impacted them in the areas of health, economic viability and 
safety, and security. The action plan should also provide direction to policy-makers and 
others about what needs to be done and how best to achieve sustainable reductions in 
violence (WHO, 2014) 
Key Concepts and Benefits of the Framework 
A few key concepts have been used in this study, and they include: public policy; 
violence as an agenda for public policy discourse; and the Boko Haram insurgency. 
Concept of Public Policy 
Public policy is an important mechanism for moving a social system from one 
state to another (Sapru, 2012). It has assumed considerable importance in response to the 
increasing complexity of societal organizations and relationships. It is useful in 
understanding the ills prevailing in a society and helps people to cope with the future. It 
helps to shape the future (Ogbeide, 2007). Also, Sapru, reflecting on the usefulness of 
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public policy in understanding particular societal issues and preparing the people for the 
future in view of the identified issues, reminisced Gibson Winter’s statement that “the 
problem of policy is ultimately how the future is grasped and appraised, and that the 
essential meaning of responsibility is accountability in human fulfilment in shaping of the 
society’s future” (p. 10). In talking about public policy, we are referring to those areas 
that are classified or defined as “public” (Dye, 2014, p. 8). Public dimension is mostly 
denoted to as public ownership or control for the purpose of the public. 
The concept of public policy therefore “presupposes that there is an area or 
domain of life which is not private or purely individual but held in common ... the public 
comprises that domain of human activity which is regarded as requiring governmental 
intervention or common” (Eneanya, 2013, p. 220). The implication is that all persons are 
affected by myriad of public policies in their daily lives. The range of public policy is 
wide, from the vital to the trivial. Public policies may deal with such areas as defense, 
environmental protection, health, education, housing, science and technology, peace and 
so on. 
In modern political systems, public policies do not by and large, just happen. 
Rather, they are often designed to accomplish specific goals or produce definite results 
(Sapru, 2012). Nowadays, people expect their governments to do many things for them, 
which could be in the areas of the economy, health, security, infrastructure, education etc. 
Dye (2014) observed that there is hardly any personal or societal problem for which some 
group will not demand a government solution – that is, a public policy designed to 
alleviate personal discomfort or societal unease, as in the case of Boko Haram insurgency 
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in Nigeria, for example. For Dye, people or groups make demand on government because 
only government policies involve legal obligations, have universality and can extend to 
all people in a society (Dye, 2014). He argued that policies become public to the extent 
that they are adopted, implemented and enforced by some government institution. Dye 
concluded that because of government’s involvement, public policies can be legitimate 
and generally acceptable for compliance by all citizens in a given society (p.8). 
From the above view point therefore, public policies can be seen more as 
activities of government (Ozumba, 2014). In practice however, a government rarely has a 
set of guiding principles for all its activities. Important public policies are often made 
more explicit, particularly where the issue of a law, a regulation, or plan is involved 
(Mato & Olasupo, 2014). This therefore permits us to see public policy as a guide which 
government has designed for direction and practice in certain problem areas (Sapru, 
2012). 
Dye (2014) argued that because government does many things, public policy is 
whatever governments choose to do or not to do. Dye espoused that in the society; 
governments regulate conflicts; organizes society to engage in conflict with other 
societies; distributes great varieties of symbolic rewards and material services to 
members of the society and extracts money from society mostly in the form of taxes and 
levies (Dye, 2014). However, a cursory look at this definition would show a gap between 
what governments decides to do and what they actually do. Low-level actions like staff 
recruitment or grant of licenses, for example, may be excluded on grounds that they are 
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not regarded as policy matters (Eneanya, 2013). But the definition however shows policy 
as a decision of government. 
Eneanya (2013) reminisced on various definitions of public policy thus: Public 
policy is deciding at any time or place what objectives and substantive measures should 
be chosen in order to deal with a particular problem (Dimock et al., 1983); Public policy 
is the strategic use of resources to alleviate national problems or governmental concerns 
(Chandler  & Plano, 1988); and lastly, the definition by Freeman  and Sherwoods (1968) 
who saw public policy as the response to the interest in improving the human conditions 
(Eneanya, 2013, p. 220). 
These definitions link policy to purposive or goal-oriented action rather than just 
random behavior or chance occurrences. For Eneanya (2013) “public policies emerge in 
response to policy demands, or those claims for action or inaction as some public issue 
made by other actors, – private citizens, group representatives or legislators and other 
government officials or agencies” (p. 221). In response to policy demands, public 
officials make decisions that give content and direction to public policy. 
In the Nigerian context, public policy would refer to the collective decision of the 
Executive Council of Government on matters which derive their primacy from the 
Constitution as provided for in the chapter on fundamental objectives and directive 
principles of state policy (Mato & Olasupo, 2014, p. 49). It is a fact that society is 
ordered, steered and directed towards desired end or goals by the state through policies. 
This is so because a public policy would have a legally coercive quality (Kpesa, 2012) 
that citizens accept as legitimate, for example, citizens or residents must pay taxes or risk 
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fines or jail sentences. Public policies therefore play crucial role in the state and are 
equally instrumental to the development, or underdevelopment of any given state. It is 
about means and ends, which has to have a relationship to each other (Mato & Olasupo, 
2014; Ozumba, 2014). Whereas, there has been no lack of public policies in Nigeria since 
independence, the paradox of public policy implementation has continued to militate and 
mar the realization of public policy objectives in the country (Ekong, 2016). 
As a proposal for resolving public problems, public policies may emanate from 
groups, individuals, institutions and the civil service. Public policies may be expressed in 
legislative enactments, executive decrees or orders, government official statements, 
government budgets, judicial decisions, and sometimes political party manifestos (Mato 
& Olasupo, 2014, p. 49). Eneanya (2013) noted that in Nigeria, the Civil Service is a key 
factor in policy development and recommendation. That by their strategic location, 
awareness and functions, their recommended responses are often invaluable. While 
appropriate civil service agency or agencies does the preliminary studies of the problem, 
the available options and consequences of alternatives, the legislative bodies are the final 
arena of policy influence activity, where final attempts are made by varying interests to 
shape the content of policy (Eneanya, 2013). 
But Mato and Olasupo, (2014) observed that the world is becoming complex, 
uncertain and unpredictable, and therefore developing policies has become difficult. For 
them, citizens are better informed, have rising expectations and are making growing 
demands for services tailored to their individual needs (p.173). A key policy issue such as 
citizen security and violence prevention would therefore require to be tackled effectively 
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through collective action and hence the need to improve the understanding of public 
policy measures that will best address the Boko Haram mayhem in Nigeria. 
Violence as a Consequence for Public Policy Agenda 
Violence in society has become a problem since the 20th century. Nearly 500,000 
people are killed every year all over the world (WHO, 2014). Violence bedevils progress, 
peace and tranquility of any nation and indeed the world in time and space (Elaigwu, 
2014). WHO (2014) noted that violence has for decades ruined the lives of people 
resulting to drug and alcohol addiction, depression, suicide, school dropout, 
unemployment, and persistent relationship difficulties. People suffer abuse, pains, 
exploitation, and manipulation as a result of violence being meted to them (WHO, 2014). 
The word violence, as is commonly used, defies any precise or commonly 
accepted definition. But WHO (2014) refers to it as the “intentional use of physical force 
or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, or against a group or community that 
either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, 
maldevelopment or deprivation” (p.2). Violence, as Robert Audi, comments, “is an 
unjustified use of force” (Alozieuwa, 2013, p.167). This means that there could be a legal 
and illegal appropriation of force/violence. However, in Audi’s view, legal violence is the 
prerogative of the state. Thus, Alozieuwa concluded that violence is considered illegal 
whenever it is committed by non-state agents. Alozieuwa found further explanation in 
Corsini’s definition that violence is the expression of hostility and rage through physical 
force directed against persons or property. It is aggression in its most extreme and 
unacceptable form, and most investigators conclude it has no therapeutic justification, 
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since there are most constructive and humane ways of expressing anger. Violence 
connotes rough treatment, use of bodily force on others, especially unlawfully, with the 
intention to hurt or harm. It is an act of human inflictions, resulting in physical, sexual, or 
psychological harm (Alozieuwa, 2013, p.168). 
In Nigeria, the burden of violence has been heavy. For a long time, citizens have 
had to live with violence (Elaigwu, 2014). In the northern parts of the country in 
particular, ethnoreligious or communal violence has led to the death of thousands of 
people, the destruction of property, and the displacement of millions of people from their 
homes. Young people have had their hands stained in human blood (Elaigwu, 2014). 
Insecurity looms large in the horizon, and the average citizen is skeptical of assurances 
given by government. It therefore becomes imperative that Nigeria must come up with a 
comprehensive public policy that will guarantee a peaceful and violence-free 
environment necessary for harmonious coexistence and socioeconomic and political 
advancement of the citizens (IPCR, 2016b). The magnitude of violent conflicts Nigeria is 
witnessing is an indication of the need for all stakeholders to devise appropriate 
mechanisms for addressing violent conflicts. The main thrust of government response is 
to use the military to suppress violence, and this may only stop the violence in the short 
term and never address genuine underlying problems (Akinbi, 2015; Albert, 2017; 
Elaigwu, 2014). 
The UNDP stated in its 2014 HDR that “conceptions of security require a view of 
the human person that includes physical and psychological vulnerability, strengths and 
limitations, including limitations in the perception of risk” (p. 77). To this end, analysts 
44 
 
have argued that some risks appear to be intensifying, and this is especially true of 
Nigeria where from armed robbery and kidnapping, ethno-religious and communal 
violence, the country has now graduated to bomb-violence (Afoaku, 2017; Akinbi, 2015; 
Elaigwu, 2014). From the Niger-Delta bombs, Nigeria is now plagued by the Boko 
Haram bombs and street gun-fights with security agencies. Elaigwu (2014) observed that 
no town or place is sacrosanct: churches and mosques, schools, police stations, and even 
military barracks have become targets. Some schools in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe 
states have been attacked, killing innocent children and rendering thousands of them 
without schools (p.29). 
The UNDP HDR for 2014, quoting from its 1994 edition stated that “the world 
can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives” (p.77). The 
people’s perception of threats should therefore offer feedbacks on policy efforts and shed 
light on the burden of fear in their lives. The HDR Report identified three broad issue-
areas where policies and related measures would be of help in addressing violence and 
vulnerability of people in communities. The first area is the anticipation that policies 
should be made to prevent violent conflicts, improve economic stability, and reduce the 
impact of environmental shocks in the form of disease, disasters, loss of lives of loved 
ones and loss of livelihoods. The second is that better social and economic policies can 
advance core capabilities of people, which have the direct advantage of improving human 
resilience in the face of adversities “through better laws and norms and the protection of 
rights” (p. 78). The third broad area relates to requiring policies to reduce or overcome 
restrictions on opportunities and the exercise of choices- protecting choices (UNDP 2014 
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HDR). The report noted that policy response choices may also involve health insurance, 
social protection and active labor and job creation programs and that it is therefore 
important that the greater interest should be that public policies are capable of reducing 
vulnerabilities in the society (UNDP, 2014). 
Eneanya (2013) noted that policy makers are often seen to make choices or feel 
compelled to act on a policy agenda which may be distinguishable from political 
demands generally. He argued that to achieve agenda status, a public problem must first 
be converted into an issue requiring government attention. The experience here however 
may be that the nature and scope of problems may be difficult to specify because they 
may be diffuse or invisible. So, the magnitude and complexity of a problem would depend 
upon its definition (Eneanya, 2013). 
But for Cobb and Elder (1983), as reminisced by Eneanya (2013), there are two 
basic types of agenda: the systematic and governmental or institutional agenda. They 
stated that “systematic agenda consists of all issues that are commonly perceived by 
members of the political community as meriting public attention and as involving matters 
within the legitimate jurisdiction of governmental authority” (p. 297). Systematic agenda 
is essentially a discussion agenda, and most of the items are abstract rather than specific 
or detailed (Eneanya, 2013). Cobb and Elder further noted that institutional or 
governmental agenda on the other hand, has items that range from mandatory to 
discretionary and that discretionary items may be classified as either minor or major. 
Eneanya however added that major discretionary items on a legislative agenda, for 
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example, can include such matters as tax increases or reductions or disaster reliefs (p. 
298). 
In modern societies, many problems and issues will be competing for the attention 
of public officials, who may also have their own preferred ideas to push, but issues such 
as the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria can be rife for a pride of place on public policy 
agenda (Ojelade, 2018). While the return to civil rule remains a remarkable development 
in Nigeria, it is palpable that the country is witnessing a sustained militarized society 
under democratic governance. The critical objective of a counter-insurgency strategy 
(Ojelade, 2018) is to ensure sustainable security of all citizens and residents. 
Boko Haram Insurgency 
Boko Haram insurgency that started smoldering since 2002 erupted in the north 
eastern region of the country in 2009 when Nigeria was writing the epitaph of the Niger 
Delta insurgency with an amnesty program (Ewa, 2017). Hussaini (2017) also noted that 
the Boko Haram insurgency started precisely on July 26, 2009 when a dissident group led 
by Mohammed Yusuf, took up arms against the Nigerian government in a desperate 
move to enforce a self- acclaimed sharia legal system as a replacement to the system of 
government in Nigeria. Ibrahim et al (2015) noted that the Boko Haram insurgency had 
been characterized by high levels of destruction and violence against the population. That 
the insurgency is part of the menace of international terrorism threatening the 
contemporary world and its Nigerian dimension has become the deadliest terrorist 
movement in the world today. 
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They observed that schools have been a particular focus of destruction or damage 
by Boko Haram. That, in states such as Borno, the epicenter of the violence, schools were 
closed for over a year. In August 2013, about 882 classrooms were destroyed in Borno 
state. While in Yobe state, all schools were shut down between June-September 2013 and 
by March 2014, the Federal Government closed five Federal Government Colleges 
(Unity Schools) in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. In the Lake Chad area – in 
Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Nigeria – an estimated 1,100 schools were destroyed in 2015 
alone (Ibrahim, et al, 2015). 
Okene & Olawale, (2013); Ewa, (2017) posited that the Boko Haram insurgency 
is characterized by the use of sophisticated weapons like AK 47 rifles, rocket launchers, 
IEDs, and bombs. The ultimate goal of the Boko Haram has been to establish by means 
of jihad, an Islamic state in the north eastern Nigeria. They plan to use the state as a base 
to conquer the rest of Nigeria and the West African sub-region and then designate the 
subjugated territory as the Islamic State West Africa Province, which is to also be 
developed as a province of ISIS (Ewa, 2017). 
Consequently, Nigeria’s security forces have been faced with daunting 
challenges, made more intractable, by the novel tactics of suicide bombing and hit-and-
run attacks by heavily armed insurgents who are able to strike targets at the times and 
places of their choice (Ibrahim et al., 2015). Ibrahim et al further stated that the religious 
ideology that informed the Boko Haram insurgency provides the movement with 
powerful motivation, making the insurgents fearless in their attacks and fearsome to 
confront. They noted that the religious ideology seems to make it easier to attract highly 
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dedicated recruits, willing to sacrifice their lives for what they believe to be the righteous 
struggle against what they regard as an ungodly political dispensation, whose agents have 
carried out the extra-judicial execution of their leaders and members (Ibrahim et al., 
2015). 
Although the security challenges created by the Boko Haram insurgency appeared 
to be formidable and daunting, the Boko Haram insurgency must be confronted, so that 
normalcy can be restored in the North East, thereby enabling millions of citizens affected 
by the insurgency to rebuild their lives and livelihoods. Therefore, Ewa (2017) suggested 
that as part of the implications and lessons, the government of Nigeria – which is the 
main provider of security – must know that Nigeria no longer has unchallengeable 
monopoly of the means, instruments and use of force and coercion, given the emergence 
of Boko Haram. The shared control of the means and instruments of force and coercion 
with the state by its real and potential enemies, portends danger because the power of the 
state is being gradually eroded (p.44). The Nigerian government must therefore rise to the 
challenge. Ewa argued that the Boko Haram insurgency have brought forth realities that 
will help Nigeria to determine whether or not her national security would be focusing 
more on human needs than on the safekeeping of the country through her military and 
security forces; or whether in the face of any military threat as posed by the insurgency, 




Literature Review Related to Key Concepts and Variables 
The review of literature relating to some key concepts and variables identified in 
the study is provided below. 
Policies and Principles of Internal Security Management 
Section 14 (2) (b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as 
amended) states that, “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose 
of Government” (p. 8). The Constitution has therefore saddled the Government with the 
responsibility of safeguarding people against all forms of threats. 
The thrust of internal security policy of any nation would therefore be to create a 
safe and secure environment for the pursuit of peace, personal well-being, prosperity and 
development of citizens (Imobighe, 2013), and this pre-supposes the application of 
relevant measures necessary to maintain and restore law and order. Mbachu (2013), 
remarked that a policy on internal security is necessary for man to actualize his innate 
potentials, yearnings and aspirations in an atmosphere of peace and tranquility since 
peace is an important factor for development in any nation (p.21). Also, in the view of 
McNamara (1967), “security affects not only the attainment of human aspirations, but 
also the fundamental issue of national survival” found in Mbachu (2013, p.21). For 
human beings, a safe life, without fear, is one of the most basic aspirations. 
In this sense, security must be seen to have a positive impact on the conditions of 
life of the individuals within the state, as well as provide them with the right environment 
for free interaction and for their individual and collective self-improvement and the 
actualization of their legitimate aspirations (Elaigwu, 2014; Imobighe, 2013; Nwolise, 
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2012). Imobighe argued that security affects not only the ability to satisfy needs, but also 
the fundamental issue of individual and collective survival as human persons, including 
societies and nations. It is about a safe and peaceful environment which makes freedom 
possible, and fear, danger, hostility, war, and violence absent (p. 4). 
Nwolise (2012) posited that security can expand horizontally and vertically. He 
stated that horizontal security goes beyond the military to encompass economic, political, 
environmental, social, and other aspects, while vertical security on the other hand, goes 
beyond the state to incorporate and emphasize the individual and social groups, the state 
and humanity at large (Nwolise, 2012, p. 14). Hence policies and principles of internal 
security management must be capable of promoting improved public perception, trust, 
and confidence in the security agencies to rid the society of all forms of violence and 
insecurity. Internal security policy should necessitate a concerted, proportionate, open, 
flexible but effective application of political, economic, social, informational, diplomatic, 
intelligent law enforcement and military responses to insecurity caused by extreme 
violence (Mbachu, 2013). 
The Boko Haram insurgency constitutes one of the greatest threats to internal 
security in Nigeria. In fact, in the words of former President Goodluck Jonathan, “it is 
incontestable that the insurgency waged by Boko haram, characterized by mindless 
violence, and which undermines our freedom, way of life and sovereignty, by far remains 
the greatest threat to our collective security as a nation” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
2014, p. 1). The violence and attendant insecurity of lives and property caused by Boko 
Haram is worrisome. Lives are continually lost due to preventable insecurity. Nigeria is 
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increasingly under threat. Other threats include the Fulani pastoralists attacks on rural 
farming communities; banditry in the north west zone; kidnappings for ransom across the 
country; militancy in the Niger Delta; the incessant community attacks in the north 
central zone; separatist agitations in the south east; and the pervasive corruption and 
poverty (Mbachu, 2013; Ojelade, 2018). For Mbachu, 
These threats have not only challenged the monopoly of the state as primary provider of 
security and general well-being, but they have continued to act as a clog in the wheel of 
progress in Nigeria’s democratic process and overall national security. (p. 167) 
In Nigeria, the security sector is traditionally considered to comprise the military, 
police and intelligence agencies that are mandated by the state through national 
institutions, statues, and policies to use force and violence to defend the state from 
external aggression and insurrection (Onu, 2013). Thus, it can be observed that in the 
current thrust of security policies, troops are often deployed to various parts of the 
country to monitor and maintain law and order (Ojelade, 2018). Although doing this has 
not exactly eliminated acts by misguided individuals or groups such as the Boko Haram 
Islamist sect to rise in violence against the society, it has succeeded in building resilience 
for and mobilization for public safety. 
Regrettably, as observed by Onu (2013, p. 88), Boko Haram has instilled 
widespread insecurity across Nigeria and has increased tensions among ethno-religious 
groups in the country. Onyebuchi and Chigozie, (2013) stated that the Boko Haram is 
against democracy as a system of government; believes it is unlawful for Muslims to 
subject themselves to constitutional governments; does not believe or support political 
parties and has as its major strategic goal to destabilize, degrade, and finally destroy the 
Nigerian nation (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). The Boko haram considers Muslims who 
52 
 
believe in Nigeria and work for the Nigerian government to be legitimate targets of 
attack. Also, the group believes that Islamic scholars, who hold opinions different from 
theirs (Boko Haram), are hypocrites (Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). 
Worse still, they reject peaceful coexistence with Christians and Non-Muslims, 
and states that Muslim civilians who die or lose property as a result of the Boko Haram 
war are making sacrifices for Islam (Golwa & Alozieuwa, 2012). This is perhaps why the 
sect has continued to target civilians going about their daily lives. People cannot know 
who among their fellow subway or bus or airplane passengers, or those standing next to 
them in a crowded spot or sitting next to them in a restaurant, is preparing to launch an 
attack. This therefore imposes a sense of fear and insecurity on the people (Golwa & 
Alozieuwa, 2012, p. 82). 
Towards Nigeria’s National Security Policy and Administration 
Nwolise (2004), believes that security is central to the survival and actualization 
of state policies and development, and that these are largely determined by the level of 
prevailing security stratagem both internally and externally. Creating secure lives in a 
complex, turbulent world entails hard work, and research shows that security building 
activities are often plagued with risks. Some of the risks could be transnational; with 
insecurities associated with war, environmental problems, crime, etc.; and also, with 
individualization and ideological tendencies favoring individual freedom at the expense 
of sacrificing security (Iwu & Oko, 2013, p.285). The onus for national security therefore 
is to protect people and institutions and create an atmosphere that is conducive for the 
pursuit of the aspirations of the people (Elaigwu, 2014). It includes all strategies adopted 
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for the preservation of a nation’s sovereignty and her continued economic and socio-
political values and development (Elaigwu, 2014). 
Since the Nigerian civil war of 1967 – 1970, Nigeria has been facing both latent 
and manifest threats of disintegration and possible extinction as a sovereign state 
(Mbachu, 2013). The numerous internal ethno-religious conflicts, armed attacks, 
kidnappings, assassinations, bombings and the Boko Haram insurgency, has constituted 
great threats to Nigeria’s security as a nation (Mbachu, 2013, p.168). Mbachu suggested 
that in view of these real and potential threats to internal security, efforts should be made 
to constantly review and discuss solutions. 
The fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy in chapter two 
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides that 
the primary purpose of government is the security and welfare of all persons within the 
polity (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). By this, the President of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria is responsible for the safety of all Nigerians, and that all persons within 
Nigeria, whether locals or foreigners, are free from fear of anxiety in any part of the 
country. The Constitution ensures that the security apparatus is such that whenever any 
crime is committed, apprehension, detention and subsequent trial are done speedily 
(Nwogu, 2011, p.43). 
Thus, for Nigeria, the national security policy gave rise to the grand strategy for 
national security. Mbachu (2013, p.169) observed that this strategy provides direction and 
an institutional framework for the overall conduct of state policy including strategies for 
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achieving national security. Mbachu (2013, p. 169) listed the objectives of national 
security policy to include: 
 Securing the territorial integrity of Nigeria through internal and foreign policy 
objectives 
 Promoting the stability of the West African sub-region, Africa and the world at 
large by engaging in peace support operations 
 Combating criminal activities like oil bunkering, cross border banditry and 
religious fanaticism that make Nigeria vulnerable to terrorist attacks 
 Developing and improving the economy of Nigeria so as to create employment, 
achieve food security and improve the standard of living of citizens, and 
 Strengthening of Nigeria’s democratic institutions and values to ensure stability. 
Mbachu (2013) added that this grand strategy should be about using all elements 
of national power in peace and war to actualize national objectives related to national 
security. He stated that it is an overarching concept that guides how nations employ all 
the instruments of national power to shape world events and achieve specific national 
security objectives. For him, this strategy must provide a broad direction for all the 
elements of national power toward achieving a more secure and prosperous future for the 
nation. A well-formulated grand strategy must transcend war and acquire an enduring 
quality that is above the period of relative peace and war (Mbachu, 2013 p.169). 
Buttressing the assertion that the search for security can be universal, Akpan 
(2013, p. 31) observed that almost all countries, except for Costa Rica and Iceland, 
maintain military forces and commit up to 30% of total economic output (GNP) for arms, 
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dedicated to maintain internal security and to starve off external threats. Akpan (2013) 
stressed that governments must therefore maintain armed forces to deter or cope with 
crime, rebellions, secessions, coups and the possible threats from other state or non-state 
actors such as terrorist groups against the lives of their citizens and their private 
activities; and against territorial integrity of a country or its values and way of life. 
In Nigeria, the active involvement of the military to contain violence, given her 
peculiar circumstances, is vital. Defense and security intellectuals have long recognized 
that productive participation in formulation and implementation of national security 
policy is a key responsibility of modern military professionals. To this, Mbachu (2013), 
said, “the ability of military experts to give wise advice and get it listened to by policy-
making officials depends in great measure on their possessing sufficient knowledge in 
key non-military fields and in seeing issues in a broad perspective” (p.169). 
However, there are certain strategic institutions in Nigeria that directly or 
indirectly manage the formulation and implementation of the nation’s security policies. 
There are such institutions as the Nigeria Police Force that was created for the primary 
purpose of maintenance of law and order and for the provision of general security 
(Mbachu, 2013). Other such security agencies include: The State Security Service (SSS); 
the National Intelligence Agency (NIA); the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint 
Intelligence (JIB; Mbachu, 2013, p.180). 
But because no government in the world has the capacity to provide 100% 
security for her people, corporate Private Security Organizations (PSOs) have begun to 
exist on the security landscape in many countries including Nigeria (Osuji, 2013; Udeh 
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2013, Mbachu, 2013). For fear of crime and awareness that public police cannot 
efficiently control crime alone, private security personnel are highly visible in many 
countries, guarding businesses, homes and neighborhoods. At individual levels in Nigeria 
for example, many households engage the services of “mai-guards” (local guardsmen) as 
private watchmen (Osuji, 2013). Mbachu (2013), argued that security has thus become a 
major part of the Nigerian economy, because looking at the best-informed estimates,” 
there had been between 1,500 and 2,000 PSOs in Nigeria, employing in excess of 
100,000 people” (p.25). 
Abrahamsen & Williams, (2005) adduced various reasons for the emergence of 
private security organizations in Nigeria. They noted that the State and the formal 
security organizations like the Police are mostly too weak to provide adequate protection 
and security for majority of its citizens; monopoly on the use of force no longer lies with 
the Police and other security organizations; and that it is the tradition in many societies in 
Africa to engage the services of non-formal security organizations. Furthermore, it is 
believed that the emergence of PSOs can be linked to lack of adequate resources; corrupt 
practices; widespread political interference in security matters by government 
functionaries; resources manipulation; and poor human and resources management 
(Nwolise, 2013). The activities of these private security organizations are however 
overseen by the Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC). The enactment of 
the NSCDC Act in June 2003 by the National Assembly allows the implementation of 
private guards’ matters to be policed, monitored and reported by the NSCDC so as to 
ascertain compliance to stipulated rules and regulations (Osuji, 2013). 
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The caveat for the permission of activities of the PSOs notwithstanding, the 
Nigeria Police is as a matter of policy, the lead statutory agency responsible for the 
conduct of internal security in Nigeria (Osuji, 2013). It has therefore been empowered to 
carry out effective internal security predicated on law enforcement philosophies that are 
driven by seamless technology-enabled intelligence. However, in the event of a large-
scale breakdown in the management of internal security challenges, such as the mindless 
violence orchestrated by the Boko Haram Islamists, the military is brought in through an 
invocation of statutory provisions (Udeh, 2013). 
But the HNT holds that national security should go beyond the management of 
military threats to accommodate human related problems (Adedoyin, 2013). Ewa (2017) 
observed that human needs school of thought believes that non-military issues such as 
poverty, unemployment, safety from hunger, disease, repression, harmful disruption of 
daily life, food security, community, political and environmental security are within the 
domain of national security. 
He argued that national security is inherently dynamic and selective, and that 
outside its traditional focus on the safety of the nation, it could bring into its domain for 
ad hoc attention, any human problem adjudged through threat analysis to be real or 
potential threat to the nation. He concluded that it is not however necessary to bring all 
human problems into the realm of national security, arguing that human problems which 
do not constitute threats to the country should be attended to by the appropriate agencies 
of government (P.47). 
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Counterinsurgency Policy Process in Nigeria 
Based on its experience in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the government of the United States defined counterinsurgency as a “comprehensive 
civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and 
address its root causes” (US State Department, 2009, p.20). Ewa (2017) reinforced this 
perspective by reflecting on the definition provided by R. Scott Moore who earlier saw 
counterinsurgency as an: 
Integrated set of political, economic, social and security measures intended to end and 
prevent recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic and 
social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of insurgency in order to establish 
and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability (p.46). 
Insurgency in all its forms and manifestations constitute one of the most serious 
threats to peace and security in Nigeria – in its overt manifestation, it is largely a bestial 
warfare (Osakwe & Umoh, 2013; Ewa, 2017). A solution to insurgency should therefore 
focus attention to the people in the locale in which the insurgency is rooted and carried 
out (Osakwe & Umoh, 2013). Osakwe and Umoh argued that there is need for a 
competition for the allegiance of the people since the local population forms ground zero 
for both insurgency and counterinsurgency. That failure to woo and court the local 
population will invariably lead to the loss of valuable psychological ground which is the 
most potent battle field in insurgency and counterinsurgency operations (p.391). Ibrahim 
et al (2015) christened the States and Local Governments directly affected by the Boko 
Haram insurgency as the Ground Zero of the crisis. In their view, the Boko Haram 
insurgency poses a direct threat to the sovereignty of Nigeria and the security of citizens, 
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making the Federal Government and its Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) 
and the states and local governments frontline actors in the crisis (Ibrahim et al., 2015). 
Like some countries, and the United States of America, Nigeria operates a 
presidential system of government comprising the executive, legislature and the judiciary. 
In Nigeria, these three arms of government are involved in the policy process 
(Anyaegbunam, 2012). The executive arm which is made up of security agencies, public 
servants, and civil servants executes, enforces and coordinates government policies to 
ascertain that they are implemented as designed or planned (Anyaegbunam, 2012, FGN, 
1999). The legislature (National Assembly) makes the law and may overrule any decision 
from any of the security agencies by repealing laws, and this may affect implementation 
(Eneanya, 2013; Ozumba, 2014). The judiciary interprets policies especially when it 
comes to their specific application (Eneanya, 2013). The National Assembly plays 
significant roles in appropriating funds for the counterinsurgency operations as prescribed 
by the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Anyaegbunam, 2012). 
Developing a counterinsurgency policy towards Boko Haram is a commitment 
towards achieving peace, and security, and reduction of the threat of terrorist violence 
(Ojelade, 2018). An effective counterinsurgency strategy should provide a framework for 
tackling the Boko Haram threat and serve as an institutional system that brings all key 
stakeholders in government and civil society organizations together in a collaborative 




Anyaegbunam, (2012) observed that the policy process involves the issuance of a 
policy statement which usually describes the intention of a government which may be in 
the form of presidential orders, administrative rules and statutes, regulations, legislative 
statutes, and court opinions. He explained that the policy process involves a combination 
of inputs from the three arms of government; the legislature, executive, and judiciary thus 
making them vital in the policy process (Anyaegbunam, 2012). The magnitude of the 
Boko Haram violence made it necessary for the government of Nigeria to adopt some 
policy measures to combat the sect (Ewa, 2017; Dasuki, 2013; Idowu, 2013). 
However, there is a need to make a holistic review of the functions of the arms of 
government in the policy process so as to have an in-depth understanding of the 
counterinsurgency policy process in Nigeria (Ewa, 2017). Akinola & Tella, (2013); 
Akpan et al., (2014) stated that section 305 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria allows the president to make some orders which may or may not 
need the consent of the National Assembly. That the President can declare a state of 
emergency anywhere if he discovers a threat to the security and peace of the country. But 
for Anyaegbunam, (2012), the declaration must secure the approval of the two-thirds 
majority of the parliament and where such proclamation fails to receive the support of the 
two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, it ceases to exist. 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 provides that a state of 
emergency may be declared for 6 months in the first instance and if peace or normalcy is 
not restored, the President can extend it for another 6 months with the approval of the 
National Assembly (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Adibe 
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(2014), recorded that in May 2013, President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in 
Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states which was extended two times but rejected by the 
National Assembly when a third extension was sought. Boko Haram’s continuous attacks 
after the emergency rule dictated the need for a fresh request for the extension of the 
emergency rule (Dasuki, 2013). Unfortunately, the request for extension of the 
emergency rule was not approved by the National Assembly due to the result of an 
evaluation of the earlier ones through an oversight function (Dasuki, 2013). 
In an attempt to destroy the Boko Haram, the federal government as a policy 
measure, suspended telephone communication in three states of Adamawa, Borno and 
Yobe. This was done through the military, which took the responsibility to implement, 
monitor and evaluate the policy (Onapajo, 2017). Other policies were adopted through 
presidential directives and administrative rules and regulations. Such policies included 
the relocation of the military command center, deployment of troops, and the 
establishment of IDP camps (Campbell, 2014; Akinbi, 2015). 
Ozumba (2014) observed that the legislature has important roles to play especially 
as it relates to passing annual budgets, making laws, ratification of treaties and the 
approval of declaration of state of emergency by the President Etc. Also, the passage of 
the Terrorism Prevention Acts of 2011 and its amendment of 2013 were other significant 
roles of the legislature in the counterinsurgency policy process (Dasuki, 2013; Onuoha, 
2014). Udeh (2013) noted that the enactment of Terrorism Prevention Acts 2011 and 
2013 became appropriate in view of the need to attack Bok Haram terrorist group with 
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inputs from the statutory bodies such as National Defense and Security Council; Ministry 
of Justice; and security agencies. 
Ewa (2017), remarked that counterinsurgency efforts have reinforced the 
relevance of collective security and regional cooperation to Nigeria’s national security. 
He argued that without the collective diplomatic and military efforts of neighboring 
countries like Cameroon, Niger and Chad, it would have been difficult for Nigeria’s 
counterinsurgency to achieve the present level of seeming success in the fight against 
Boko Haram. He stressed that the goal of counterinsurgency should be either to defeat, 
persuade, or humble insurgents to an agreement or compromise favorable to national 
interest, return the territory and population under siege to safety and normal life, and 
provide a sustained enabling environment for the government to carry out its obligations 
to the people (Pp.52-53). 
The idea of collective security and cooperation in fighting Boko Haram resonated 
with US military assistance for regional efforts to counter Boko Haram (CRS, 2019). The 
CRS stated that, “bilateral counterterrorism cooperation increased in the aftermath of the 
2009 bombing attempt of a US airliner by a Nigerian national, but was constrained during 
the Jonathan Administration despite US concern over the rising Boko Haram threat” 
(p.20). To strengthen its security arrangements, the government of Nigeria coordinated 
alongside the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Aviation Administration 
and the International Civil Aviation Organization (CRS, 2019). CRS noted that Nigeria’s 
cooperation with the US Department of Defense expanded over the years, thus making 
Nigeria a participant in the State Department’s Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
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Partnership (TSCTP), a United States interagency effort that aims to increase regional 
counterterrorism capabilities and coordination (Pp. 20-21). It is instructive to note that 
Nigeria has played a significant role in peace and stability operations across Africa, and 
the United States has provided her with security assistance that is devoted to improving 
its peacekeeping capabilities (CRS, 2019). 
The Boko Haram Violence in Nigeria 
Violence, mass deaths and injuries caused by terrorists are basically geared 
towards achieving an end, and within a state system, the end can only be but a political 
goal (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 2013, p.71). The Boko Haram insurgency marks another 
phase in the recurring pattern of violence in Nigeria. The growing spate of killings, 
bombings, kidnappings and abductions associated mostly with the “Jama’atu Ahlus 
Sunnah Lidda’awati wal-Jihad” (meaning People Committed to the Prophet’s teachings 
and Jihad) commonly referred to as Boko Haram is worrisome. In their quest to impose 
sharia in some parts of Nigeria, several people have been killed, displaced or orphaned 
(Botha et al., 2017). 
In one of the first recorded violent attacks, Boko Haram attacked the village of 
Kanamma, which was located about a mile away from the area the group was then 
camping. They attacked local government installations and killed about 30 people on 
December 29 2003 (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012, p.102). This attack also coincided with 
a raid on a police station in a near-by Geidam, which Cook (2011, p.4) said, “was to 
obtain weapons for further destabilization.” 
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Other earlier recorded Boko Haram violent activities included those of 7 January 
2004; 23 September 2004; and 10 October 2004, when the sect attacked a police station 
with AK-47 assault rifles in Damboa, attacked police stations in Gwoza and Bama, 
killing 4 Policemen and losing 27 members, and attacked a convoy of 60 Policemen at 
Kala-Balge on Lake Chad, respectively (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012, p.102). During the 
attack at Kala-Balge, 12 Policemen were taken hostage and later executed. In response 
however, the federal government dispatched military troops in a counter attack which left 
several of the sect members dead (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012, p.102). The series of 
onslaughts by the security forces resulted in the killing of scores of the group’s ‘foot’ 
soldiers. Sheik Mohammed Yusuf, the then leader of the group, was also captured and 
later killed in police custody (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 2013). 
However, Adamu (2013) saw this counter attack on the group as an assault and 
argued that it was this action by the Nigerian security forces and the many subsequent 
state sanctioned killings of the various members of the sect that made them resolve from 
July 2009 to metamorphose into a hard-core militia whose modus operandi borrows 
heavily from Al-Shabab of Somalia and GIA of Algeria which centers around fighting 
the government with any means they consider necessary (Adamu, 2013, p.119). 
Adamu (2013) remarked that this resolution was followed by a series of increased 
sniper attacks on security forces (police stations, police and military check points), with 
increased use of both IEDs and ready-made bombs that are dropped near security patrol 
points. These bombs were then remotely exploded. Also included in the violence were 
targeted killings of individuals considered by the sect to have either betrayed them or 
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provided support to the security forces to prosecute them (Adamu, 2013, p.119). Adamu 
further noted that all these was done to create a climate of fear in Maiduguri and which 
later spread to Bauchi (p.120). 
In September 2010, under the sect’s new leader, Abubakar Shekau, the sect’s 
strategy shifted from direct attacks on security personnel with small arms to use of IEDs 
on government installations, public and private gatherings including targeted 
assassinations of political and religious leaders (Adewumi, 2014, p. 5). Adewumi found 
out that the group resorted to act of suicide bombings, and among the earliest ones, were 
the bombing of the Police Force Headquarters and the United Nations Office in 2011, 
which no doubt, jolted the security apparatus of Nigeria and signaled the undeterred 
resolve of the group to scale their violence (p. 5). 
Adamu identified Alhaji Mohammed Manga and Mohammed Abul Burra as the 
suicide bombers that bombed the Police Force Headquarters and the United Nations 
office respectively (Adamu, 2013). Five people including Mohammed Manga, lost their 
lives in the bombing of the Force Headquarters while Burra and twenty-two other people 
were killed in the attack on the United Nations office (Adamu, 2013, pp. 120–121). 
Despite the implicit and sometimes obvious successes of the security agencies in 
curtailing the insurgents, the group has remained emboldened. Agbiboa (2014) recorded 
that between 2011 and 2013, the intensity of the attacks and bombings had increased, 
which included targets such as religious gatherings, churches, mosques, and schools. 
Profiled killings of prominent and vocally isolated Islamic scholars and attempted 
eliminations of revered traditional rulers were also prominent within this period 
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(Agbiboa, 2014). The attacks became too numerous that has made the Nigerian state to 
lose track of the number of deaths. 
Agbiboa (2014) also reported that Boko Haram splinter group, the Ansaru 
(meaning vanguards for the protection of Muslims in Black Africa) attacked and killed 
two Nigerian soldiers from among the troops that were going to Mali on January 19, 
2013. The group claimed this attack was a revenge for the French-led intervention in 
Mali and for the atrocities committed by the West in Afghanistan (Zenn, 2014, p. 26). 
The Ansaru also kidnapped and killed seven foreign workers in February 2013 in the 
north east of Nigeria and blamed the deaths on the then joint Nigerian-British military 
operation that was seeking to free the hostages (Agbiboa, 2014). 
Agbiboa reported that the media in Nigeria also attributed to the Ansaru group of 
the Boko Haram, the killing of four Chinese nationals, three Indians, and one Ghanaian in 
Borno, including the May 2011 kidnap of two Europeans in an Italian construction 
company in Kebbi state, northwestern Nigeria, who were murdered in a botched rescue 
attempt in 2012 (Agbiboa, 2014). Hassan, (2014) also made notes on Boko Haram 
violence. He recorded that the attacks by the Boko Haram on the military and mosques in 
Maiduguri in 2009 resulted to the death of over 700 persons. He further noted that the 
January 2012 attacks in Kano led to the death of at least 185 persons, while in September 
2013, 40 soldiers died from the Kasiya forests in an attack in Borno state, and in April 




What is obvious from these attacks is that Boko Haram has included the general 
public as targets of its violent attacks, and it is to be noted that targeting civilian 
population meets the US State Department’s notion of terrorism as premeditated violence 
against non-combatant audience (Agbiboa, 2014). It can be seen that the sect has 
included in its strategies to kill Christians and security personnel including all those who 
collaborate with security officials as well as Muslim clerics who criticize Boko Haram 
activities. Other of their strategies also include robbing banks; threatening southerners 
and non-Muslims to leave northern Nigeria; and burning down of secular schools (Adibe, 
2012). All of this is to inflict maximum violence on the populace, traumatize the citizenry 
and impose an atmosphere of siege. Also, attacks on particular ethnic groups and places 
of religious worships are a carefully designed strategy to plunge Nigeria into sectarian 
crisis (Golwa & Alozieuwa, 2012, p.82). 
Pieria and Serrano, (2014) found out that the attacks since early 2014 have been 
particularly venomous, with the sect targeting remote villages, markets, hospitals and 
schools. They stated that one of such attacks include that of February 24 2014, where 
attackers killed about 43 male students of Federal Government College, Bunu Yadi in 
Yobe state. Their report indicated another attack, which occurred in Konduga, a village of 
about 35 kilometers from Maiduguri, in which Boko Haram abducted 20 female students 
at Government Girls’ Science College and five female street traders in an attack that 
caused the death of more than 53 people (Pieria & Serrano, 2014). As a result of that 
attack, the Federal Government closed down five federal colleges in the three states of 
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Adamawa, Borno and Yobe - the states where state of emergency was declared (Pieria & 
Serrano, 2014, p.1 4). 
Some analysts have argued that the factors influencing these attacks arose from 
the manner that the operators of the Nigerian State handle national issues, and also, that 
the scale of the attacks is a possible indicator that the sect has operational contact with 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Nwogu, 2011). Nwogu added that the shared Hausa 
ethnicity and conservative form of Islam also made it possible for radical Islamists to 
freely move across Nigeria’s borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroun (Nwogu, 2011, 
p.48). 
Boko Haram Insurgency: A Causal Analysis 
Nigeria is bedeviled by political, economic, religious and social crises that are 
threatening her continued corporate existence as a nation (Elaigwu, 2014), and the Boko 
Haram insurgency is one of the manifestations of these crises. The challenge is that the 
security and sovereignty of Nigeria, public order and citizen security are continuously 
threatened by terrorist violence. Alemika (2013), noted that the Boko Haram insurgency 
has assumed what sociologists referred to as “social problem.” He stated that 
“sociologists describe social problem as an undesirable condition created by 
dysfunctional social, political and economic structures that is pervasive, persistent, and 
destructive in consequences, and which is not effectively controlled by existing 
prevention and control mechanisms and actions” (p.181). 
Boko Haram insurgency is a social problem precipitated by political, economic 
and religious motivations (Agbiboa, 2014; Akinbi, 2015; Onuoha, 2013; Osuji, 2013). 
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But in the context of Nigeria, religious motivation appears to be highest (Onyebuchi 
&Chigozie, 2013). The sect’s teachings were initially Salafis, whose ideology believes in 
sacrosanct Islamic order that has not been tainted by western culture and doctrines of 
other Muslim groups like the Sufis and the Shiites (Nwogu, 2011, p.48). Salafis believe 
that Islamic revival can only come about by purging foreign influences from the doctrine 
and emulating the early generations of Muslims. Alonge (2012) stated that Boko Haram 
believes that women, for example, have become ‘loose’ because westernization and 
secularization encouraged it. That Boko Haram often argue that rather than make people 
enlightened and holy, western education and its associated civilization was churning out 
thieves, whores, and gangsters because they are being taught the culture and ways of the 
West, including its lewd language, dressing and apparent godlessness (p.49). 
While there are several arguments for the motivation and fueling of the 
insurgency, it appears that the pursuit of the religious ideology remains dominant. In 
rejecting western education, the sect sought to impose sharia across all Nigerian states 
(Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013). It is worthwhile to note that religion-inspired violence 
appears to be highest under certain circumstances, which in most cases, are true of 
Nigeria. Alemika (2013) stated these circumstances such as when: 
 There is little or no cross-cutting relations and loyalties among people in a 
community. 
 A society is made up of two or three dominant religions with large followers. In 
such context, religion tends to be divisive with potential for inter-religious 
violence (Osuji, 2013). 
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 Socio-economic and political grievances are expressed in religious terms. This 
can result to prolonged or recurring devastating violent conflicts. 
 Societies where being an adherent of a given religion gives economic and political 
advantages due to the way and manner the affairs of government are conducted, 
and 
 The religious groups have different levels of disposition to violence and terrorism 
(Alemika, 2013, pp. 190–191). 
Nigeria is a country with the sixth largest Muslim population in the world. It is the 
world’s largest country to have approximately equal numbers of Christians and Muslims 
(Kwanashie, 2013, p.165). Many people feel that the secular nature of Nigeria is an idea 
that the Boko Haram is not comfortable with, and hence the drive for Jihadist movement 
that is leading them to attack churches, public schools and other symbols of faith it deems 
apostate (Kwanashie, 2013, p.165). Obadofin (2012) expatiated on this when he stated 
that religion is linked to terrorism and has political undertone. He explained that the 
Islamic fundamentalists who received training as suicide bombers are indoctrinated to 
believe that if they kill unbelievers, great reward of paradise awaits them, including 
access to very young ladies that are capable of giving sexual satisfaction (p.35). 
Some scholars however attribute the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency to 
widespread disenchantment of citizens with the Nigerian state arising from its failure to 
meet its obligations to the people, and the perception that state policies are implemented 
only to advance private interests for personal accumulation (Akpan, 2013; Albert, 2017; 
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Barkindo, 2016). There is extensive opinion and evidence to suggest that the citizens are 
getting a raw deal from the State (Nwogu, 2011, p.50). 
Kwanashie (2013) argued that the vast majority of Nigerian citizens live on less 
than $2 per day while corrupt elites siphon off millions of dollars. He pointed out that 
widespread poverty provides a fertile ground for insurgency, stressing that a large pool of 
citizens that are marginalized and pauperized are easy to mobilize and indoctrinate to join 
any form of insurgency. He added that when a segment of the population sees no hope in 
the system and cannot identify with the goals and aspirations of the nation, then it would 
be difficult to extract any loyalty and patriotism that is required of citizens (Kwanashie, 
2013, p.161). 
While poverty and economic marginalization does not automatically lead to 
insurgency, evidence from history suggests that this can easily lead to frustration of the 
affected segment of the society thus making them to be aggressive (Adibe, 2012). For 
Adibe, the frustration-aggression hypothesis, otherwise known as frustration-aggression 
displacement theory supports this assertion. Reflecting on the work of Dullard and his 
colleagues, Adibe asserted that frustration causes aggression and when the source of the 
frustration cannot be challenged, the aggression gets vented on an innocent target (p.56). 
Akpan, (2013) also observed that there is widespread feeling that the Boko Haram 
insurgency is a product of frustration of the segment of the society due largely to the way 
and manner government business is conducted. That the level of disaffection among 
different sections of the population gave rise to racial manifestations and fundamentalist 
ideologies like Boko Haram to thrive and wreak havoc in Nigeria. 
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However, Okpara (2013) argued that the existence of frustration does not always 
lead to aggression, given that frustration may have other consequences, which may 
include instigation to certain kind of aggression. The author stated that frustration-
aggression theory does not very much account for the reason for violence by Boko Haram 
because most of the victims of Boko Haram attacks are ordinary people who are already 
victims of the social conditions that Boko Haram claims to be fighting to change (p.232). 
A further argument is that bad as the insurgency may be, there is always a 
constituency that benefits from or expects to benefit from it (Kwanashie, 2013). Often, 
this segment of the society finds that the outcome of a particular insurgence will be to 
their advantage or that the process of counter insurgency benefits them. To this, 
Kwanashie (2013) noted that “when this constituency is large, the effort to combat the 
insurgency is often difficult” (p.146). 
There are diverse arguments for and against this assertion with respect to 
Nigeria’s Boko Haram insurgency. Some people argue that many Muslims in Nigeria like 
what is happening because according to them every Muslim is enjoined to carry out Jihad 
(World Council of Churches, 2012), while others argue that arms dealers [and even some 
officials of government’s security top hierarchy] are happy because of the economic 
benefits they are corruptly getting from the insurgency (Kwanashie, 2013). The result is 
that there is a tacit acceptance, collusion or indifference to the insurgency by a sizeable 
segment of the society (Kwanashie, 2013, P.146). 
Adesoji (2011) added that partisan politics and a culture of political patronage are 
also playing significant roles in the sustenance of the Boko Haram insurgency. The 
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competition for political power as a means of resource allocation has meant that the 
ethnic elites within the Nigerian state have had to fall back on what can and will enhance 
their prospects for capturing and retaining power for their immediate constituency. 
Perhaps that is why Fafowora (2013) argued that the Boko Haram insurgency is a 
product of political and social process that failed to ensure an even development in 
Nigeria, with the north trailing far behind the south in economic and social development. 
Fafowora sees the insurgency as a symptom of a deep-seated malaise that can be traced to 
the colonial policies adopted by the colonial masters, when the northern leaders 
surreptitiously among other forms of negligence, failed to invest in the education of their 
people. He argued that the army of uneducated youths, today, provides a ready pool from 
which the Boko Haram could make its recruits (Fafowora, 2013, p.8). 
The above assertion can be corroborated with what Enwere (2013) wrote on the 
factors responsible for civil insurgency in Nigeria. Enwere stated that “the failure of the 
state to provide the greatest benefits to the greatest number of citizens either in their 
individual or collective pursuits of happiness is another factor which generates the violent 
outbreak of civil insurgency in Nigeria” (p.241). Arguing further, he averred that the 
political and economic environment in which Nigerians live as well as the failure of the 
state to meet its obligations to the people are the factors responsible for civil insurgency 
in Nigeria, the genesis of which he traced to the Aba Women’s riot of 1929, when the 
women protested against a ferocious tax system by the colonial masters and a group of 
disgruntled peasants and radical clerics and slaves, otherwise called, the Mahadest 
revolutionary sect (p. 242). 
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Types of Insurgencies in Nigeria 
Groups that cannot achieve their political objectives through conventional means, 
adopts insurgency as a strategy. These groups do this through asymmetric violence, use 
of complex terrain, use of psychological warfare, political mobilization, killings and 
massive destruction of properties (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 2013). In the history of 
states, insurgencies are not new. They date back to ancient times, as far back as the old 
civilizations of the Greek city state and the Roman Empire, when the rulers of these 
ancient civilizations often had to face the challenges of insurgencies, insurrections and 
revolts (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 2013). In Nigeria, various insurgent groups have 
emerged at different times in the course of her political history. Akpotor & 
Oromareghake (2013) and Fadile, (2013) listed these groups to include: the Movement 
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND); Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Ogoni People; the Odua People’s Congress (OPC); Movement for the Actualization of 
the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); and the Jama’atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda’awati 
wal-Jihad (Boko Haram). 
In trying to describe the types of insurgencies experienced in Nigeria, Akpotor 
and Oromareghake (2013) observed that the insurgency in the Niger Delta region is an 
unfinished business of Isaac Adaka Boro’s militancy to that of Saro Wiwa of the Ogoni 
and on to the one led by Tony Engurubu. They added that the insurgency by MASSOB 
and OPC is the consequence of the civil war of the First Republic and the aborted Third 
Republic denial of M.K.O Abiola’s electoral victory. To him the Boko Haram insurgency 
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is the climax of pre-independence anti-south riots in Kano, and on to the 1966 crisis; the 
civil war; and the Sharia crisis in the 1977- 1978 Constituent Assembly debate (p.73). 
Others are Egbesu Boys; Bakassi Boys and the Maitatsine religious sect that 
operated in Kano, Borno and Adamawa states in the 1980s. Ochoeche (2013, p.351) 
observed that these groups often have uncontrolled access to illicit arms and their modus 
operandi include hostage taking, assassination, burning properties, looting, raping and 
maiming of their victims. Fafowora (2013) noted that there has been a surge in both the 
tempo and range of global insurgencies and terrorism, and sadly, Nigeria is one of the 
latest to be added to the list of countries affected by sectarian insurgencies. He stated that, 
“of some fifteen countries surveyed in 2011 by the US Department of State for 
Terrorism, Nigeria ranked fifth. It also ranked fifteenth in kidnappings reported, and 
since then, the tempo of terrorist attacks and kidnappings has greatly increased” (p.1). 
Nigeria’s population is largely dominated by three ethnic groups: The Yoruba; 
Igbo and Hausa-Fulani. These groups are dominant in the West, East and North of 
Nigeria respectively. However, there are over 250 other ethnic groups of diverse 
population sizes (Fafowora, 2013). Populations in which insurgents seek support are 
usually heterogeneous, cutting across many ethnic groups such as the case of Nigeria. 
Alli (2013) corroborated this when he remarked that Nigeria witnessed serious security 
challenges during the fourth Republic which manifested in the rise of ethnic pressure and 
agitations for self-determination by various groups like the Arewa Youths Congress 
(AYC); Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); 
Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND); Odua Peoples’ Congress 
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(OPC); and the Ijaw Youths Congress (IYC). These groups have engaged in terrorist 
activities against the State (Alli, 2013, p.481). 
Ker (2013) noted that the insurgents use six different methods with which they 
seek support or make recruitments from these ethnic groups, and these include 
charismatic attraction; esoteric appeals; exoteric appeals; terrorism; provocation of 
government counter-terrorism; and demonstration of potency (Ker, 2013, p.212). Ethnic 
cum separatist violence that contains elements of terrorist insurgency also finds 
expression in the activities of MASSOB and lately IPOB. The IPOB is an Igbo ethnic 
militia advocating for secession from Nigeria. Since its formation, IPOB has engaged in 
several bold strategies and tactics to press its case as the leading movement of the 
agitation for the self determination of the Igbo people. IPOB finds its origin and 
foundation around the conditions of the Igbo in Nigeria and the circumstances in which it 
became part of the Nigerian federation. Nwala (2012) revealed that MASSOB (now 
IPOB) has been lamenting the manner in which the Igbo people were forcefully brought 
into a federation in which they are rejected, victimized and killed recklessly (p.42). 
He reported that the MASSOB is arguing that the amalgamation of Southern and 
Northern Nigeria without due consultation with the people was a contraption of the 
British to serve British interests. In trying to forge an ethnic agenda, therefore, Mr. Ralph 
Uwazurike (leader of MASSOB), is calling on Igbos to turn their back on the fake 
democracy that is denying them their fair share of the ‘national cake’ (Nwala, 2012). 
Occasionally, the group would apply the weapon of civil disobedience by sporadically 
hoisting the Biafran flag in cities like Aba, Okigwe and Onitsha in the South Eastern 
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region of Nigeria. Often, the Nigeria Police Force immediately de-hoist such flags 
(Opukri & Etekpe, 2013, p. 364). 
However, unlike the other insurgent groups, Obafemi & Galadima (2012) 
observed that the Boko Haram sect is dangerously exploiting Nigeria’s precarious 
sectarian fault lines to fracture the country. They argued that the Boko Haram insurgency 
is a product of a political and social process that seeks to remove the secular system of 
government and establish Islamic sharia law in the country, and that it is loosely 
modelled on the Algerian Islamist group turned Pan-Maghreb jihadi organization AQIM. 
The group has an ideology similar to the one espoused by al-Qaeda with nearly 
coincidental goals and objectives as well as employs conventional terrorist tactics 
(Obafemi & Galadima 2012). 
Taken together, the use of violence by MEND, OPC, MASSOB and IPOB, Boko 
Haram and other insurgent groups in Nigeria to draw the attention of government to 
repressed grievances suggests issues that are potentially dangerous for the continuous 
survival of Nigeria as one indivisible sovereign state, and can be likened to what Regan, 
Frank and Aydin (2010) referred to as the conditions of civil war in a State. From the 
Regan’s Interventions in Civil Wars (ICW), civil war refers to “armed combat between 
groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities” (Aydin, 2010, p. 
54). To use one or two or a combination of these explanations to look at the case of 
insurgencies in Nigeria, it can be argued that there is a war in Nigeria with the OPC 
creating the sparks; the MASSOB and IPOB turning them into flames; the Niger Delta 
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insurgents feeding the flames and the Boko Haram raising the bar of these bloody 
encounters (Akpan, 2013, p.67). 
Nigerian Government Response to Boko Haram Violence 
Nigeria’s experience shows that micro-nationalism and religion- inspired violence 
has become more vicious and better organized (Ibrahim et al., 2015). Forms of violence 
ranging from kidnapping, hostage-taking and assassination to bombing have grown in 
sophistication. Opukri and Etekpe (2013) observed that Nigeria experienced the first 
terrorist act in 1985 when Dele Giwa, a Nigerian journalist was killed through a letter 
bomb. They noted that this was followed by the Maitatsine religious uprising in 1987; the 
Niger Delta crises in the 1990s and now Boko Haram (Opukri & Etekpe, 2013). The 
Boko Haram evolved from a sect that waged poorly planned ‘hit and run’ attacks on state 
security establishments to one that increasingly uses IEDs, targeted assassination, drive-
by shooting and suicide bombings in its violent campaign (Agbiboa, 2014). 
Towards this, Onuoha (2013), agreed with the 2011 Global Terrorism Index 
report released by the Institute for Economics and Peace that Nigeria ranked seventh 
among the countries most affected by global terrorism following violent attacks by Boko 
Haram. The Global Terrorism Index, which is a comprehensive attempt to account for 
direct and relative impact of terrorism in 158 countries in terms of its effect on lives lost, 
injuries and property damaged, showed Nigeria ranked only marginally better than 
Somalia, the other sub-Saharan African country in the top 10 (p.407). 
The implication of this is for Nigeria to set in motion the processes of achieving 
active peace and perfect security. The many conflicts and crises in the country, including 
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the Boko Haram insurgency should be used as facilitator of the much-desired peace and 
security (IPCR, 2016b). Threats delineate the character of the security question, and the 
security needs define the nature of defense doctrine, which determines the dynamics of 
defense strategy, and while trying to achieve these, efforts must be holistic rather than the 
often trial-and-error approach (IPCR, 2016b). For Nigeria, this response strategy has not 
worked. Akpan (2013) argued that: 
If one is lost in a forest, trial and error could be a useful procedure. But trial and error 
applied to dispute or conflict situations, in which the quality of life and life itself may be 
at stake, is unacceptable (p.29). 
The counter-terrorism measures adopted by the Nigerian government in tackling 
the Boko Haram insurgency have not yielded much result (Ojelade, 2018). Unumen 
(2014) found out that government responses to the activities of Boko Haram have been a 
mixture of good and bad. To him, the good initiatives implemented include accepting to 
negotiate with the members of the sect when they come out to identify themselves; 
initiating a program to integrate the almajeri education system into the formal school 
system; and setting up a panel to investigate the root causes of violence in the north 
eastern Nigeria. Unumen identified other good measures as the invitation to all northern 
leaders, including former heads of state, to a round table meeting aimed at finding lasting 
solutions to the Boko Haram problem; increased budgetary funding to security; signing 
into law the terrorism prevention Act; enhanced border security with neighboring 
countries; declaration of state of emergency in some of the affected states; and sending 
some members of the security forces to the United States for training in counter terrorism 
and bomb disposal (Unumen, 2014, p.242). 
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On the bad initiatives, Unumen observed that demolishing buildings suspected to 
be owned or used by members of the sect, and in some cases whole communities is 
counterproductive. He noted that while doing this, relations of suspected members of the 
sect, including their wives, brothers, parents and children have been arrested and detained 
for long periods for offences they did not commit. He observed that the demolition of 
houses and communities used by suspected terrorists are usually preceded by gun battles 
lasting hours between the inhabitants and the Nigerian security operatives and as a result, 
women, children and other vulnerable groups often get caught up in the crossfire or even 
killed (Unumen, 2014, p.242). Fafowora (2013, p.17) assessed this response strategy and 
noted that the Nigerian security forces have failed in their attempt to effectively tackle the 
Boko Haram terrorists in spite of the fact that they have stepped up their activities and 
operations in the north east. He concluded that the application of military force to counter 
the Boko Haram by the authorities have being without much success. 
But Onuoha (2013, p.423) in his view argued that the deployment of special 
security forces as offensive against the sect had been partly successful. He observed that 
the use of military patrol vehicles equipped to detect hidden bombs and other weapons 
within a radius of 50 meters is a response strategy that has worked well. With this 
strategy, the vehicles are put on the roads in suspected Boko Haram hideouts in densely 
populated areas of the city, and once bombs or weapons are detected, security operatives 
move into the area to effect arrests and seize weapons. He reported that, “many leaders of 
the sect had been arrested in this way” (P.423). Considering the fact that the Boko Haram 
has defied the action of the security forces and that countering the sect with force alone 
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may not yield the desired results, the Nigerian federal government considered some other 
response strategies, such as former President Obasanjo- led peace initiative; the Ibrahim 
Datti Peace Meeting and the setting up of Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari Committee, 
among others (Opukri & Etekpe, 2013, p.374). 
Opukri & Etekpe reported that the President Obasanjo Peace Meeting with the 
family of Late Mohammed Yusuf (the generally acclaimed founder of Boko Haram) took 
place on 15 September 2011. But that earlier on in the day, Obasanjo had joint peace 
meetings with the Jamatul Nasril Islam, (JNI); Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN); 
and Plateau State Leaders of Thought in Jos. Opukri & Etekpe stated that Obasanjo 
pleaded with Yusuf’s family to prevail on Boko Haram members to sheathe their sword 
and to stop the spate of bombings nationwide (p.374). Assessing this gesture however, 
Okene and Olawale (2013) saw this as failed intervention apparently because the 
Obasanjo led delegation did not visit the members of the sect but only limited themselves 
to the family members of the erstwhile leader, Mohammed Yusuf. The Sect members felt 
provoked and therefore rejected the intervention (p.336). Again, the federal government 
initiated a peace move through Ahmad Salkida (a veteran journalist) and Dr. Ibrahim 
Datti. Unfortunately, it failed in its objective to placate the sect. The reasons for this 
failure according to Okene and Olawale (2013) were the hawkish stance of some people 
in government who believed that reconciling with the sect was a doubly reprehensible 
and dishonorable course. These people were opposed to any form of discussion with 




In August 2011, the federal government inaugurated the Committee on Security 
Challenges posed by Boko Haram, led by Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari (Onuorah, 
2011). Onuorah commented that the Report decried the general failure of effective and 
coordinated intelligence gathering and its deployment to forestall attacks by Boko Haram. 
The Report also condemned the alarming rate of poverty and illiteracy in the North –East 
region of Nigeria; massive unemployment of youths; existence of private militias 
established and used by politicians who later dump them; presence of large number of 
almajeris (street children) who are easily used to ignite and sustain violence; influx of 
illegal aliens resulting from porous and unmanned borders; and failure of government to 
deliver social services (Onuorah, 2011). The Committee recommended that the federal 
government should consider the option of dialogue and negotiation to contain the 
insurgency, after which the members of the sect should be rehabilitated. But that the 
dialogue should be contingent upon the sect’s renunciation of all forms of violence and 
surrender of arms (Onuorah, 2011). 
A careful look at the recommendation shows that it appears to suggest that 
another amnesty program should be declared for the Boko Haram terrorists in the manner 
Late President Yar’Adua did for the Niger Delta militants. Opukri and Etekpe (2013) 
however saw this recommendation as defective because the circumstance under which 
militancy emerged in the Niger Delta was not the same as Boko Haram. They argued that 
whereas the Niger Delta militants were advocating for the implementation of fiscal 
federalism and resource control, resource ownership and management as enshrined in the 
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1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, nobody exactly know the 
grievances of Boko Haram insurgents (Opukri & Etekpe 2013, p.375). 
To respond to terrorist violence, Albert, (2017) observed that the federal 
government has begun to invest in the military to enhance its capability in not only to 
resist external aggression but to also counter internal security threats, seeing that, like in 
most other countries, coercive power and military force play fundamental roles in the 
management of security (Albert, 2017). They ensure maintenance of national security by 
reinforcing adequacy of military capability and mobility. But more than this is the need 
for swift response by the authorities to stop terrorist acts through a well-coordinated 
intelligence gathering where the terrorists will be vulnerable and exposed before they 
bomb their target (Bappah, 2016; Ojelade, 2018). 
On the military efforts, Hussaini (2017) observed that after the resurgence of 
Boko Haram activities in 2010, the government of Nigeria adopted series of measures to 
contain the threat. He identified the first measure as the creation of Joint Task Force 
(JTF) in 2011, with membership drawn from various security agencies like the Military, 
Police, Immigration, Customs and the State Security Service. The JTF adopted measures 
such as imposition of dusk to dawn curfew; ban on the use of motorcycles; stop-and-
search operation along township roads throughout the country; cordon-and-search 
operations on suspected hideouts of the Boko Haram members; and the mopping up of 
non-military rifles (Hussaini, 2017). 
Hussaini also noted that in May, 2013, the federal government declared and 
enforced a six months State of Emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, to 
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improve the efficiency of military operations. This measure was renewed three times 
until 2015 (Hussaini, 2017). However, on August 25, 2013, the Nigerian Army 
Headquarters disbanded the JTF and created Nigerian Army Seven Division led by Major 
General Obidah Ethan (Hussaini, 2017). He reported that this development was followed 
by the creation of more military formations, deployment of more troops and logistics for 
effective operations against the terrorists. That before the insurgency, Borno state, for 
example, had only 21 Armored Brigade and 4 Battalions in Biu, Bama, Maiduguri and 
Monguno towns. But this increased to two Military Divisions, seven different Brigades 
and many Battalions, all overseen by the Theatre Command. Also, President 
Muhammadu Buhari ordered the relocation of the Command and Control Centre of the 
Military operation from Abuja to Maiduguri, to add impetus to the containment efforts of 
the military (Hussaini, 2017). He stated that one key achievement in the containment 
efforts was the implementation of the decision of African Union (AU) Peace and Security 
Council Committee meeting held on 29th January, 2014, in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, in 
which the Committee ratified the formation of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) 
by members of Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) made up of Nigeria, Cameroon, 
Chad, Niger and Benin Republic (Hussaini, 2017). 
Assessing the functionality of MNJTF, Albert (2017) identified its key mandate to 
include the prevention of Boko Haram from having free access to the borders of member 
states of LCB; increasing the number of troops; transferring the management of the force 
to the Lake Chad Basin Commission; the relocation of the headquarters of the MNJTF 
from Baga in Nigeria to N’Djaména in Chad; and giving the position of the Force’s 
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commander to Nigeria (Albert, (2017). He observed that following General Buratai’s 
appointment as Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff in July 2015, Major General Illiya Abbah 
(another Nigerian) was appointed as new Commander of the MNJTF. General Buratai 
was appointed as the Commander of the MNJTF in May 2015 (Albert, 2017). These 
changes were to reinvigorate the MNJTF and refocus it for a better performance in the 
fight against Boko Haram. 
Albert noted that the key assignment of the MNJTF in the fight against Boko 
Haram was to secure the borders between the LCB countries, and having secured the 
borders, each of the member countries is expected to flush out Boko Haram from its 
territory. In Nigeria, for example, the force responsible for the flushing of Boko Haram 
was code named, operation lafiya dole (peace by force). This is the force fighting the 
insurgents in various parts of north-eastern Nigeria, most especially the Sambisa forest 
(Albert, 2017). While it cannot be said that this security arrangement is not entirely 
without its challenges, it has indeed significantly contributed to the degrading of the 
capacity of Boko Haram. In Nigeria particularly, Albert recorded that: 
The operations of the MNJTF have limited the activities of Boko Haram to the vast 
Sambisa forest, and their supply lines from neighboring countries have been totally cut 
off and that their capacity to launch suicide attacks on Nigerian cities has been drastically 
curtailed (p.126). 
Boko Haram and the increasing Cross Border Linkages 
The Boko Haram insurgency started as a weak, disorganized, loosely coordinated 
and inchoate movement (Akpan, 2013). But research has shown that it has transformed to 
a group that has the capacity to pose serious threats to the peace and stability of Nigeria. 
As observed by Obafemi & Galadima (2013), “it has developed the capability for 
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strategic terrorism, strategic intelligence and the building of wide-ranging linkages to 
subvert the Nigerian state” (p.3). 
Boko Haram’s proficiency in the use of explosives and operational tempo as well 
as its tactical sophistication and aggressiveness indicate some external support. As 
observed by Fafowora (2013), some of the leaders of the sect are believed to have 
received their military training on the use of arms in Pakistan and the Yemen. Also, 
assessing key factors contributing to the success of an insurgency, Ker (2013) alluded to 
the external support Boko Haram is getting from international terrorist organizations like 
the Al Shabab of Somalia and AQIM and the Sahel region. He reported that Boko Haram 
has international links and sympathy - it is enjoying assistance in monetary, weapon, 
medical and training support. Sanctuaries are provided in which the sect train, stockpile 
arms, plan operations and escape home government retribution (Ker, 2013). While the 
sect initially relied on donations from members, its links with Al Qaeda has opened it up 
to more funding from groups in Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the Al Muntada Trust 
Fund, and the Islamic World Society (Ker, 2013, p.217). 
The Report by Crisis Group (2014) confirmed the links by Boko Haram with a 
host of other radical groups including the Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. The report 
indicates that Boko Haram’s links with foreign Islamist groups were strengthened 
following the 2009 military crackdown on the sect. Surviving sect members escaped 
through Chad and Niger to Somalia, Algeria, and reportedly, Afghanistan, where they 
joined other Islamists and received guerrilla training. This included Mohammed Nur, 
who is accused of masterminding the 26 August 2011 bombing of the UN building in 
87 
 
Abuja that killed 26 people. He fled to Somalia and reportedly joined Al-Shabab, through 
which he is alleged to have made contact with AQIM. He returned to Nigeria a year later 
(International Crisis Group, 2014, p.24). 
In fact, scholars such as Botha (2008), Cilliers (2015), Lohmann (2011), 
Werenfells (2015), and Stern and Berger (2015) share common views on the roles that 
groups in Algeria such as the Groupe Islamique Arme (Armed Islamic Group, GIA); 
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC); which later metamorphosed to AQIM 
played in the spread of violent Islamic extremism and terrorism. These terrorist groups 
relied on their experiences and connections with Osama Bin Laden when he was 
operating in the Sudan to build strongholds in their areas of operation. The participation 
of some Moslem youths from the Sahel region in the Afghanistan war that ended in 1989 
further provided grounds for radicalization and the desire to ascribe the status of caliphate 
to some countries (Okafor, 2015). 
Although the Algerian government led by Abdelaziz Bouteflika managed to 
maintain stability in the country, the influences and support provided by these Algerian 
extremist groups have been far reaching. Okafor (2015) observed that the GSPC, for 
example, provided training base as far back as 2004 for new members from Chad, Sudan, 
Libya, Mali and Mauritania in the Tibesti mountains of northern Chad as part of its 
regional expansion strategy, and was also providing firearms trainings for the Boko 
Haram terrorists in Nigeria. 
Nweze (2013) observed that since the turn of the 20th century, terrorism and 
insurgency have become the new wave of crime in many countries of the world, with 
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Nigeria now being included, due to Boko Haram activities. Nweze (2013) noted that 
terrorist group movements gravitate around different social, political and ideological 
concerns and criteria, and that extremist terrorists like the Hamas and Al Qaeda are on the 
rise, particularly given Islamic fundamentalist movement since the 1980s and 1990s 
(Nweze, 2013). He stated that religious fundamentalist movements are trying to push 
extremist views and have, as a result, taken to violence in order to achieve their religious 
perceived goals. That these terrorists “see their objectives as holy war and therefore 
infallible and non-negotiable” (p.270). 
Alao (2014) explained that the reason why the terrorists are increasingly coming 
together in operational activities is because of their belief that they are fighting a holy 
war. He observed that about 100 members of Boko Haram were in April 2012 reported to 
have been involved in an attack on the Algerian embassy in Gao, Mali (Alao, 2014). That 
the Movement that spearheaded this attack was the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in 
West Africa (MOJWA), another active militant organization that broke off from AQIM 
and announced its goal of spreading jihad across West Africa (Alao, 2014). He added 
that, in November 2011, the deputy foreign minister of Algeria - one of the countries 
where AQIM operates - stated that intelligence reports showed there was coordination 
between Boko Haram and AQIM (Alao, 2014). Alao also observed that, in June 2010, 
Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud of AQIM had declared that his group would provide Boko 
Haram with weapons, support and training to build strategic depth in Africa. That, as 
most of the cross-continent connectivity was going on, many African radical groups have 
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sent members to participate in actions in places like Yemen and Afghanistan (Alao, 
2014). 






Overview of Radical Religious Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Name of 
organization  
Doctrine/belief espoused  Recruitment base Sources of 
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Largely the same of the 
international Al-Qaeda. 
Although initially 
suspected, links with Al 
Qaeda was confirmed in 
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in Command Al Zawahiri 
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600 and 1000 
members. 
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have links with 
Nigeria’s Boko 
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The December 2007 
bombing of the UN 
offices in Algiers. 
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kidnapped and killed 





Jihad in West 
Africa 
Splinter group from AQIM, 
allegedly because it wants to 
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African members of AQIM.  
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sources of inspirations and 
wants to ensure the spread 
of radical Islam across West 
Africa. 
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Created to contest the Union 
of Zanzibar with 
Tanganyika to form 
Tanzania in 1960. Now uses 
Islamic revivalism as a 
means of ensuring cohesion 
Zanzibar in 
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Not known Largely limited 
to the Zanzibar 
region 
Most recent action 
was the spilling of 
acid on the faces of 
two young British 
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swelled with the return of 
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and MUJAO 
The shooting down 
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Table 1 Overview of Radical Religious Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa (continued) 
Name of 
organization 
Doctrine/belief espoused Recruitment base Sources of 
funding 
Extent of spread Associated violent 
incidents 
Hizb Islam Was linked with Al-Shabab 
until Fallout in 2012. Leader 
of Hizb, Shekh Hassan 
Dahir Aweys is considered 
as the father of militant 
Islam in Somalia and is 
currently in jail. 












Formed as a result of the 
collapse of the Somali State 
and it emerged from the Al-
Ittihad Al-Islami, a militant 
Salafi extremist group. 
Officially declared 
allegiance with Al Qaeda in 
February 2012 
Originally started 
from Somalia but 
activists have 
joined from other 
regions. There are 
also believe that 
radicals may be 
coming from 
Europe to join the 
group as 
evidenced in the 
attempt by one of 
those involved in 
the murder of a 
British Soldier in 
July 2013 in 
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Uganda. It is 
however 
believed that 
the group has 







AMISOM. It is 
also believed 
that it has close 
links with Al-





on AU Military base 
in Mogadishu, 
assassinations of key 
government 
functionaries. Attack 
on Uganda during 
the World Cup and 
the September 2013 





Creation of an Islamic State 
in East and South of 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia Not known South of 
Ethiopia 
 
Source. Abiodun Alao, 2014. 
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Further to the above assertion is the cause by the terrorist groups to fight for the 
propagation of their beliefs. Alao (2014) believes that this cause still unites them 
(terrorists). He argued that while many of the radical groups across the world may have 
differences over the best approach to fight what they see as a “common enemy”, most 
seem to be united in the conviction that the West and some of the values it represents, 
presents a potent force that should be confronted (Alao, 2014). He found out that many of 
these groups (obviously, not all) are beginning to put aside doctrinal differences to unite 
against what they see as the valid threat that appears determined to exterminate them. 
That, indeed, the recognition that the forces determined to silence them are strong and 
resolute, has explained the increasing determination of many of the radical groups to 
come together and create a form of unity that cuts across regions (Alao, 2014). Alao 
observed that the resolve of the radical groups to come together and create a form of 
unity was further facilitated by the “one-size-fits-all” policies often adopted by the 
international community as a response to radicalization (Alao, 2014). 
From the above review therefore, it can be seen that there is an increase in 
religiously inspired groups employing terrorist tactics to achieve their aims. But Adibe 
(2012) argued that modern terrorism is color and religion blind, and that can be seen in 
case of the Weathermen group in the US. Adibe observed that the Weathermen group 
was formed when the New Left iconic group, Students for a Democratic Society, was 
dissolved in 1969. That the FBI had in fact designated the Weathermen group as a 
terrorist group in 2004. Weathermen embraced terrorist tactics – from rioting to the 
setting off bombs to register their opposition to the Vietnam War (Adibe, 2012, p.5). 
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To buttress the assertion that the motive behind terrorist violence may not be 
entirely religion, He argued that the groups, which use religion to perpetrate terrorism are 
often on the fringe of the religion they claim to promote, stressing for example, that 
“Muhammad Atta, the architect of the 9/11 attacks in the USA, and the Egyptian hijacker 
who was driving the first plane, was a near alcoholic and was drinking vodka before he 
boarded the aircraft” (Adibe, 2012, p.5).Adibe reasoned that alcohol would be strictly off 
limits for a highly committed Muslim. The experience in Nigeria, where Boko Haram 
terrorists, rape, abduct and impregnate teen girls, further attests to views that they (sect 
members) are not true Muslims committed to the teachings of Islam. 
A trend that now seems noticeable is the desire of publicity by insurgent groups, 
in order to gain global attention. Alao observed that all the groups seem to have realized 
that their publicity interest is served when they take steps that attract global attention. For 
example, not long after Al Shabaab gained global prominence with its attack on 
Westland, Nairobi, Kenya, Boko Haram in Nigeria kidnapped over 200 school girls from 
Chibok, near Maiduguri. Also, the Nairobi Mall bombing of September 2013 was 
fashioned against the Mumbai attack of November 2008. This was later officially 
confirmed when Al-Shabaab tweeted saying: “Remember Mumbai ... it is going to be a 
long ordeal in Westgate” (Alao, 2014, p.12). 
The Report of the Crisis Group (2014) also explained the ease of Islamic 
radicalization diffusion following the military crackdown that led the sect members to 
disperse and moved into Niger, Chad and Cameroon. The report indicated that Nigeria 
expelled dozens of Boko Haram members in July 2009, some of whom are Nigerien 
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nationals. They went to settle in the south of Niger where they established bases safe to 
them and conducive for recruitment of new members (Crisis Group, 2014). Also, porous 
borders and shared ethnicity made it easy for the sect to move into these countries. The 
Report revealed that the Nigerien security services consider the group as a threat to 
Niger’s stability even much more than AQIM and reportedly prevented some attacks and 
captured many couriers carrying money and messages between AQIM, MUJAO and 
Boko Haram (Crisis Group, 2014, p.25). 
The Crisis Group reported that Cameroun could not afford any lukewarm 
approach, because the kidnap cases of French citizens in March and November 2013 was 
a demonstration of Boko Haram’s presence in Cameroun. Sect members were reported to 
live in the cities of Kousseri, Kolofata and Mokolo and are suspected to engage in 
criminal activities to finance the movement. Boko Haram was allegedly said to have 
distributed extortion letters (written in Hausa and Arabic languages) to traders in the far 
north of Cameroun demanding that the May Sava authorities implement Sharia and stop 
working with westerners (Crisis Group, 2014, p.26). 
Going from examples from other regions, it is likely that the Boko Haram sect in 
Nigeria will continue to try as much as possible to exploit external linkages to express its 
dissatisfaction against the state. As noticeable in Asia, insurgent groups are inclined to 




Review and Synthesis of Studies Pertaining to the Research Questions 
In the course of this review, I discovered a number of studies that revealed some 
public policy measures, that when properly formulated and implemented by authorities 
and stakeholders, will most likely address the challenges of Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria. However, the studies did not state the ways and means that are available through 
which strategic responses can be directed to achieve resolution of the Boko Haram crisis 
rather than management or containment of the crisis as is currently the case. 
The Boko Haram insurgency is loosely modelled after the Algerian Islamist group 
that metamorphosed into Pan-Maghreb jihadi organization AQIM. The Boko Haram has 
an ideology similar to that of the AQIM, where its goals and operational tactics involves 
the use of conventional terrorist tactics (Obafemi & Galadima, 2012). 
Onyebuchi and Chigozie, (2013) quantified the level of violence the Boko Haram 
insurgency has brought upon Nigeria. They argued that the rise of Boko Haram with its 
violent disposition to western values is a counter response to western civilization that has 
eclipsed Islamic civilization, giving rise to civilizational conflicts that are often 
noticeable among Muslims and non-Muslims. Onyebuchi and Chigozie suggested that 
since this clash of civilizations has become imperative, there is need for the Nigerian 
government to come up with urgent measures and to mobilize its security architecture to 
curb the wanton destruction of lives and property by Boko Haram. 
Udeh (2013) discussed the issues, challenges and prospects of fighting Boko 
Haram through the adoption of Counter Terrorism Strategy (CTS). Udeh stated that as a 
response to acts of terrorism, international organizations and countries adopted a CTS to 
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prevent and reduce the threats of terrorism. Particularly, he noted that the European 
Union (EU), for example, developed a CTS on November 30, 2005, based on 4 pillars of 
prevention, protection, pursuance and response in order to address the challenges of 
terrorism in the region (Udeh, 2013, p.307). Also, Udeh indicated that on 8 September 
2006, the UN adopted a CTS that was designed to enhance national, regional and 
international efforts to counter terrorism. He listed these efforts as measures that include 
addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, preventing terrorism and 
combating terrorism. He stated that there were some 14 other counter terrorism 
international conventions in developed countries under the auspices of the UN and its 
specialized agencies. The conventions were to assist in building a safer world against 
international terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda and Taliban (Udeh, 2013, p.307). 
Although the study showed that the Nigerian government, the military and other 
security agencies have made remarkable efforts to contain the violence of Boko Haram, it 
was found out that legislation, technology and socioeconomic development are major 
issues of effective CTS and the combating of Boko Haram in Nigeria (Udeh, 2013, 
p.308). Assessing the evolutionary trajectory of the Boko Haram and the tactical 
repertoire of state responses, Onuoha (2013) observed that the Boko Haram has evolved 
from a sect that poorly waged hit-and-run attacks on security establishments in 2009 to 
one that increasingly uses IEDs, targeted assassinations, drive-by shooting and suicide 
bombings in its violent campaign. Onuoha noted that the Boko Haram attacks had 
initially focused on security agents such as the police, soldiers, civil defense and prison 
officials but later extended to include public infrastructure, schools, places of worship, 
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community and religious leaders, politicians and other civilian targets that had nothing to 
do with the government (Onouha, 2013, p.407). 
Onuoha stated that the Nigerian government’s response had been ‘all-stick’ 
approach which had recorded modest successes, anyway. However, because of its global 
Salafist Islamic ideological stance, which imposed on them the duty to purge the society 
of evil influences even at the expense of their own lives, the Boko Haram had been a 
difficult force to contend, thereby posing significant threat to national and international 
security. Onuoha suggested that to effectively counter the threat posed by Boko Haram, 
the Nigerian government will need a “robust combination of use of force and political 
dexterity” (Onuoha, 2013, p.409). 
Ojelade (2018) provided insight on the development and implementation of 
counter terrorism policy towards Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria during the 2009 – 
2015 period. The study provided a better understanding of how the counter terrorism 
policy might be developed and implemented for effective fight against the Boko Haram 
terrorism in Nigeria. Ojelade recommended the development of a holistic strategy 
involving both hard and soft approaches to fight Boko Haram. Rather than engage in inter 
agency squabbles and tuff protection among agencies, he advocated for collaboration 
between stakeholders in the security sector and key community leaders in the north east 
as crucial for a successful counter terrorism effort (Ojelade, 2018). 
Botha et al. (2017) provided a deeper insight to the understanding of Boko Haram 
from the perspective of ordinary Nigerian citizens. The study provided analyses of 
perspectives of cross section of citizens with particular focus on the political context of 
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Boko Haram and the dynamics surrounding its existence. Most Nigerians believe that the 
Boko Haram crisis escalated because of the failings of politicians who are also 
considered to be the financiers of the group. Also, Botha et al, identified the factors that 
influence the decision of people to join Boko Haram to include poverty and 
unemployment, group affinity (like family members, ethnic kinship and the almajiri 
system of Islamic schooling). The others are lack of education and the religious 
institutions that they frequent (Botha et al., 2017). 
They advocated that given the complexity of Boko Haram, there is need for 
multidimensional and multi-layered interventions that address the root causes as well as 
the symptoms of violent extremism. They argued that the Nigerian government cannot do 
this alone, and that military solutions had proved to be inadequate. They suggested a 
committed and strategic partnerships that includes civil society and community role 
players, academic institutions, the private sector, regional and continental partners like 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its institutions, the 
African Union (AU) and its institutions, international partners (the UN, the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the EU. The other suggested strategic partners are the international 
development partners such as the US, UK and France etc. (Botha et al, 2017, p.76). 
Albert (2017) provided a cursory insight to the task of security management on 
regional basis as a response measure to the Boko Haram crisis, when the countries in the 
Lake Chad Basin – Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad – established the Multinational Joint 
Task Force (MNJTF). The idea of establishing the MNJTF followed a reasoning that the 
problem of Boko Haram is not sorely that of Nigeria. Albert undertook a critical 
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assessment of functionality regime of the MNJTF and came up with the conclusion that 
the member countries need to work collaboratively with one another in order to be able to 
fight a common enemy. He lamented that Nigeria is suspicious of Cameroon and Chad, 
which are in turn, suspicious of Nigeria, and the lesson is “that African states need to 
work on their relations timeously to enable them have smooth working relationship when 
they have to face a common enemy” (p.131). 
Identified Gaps in Previous Research 
From the above literature and the other works that have been reviewed, the 
observation made by Barkindo (2016) that the Nigerian government is driven by the 
assumption that the Boko Haram sect is “a gang of ignorant, poverty-stricken fanatics 
who have twisted Islamic theology for personal gain” (p.73) and as a result, the easiest 
way to handle the crisis is to use military force is worthy of attention. Although some 
scholars have argued that the use of military force as a main response to the Boko Haram 
insurgency will not easily resolve the crisis (Agbiboa, 2014; Albert, 2017; Okene & 
Olawale, 2013; Onuoha, 2013), the military efforts have recorded remarkable 
achievements. Fwa (2017) noted that on assumption of office by President Muhammadu 
Buhari in May 2015, quick modifications were made within the military, and the present 
counter insurgency operation was put in motion. Fwa stated that the COIN operation, 
code-named, Operation Lafiya Dole (Peace by Force) within three months of its launch, 
succeeded in effectively pushing out Boko Haram from all its bases within the Nigerian 
territory. However, it seems that the counter insurgency literature is yet to fully integrate 
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the theory of human needs to address the problem of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, 
and this is a gap. 
For instance, Ibrahim et al. (2017) stated that the Boko Haram sect comprises 
many actors with different motivations and who have followed various pathways of 
joining the insurgency, making tracking and combatting them very difficult. Lack of clear 
understanding of the strategies and ideological principles employed by different leaders 
of the sect, for example, will have serious security implications both at the domestic, 
regional, and international levels. Zenn et al. (2018) argued, “that whereas Boko Haram 
maybe considered vicious, ruthless, and sadistic, there is a need to carry out a 
comprehensive study of the group while engaging with it” (p.24) They stated that this 
will make it possible for the security agencies to understand the strategies of the group 
and ascertain the nature of the group’s ideology and its historical justification for attacks 
as well as the narratives it uses for mobilization and recruitment. Therefore, it is 
important that the government of Nigeria, government of countries in the West African 
sub region, security analysts and scholars do not regard Boko Haram as uninformed or 
unexperienced. Specifically, such understanding should not form the basis of a policy 
approach for resolving the Boko Haram crisis. 
Summary 
Violence caused by Boko Haram remains an ominous challenge in contemporary 
Nigeria. Boko Haram had unleashed a most ferocious, savage and terrorist violence 
against the Nigerian state and people. The violent activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria 
have seriously eroded security. Its violent operations have led to incalculable loss of lives 
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and properties. The devastating socio-economic effects of the killings and bombings by 
the sect has destroyed economic and commercial activities with many people relocating 
away from the north east to other places. 
With its violent escapades, Boko Haram has become a franchise for some small 
Islamic extremist groups that are known to exist in Northern Nigeria (Akpan, 2013). 
Taking inspiration from the Boko Haram, these groups see the possibility of escalating 
their local conflicts with sophisticated guns and bombs, making Boko Haram a big label 
for different command groups. A good example is the Fulani herdsmen and bandits who 
are known to always carry out attacks by invading villages and ambushing of 
unsuspecting innocent people in some parts of Northern Nigeria, killing, maiming and 
destroying properties in the process. 
Summary of Major Themes in the Literature 
This chapter provided the introduction and synopsis to the literature on the Boko 
Haram violence, the strategy adopted for the search of literature, and the theoretical 
foundation of the study. It examined, analyzed and synthesized literature on key concepts 
and variables relating to security and violence, and the threats violence pose to lives and 
property of people, particularly the Nigerian society. It also analyzed the place of public 
policy in addressing societal problems. 
What is Known and Not Known in the Discipline Relating to the Theme of Study 
Literature reviewed in this study provided overwhelming information on Boko 
Haram insurgency and the myriad of measures taken by authorities and stakeholders in 
Nigeria to address its challenges. However, there is lack of proper understanding of how 
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to develop short, medium- and long-term policy frameworks on handling the issues 
relating to Boko Haram and the violence that is being unleashed on Nigerians. There is a 
high disconnect between national security decision making and the actual feedback from 
intelligence. Botha et al (2017) noted that understanding the rationale or logic behind the 
existence of Boko Haram and its continued survival is key to understanding the choices 
they make and why they act in the way they do. 
Kundnani (2015) suggested the need for policy makers to understand the reasons 
why people engage in acts of terrorism before they develop or implement 
counterinsurgency policies. Also, Richardson (2011) stated that government can 
effectively tackle terrorism only when it has understood the factors that caused it. The 
literature review indicates that responses to the Boko Haram should be a combination of 
soft and hard approaches (Okene & Olawale, 2013; Onyebuchi & Chigozie, 2013; 
Barkindo, 2016), which to some extent, the Nigerian government is doing. But improving 
the understanding of these approaches for better results, is important to this study. The 
steps used for the collection of relevant information from executive officers and very 
senior personnel from peace and conflict resolution establishments; policy and strategic 
studies agencies; and reintegration agencies like the Victim Support Fund were outlined 
in chapter 3. These people are policy experts with relevant knowledge and ideas on the 





Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I describe the research design and the rationale for this study, my 
role as researcher, the methodology employed, participant selection, unit of analysis, data 
collection procedures, and my plan for data analysis. Also included in this chapter is a 
statement that the research conducted is credible and trustworthy. Issues of guiding ethics 
and the handling of researcher bias during research are also discussed in this chapter. 
The purpose of this study was to improve the understanding of public policy 
measures necessary to prevent insurgent groups like Boko Haram from emerging and 
wreaking violence on Nigerian people and how such policies should be formulated and 
implemented such that every member of society would be assured of protection and 
guaranteed fundamental rights and privileges under the law. By formulating and 
implementing relevant public policies, Nigerians will be assured of their safety and 
security. 
Research Design and Rationale 
The central research question that guided this study was: 
RQ1: What public policy measures are a solution to deal with Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria?  
Successfully answering the stated research question availed the opportunity to 
improve the understanding of the policy measures that could be taken to weaken the 
Boko Haram operations and ameliorate the dangerous effects or impacts of the 
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insurgency on the citizens. In the process, answers to some sub questions related to the 
overarching research question were provided. The subquestions were: 
SQ1: What public policy strategies or measures have been adopted by Nigerian 
government or authorities to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria? 
SQ2: Why has Boko Haram violence continued despite public policy initiatives 
meant to curtail it? 
SQ3: How can/might future public policy initiatives mitigate the impact of Boko 
Haram violence on the people of Nigeria? 
Rationale for Choosing the Research Approach 
For a study that sought to improve the understanding of public policy measures 
necessary to prevent insurgent groups like Boko Haram from emerging and wreaking 
violence on Nigerian people, a design I found useful was the qualitative method. 
Rudestam and Newton (2007) observed that “qualitative methods are linked to 
constructivist theory of knowledge because they focus on understanding experiences 
from the point of view of those who live them” (p. 35) This qualitative study involved 
stating the questions and procedures, collecting data, analyzing the data, and interpreting 
or giving meaning to the data analyzed. The study was designed to improve 
understanding of the public policies that will end Boko Haram’s violence and promote 
cohesion and harmony between decisions and actions on peace and security for all people 
in Nigeria. The study of violence and how it is managed should be the central focus of 
social change efforts within the framework of society (IPCR, 2016a). This framework 
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should be about the public policy measures that could be implemented to stop acts of 
violence against Nigerian people and residents. 
I used the case study approach for this study. The case study approach uses 
detailed mechanisms (in-depth interviewing) to derive conclusions about what best 
influences a phenomenon of study. Creswell (2013) observed that, “it builds inductively 
from individual statements into emergent themes and assumes that anything is good for 
observation” (p. 157). The lens offered by this framework is apt and useful for addressing 
the issue of violence caused by the Boko Haram insurgency. 
The research design made it possible for me to identify the conditions that give 
rise to social violence in Nigerian society and to conclude that the aggression of Boko 
Haram is a product of frustration, religious messianism, and terrorism (Onyebuchi & 
Chigozie, 2013). The design also made it possible for me to find out how the 
phenomenon of Boko Haram in Nigeria and its violent activities in some parts of northern 
Nigeria can be stopped. Furthermore, the case study approach enabled me to critically 
assess the philosophy behind the acts of violence perpetrated by the Boko Haram. Yin 
(2014) stated that a case study is an “empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 18). From this perspective, the 
researcher can study an event, object, or phenomenon that is part of an open system and 
that interacts with and is influenced by its environment. According to Yin (2014), a 
qualitative case study provides an in-depth understanding of the context and conditions of 
a problem and the attempts made to address it. This qualitative case study enabled me to 
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make policy recommendations on how to address not only the problem of Boko Haram 
but also the entire economy, which will provide the panacea to overcome terrorism in 
Nigeria. 
Role of the Researcher and Professional Relationships 
I was the researcher and the primary instrument of data collection (Creswell, 
2013) in this study on improving the understanding of public policies that can be 
formulated and implemented to stop or reduce the incidences of violence by the Boko 
Haram Islamist sect in Nigeria. To obtain the relevant data required for a study, a 
researcher must be resourceful and possess a great deal of experience in research (Apori-
Nkansah, 2008). There was need for me to undertake a desk review of secondary data 
using books, newspapers, academic articles, and journals. I conducted in-person, in-depth 
interviews with study participants in Abuja and Jos; recorded and transcribed interview 
proceedings; served as participant observer; and collected and analyzed relevant data. 
I made personal contact with many people across the various segments of 
Nigerian society to introduce the topic. My employment at IPCR in Abuja for over 19 
years as a researcher working on issues of peace, conflict management and resolution, 
and policy advisory was an added advantage in the study. Working in this area has led to 
numerous interactions with public policy experts, intelligence and counterterrorism 
experts, UN and international humanitarian and development workers, traditional and 
religious leaders, and members of many civil society organizations in Nigeria. To 




Handling Researcher Bias 
In qualitative research, the researcher must recognize the tendency of bias 
(Goulding, 2002) and must therefore guide against it. In this study, I was mindful that any 
bias would affect the objectivity of the study, especially given the issue of Boko Haram. 
In Nigeria, so many people share different sentiments about Boko Haram. Some 
respondents may have overt or covert sympathy or loyalty to the Boko Haram sect 
because Boko Haram engages in covert operations where most of their members cannot 
be open and public (Botha et al., 2017). However, to address bias in responding to 
questions by respondents, I engaged respondents with professional backgrounds and 
leanings relevant to the theme of the study to aggregate and validate their responses. 
I was the primary instrument for data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2013), 
and as such maintained an open mind throughout the entire process of the research. I 
shared the results of preliminary findings of the research with selected participants and 
then incorporated key comments and observations into the report. Efforts were also made 
to corroborate the findings using multiple data sources such as interview reports, 
academic journals, archival documents, and organizational websites to enhance the 
credibility of the research. 
Methodology 
In research there is always the need to provide explanation and to do this with less 
ambiguity. The explanation provided must give rise to some form of evidence consistent 
with theory, but this cannot happen unless there is a “plan or proposal to conduct 
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research”; usually this would include “the intersection of philosophy; strategies of inquiry 
and specific methods” (Creswell, 2011, p. 5). 
This research is a qualitative case study of how to improve the understanding of 
public policies that could be formulated and implemented to bring to an end the Boko 
Haram insurgency and its violent activities in Nigeria and how effective policy making 
and implementation can address its impact in the immediate, short-term, and long-term 
dimensions. Policy addressing the problem of violence needs to be impactful (Ojelade, 
2018). The study design was structured along the following areas: (a) participant 
selection, (b) unit of analysis, (c) instrumentation, (d) procedures for data collection, and 
(e) plan for data analysis. 
Participant Selection 
The participants for this study were selected from peace and conflict resolution 
establishments, policy and strategic studies agencies, and reintegration agencies like the 
Victim Support Fund. Participants included executive officers, senior personnel of their 
respective organizations, and retired personnel. Participants were public policy experts 
who were able to provide useful information and insight on how effective policy making 
and implementation could be used to address the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria. These 
participants were selected based on their experience with public policy formulation and 
their ability to give expert opinion on the Boko Haram issue under study. 
The sample population consisted of 12 participants after initial prequalification of 
24 participants from the identified organizations. The sample comprised of mostly retired 
personnel and a few others who are still serving. I selected retired employees because of 
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undue pervasive political influence on public bureaucracy in Nigeria. Appointments and 
promotions to the headship positions in many of the public bureaucratic organizations in 
Nigeria are based on political patronage and loyalty. Therefore, officials appointed or 
promoted on such circumstances are morally bound to subject their views, decisions, and 
actions substantially to the wishes, preferences, control, and endorsement of their 
political masters (Ugwuanyi & Chukwuemeka, 2013). Obtaining objective views or 
responses on sensitive topics like Boko Haram from participants who are not yet retired 
from service can be an arduous task. Public officials often must make due consultations 
and obtain consent from relevant political authorities before they can take certain 
decisions or actions (Ugwuanyi & Chukwuemeka, 2013). Participants in this category 
will bare their minds on the research topic with some form of hesitation and the quality of 
data may be poor (Polkinghorn, 2005). 
The sampling technique was purposeful and elitist (Apori-Nkansah, 2008; Berger 
et al., 2004; Creswell, 2013, pp. 154–156; Maxwell, 2013; Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 
2014, pp. 31–32). The choice of purposive sampling technique was informed by the need 
to ensure that relevant persons who have experiences significant to the Boko Haram 
phenomenon in Nigeria and who are the most appropriate to provide information for the 
study. This gave me the opportunity to obtain diverse descriptions of experiences for a 
detailed account on the Boko Haram phenomenon. I was guided by the fact that for a case 
study, diversity in perspectives is always a hallmark (Creswell, 2013). 
A two-tiered approach to participant selection was adopted. Services of key 
informants from prominent public bureaucracies like the IPCR and the National Institute 
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for Policy and Strategic Studies were engaged to identify participants who met the 
selection criteria. Goulding (2002) observed that key informants are those individuals 
who can provide valuable information and insight into the study and who are also able to 
identify others with relevant information on the subject of the research. The selection 
criteria were as follows: 
 Individuals with experience of public policy formulation and the ability to give 
expert opinion on possible measures that could be taken to resolve the Boko 
Haram crisis;  
 People who can understand, speak, read, and write English to the extent that they 
will understand the research or interview questions; and 
 Participants who have valid communication addresses or locations that will be 
easily accessible to the researcher for purposes of contact and follow up. 
The second approach was the use of a snowballing technique (Ellard-Gray, 
Jeffrey, Choubak, & Crann, 2015), where participants in the first tier were requested to 
make recommendations or identify individuals they thought or knew to have knowledge 
or experience on the Boko Haram insurgency. These are persons who have experienced 
the phenomenon of Boko Haram in its richness and variety and would therefore be able 
to present its account in great depth and breadth (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). I then 
proceeded to interview the participants to attain data saturation. Gergen, Josselson, and 
Freeman (2015) observed that in qualitative research, saturation is a shared theme, and its 
importance lies in giving full expression to the values the researcher desires to advocate 
through the research. In other words, saturation concerns addressing satisfactorily, all the 
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features of the phenomenon being studied to the extent that no additional insights are 
needed (Morse et al, 2014). 
To achieve saturation, I engaged in in-depth, semistructured interviews with the 
participants. The interviews span between 45-60 minutes and were digitally recorded. 
The recordings were later transcribed verbatim and kept in files in password protected 
computer that was kept sorely by the researcher. I also kept contemporaneous hand-
written notes as complements or add-ons. Each interview had its own data set 
(Moustakas, 1994). I shared the transcripts with the participants for their comments and 
review. 
I treated discrepant cases discovered in interview data and documents through 
quality check and verification or interrogation of data. Creswell (1998) recommended 
searching for convergence of information from treating discrepant cases arising from 
multiple data sources. Data from the semi-structured interviews were validated by use of 
epoche technique (Moustakas, 1994). Epoche or bracketing is a process in which 
investigators set aside their experiences, as much as possible, to take a fresh perspective 
toward the phenomenon under study. Researchers use the epoche technique to increase 
academic rigor and eliminate all preconceived notions about the subject of the research 
(Moustakas, 1994). 
Unit of Analysis 
In order to give sufficient depth and breadth to the problem of violence caused by 
the Boko Haram insurgency, the unit of analysis that was studied (Frankfort-Nachmias et 
al., 2015) was policies. Policies are activities of government, which can be specific or 
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general in nature.  Generally, policies contain certain goals or objectives that may either 
be expressed in implied or clear terms. A public policy may be narrow, covering a 
specific activity. A public policy may also be applied to all people in a country or it may 
be limited to a section of its people, and policies have outcomes that may or may not have 
been foreseen (Sapru, 2012). 
Thus, for public policies which are subject of this research, efforts were made to 
improve the understanding of the various measures that could be adopted as a solution to 
the Boko Haram crisis. What policy strategies or measures have been adopted by 
Nigerian government and why is it that the insurgency has continued despite the many 
policy measures adopted? The goal was to “gather comprehensive, systematic, and in-
depth information” (Patton, 2002, p. 447) on the problem under study, for analyzing the 
data, and to arrive at public policy recommendations that will be a solution to the Boko 
Haram crisis 
This therefore was the basis for the purposive sampling that was used for this 
study. The participants that were interviewed were limited to individuals that are relevant 
to the study. The focus was on peace and conflict resolution establishments; policy and 
strategic studies agencies; and reintegration agencies like the Victim Support Fund. The 
selected agencies are: IPCR; National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies; Nigeria 
Institute for International Affairs; Centre for Public Policy Alternatives; Nigeria Institute 
for Social and Economic Research; and the Victims Support Fund. Two (2) persons were 
selected and interviewed from each of the organizations mentioned, making twelve (12) 
persons all together 
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Procedures for Data Collection 
Considering that the purpose of this research was to improve the understanding of 
public policies that could be formulated and implemented to stop or reduce the violence 
by the Boko Haram Islamist sect in Nigeria, the data collection instruments used include 
interviews using a voice recorder, electronic mails, field notes, archival materials and 
agency or organizational websites. 
Interviews were conducted to obtain information from respondents. Interviews 
have the advantage of allowing respondents speak freely and the interviewer can probe 
further into other matters arising in the course of the interview (Creswell, 2013). In-depth 
interviews were conducted with regards to research questions and objectives of the study. 
Respondents were interviewed based on the research question(s). 
This is a wide range of written materials which includes policy documents, annual 
reports, minutes of meetings, etc. Given availability of data, the researcher made use of 
primary and secondary source materials from Government White Papers; Commissions 
of Inquiry Reports; Archival Materials; and Research articles and journals. 
Data Collection 
Before starting the process of collecting data, I obtained necessary approvals; first 
from the Committee and then from the University Institutional Review Board (IRB). It is 
important to point out that to ensure a good research, the researcher must be skillful, 
sensitive, and able to safeguard methodological integrity of the entire research process 
(Patton, 2002, pp. 4 - 5). The participants were identified, selected (through purposive 
sampling method), and interviewed using in-depth interviews. 
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The sample population include executive officers and very senior personnel from 
peace and conflict resolution establishment; policy and strategic studies agencies; and 
reintegration agencies like the Victim Support Fund who are individuals with relevant 
knowledge and ideas on the violence perpetrated by the Boko Haram Islamist sect in 
Nigeria. A sample size of 12 participants from the agencies was sufficient for the purpose 
of the research (Creswell, 2013, Pp. 156-157). The smallness of the sample size was to 
give convenience of the study and to limit the range or number of strategies, since the 
participants are public policy experts who already have experience of the subject of the 
research that was to be conducted (Miles et al., 2014, p. 31–32). These strategies include 
choosing location, gaining access to it and sampling, interviews, or actual collection of 
data, recording data, and on to data storage. 
Ihenacho (2018) found out that “a combination of small sample size and a 
purposeful elitist sample is possible and convenient in a qualitative research design” (p. 
83). Maxwell (2013) and Miles et al. (2014) also observed that the sampling technique 
and the quality of data will not depend on the number of cases or on the largeness of the 
sample size apparently because the research case is unique enough to deserve a purposive 
sampling. Interviews were conducted in the places suitable to the participants for 
purposes of confidentiality. Earlier appointments were made with them, and the interview 
lasted for about one hour with each respondent. 
Access to the research sites and to the participants did not require special 
permissions from any authority and there was no need to engage the services of a “gate-
keeper” or intermediaries (Creswell, 2013) to facilitate the access. Desk review of 
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secondary data using books, newspapers, academic articles and journals were undertaken. 
Data were stored in the primary form in which they were recorded, such as audiotapes, 
camera pictures and field notes (Patton, 2002). Data were organized and transferred into 
storage devices such as computer hard disk and an external hard drive. This gives room 
for effective back up of data (Creswell, 2013). 
Data Analysis Plan 
This section concerns the strategy put in place by the researcher to analyze the 
data that was collected for the research. Data in this study comprise recorded interviews 
and transcribed materials; written personal experiences or perception obtained during the 
research; and documents pertaining to transactions or information on the case (Miles et 
al., 2014). In qualitative research, data analysis begins as soon as data collection starts 
(Goulding, 2002). The researcher took inventory of the data collected and made sense of 
the whole (Patton, 2002). 
Creswell (2013) recommended four types of data analysis for case studies as 
follows: Categorical analysis, which allows the researcher to focus on the various 
instances found in the data to get meanings that are relevant to the issue (see Stake 1995). 
The second type of data analysis is the direct interpretation, where the researcher focuses 
on a particular instance from the data and tries to draw conclusion without reference to 
other instances through “pulling the data apart and putting them back together in more 
meaningful ways” (Stake, 1995). A third type of data analysis is to establish patterns and 
categories to see a “correspondence between two or more categories” (Creswell, 2013, 
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p.199). Lastly, Yin (2009) proposed a type of data analysis that uses “cross-case synthesis 
as analytic technique” (Yin, 2009, cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 199). 
However, in an effort to improve the understanding of public policy measures that 
may bring the violence of the Boko Haram to an end, this research adopted the deductive 
thematic analysis approach (Yin, 2014). Deductive thematic analysis is used for 
“identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns or themes within data” (Braun & Clarke, 
2006, p.79). The approach allows the researcher to familiarize with data generated from 
the interviews; code the data and generate themes from it. The approach is also useful in 
reviewing the themes, defining, and naming the themes and writing up the reports. It 
focuses on the various instances found in the data to get meanings that are relevant to the 
theme of study (Pearse, 2019). The steps involved in deductive thematic analysis are:  1. 
Considering sampling and design issues.  2. Developing the code manual (this entails 
labeling, defining and describing when the theme occurs).  3.Validating or testing the 
reliability of the code.  4. Summarizing data and identifying initial themes.  5. Applying 
the template of codes and additional coding.  6.Connecting the codes and identifying 
themes.   7. Corroborating and legitimating coded themes (Boyatzis, 1998; Fereday & 
Muir-Cochrane, 2006). I conducted a thorough reading of the data and carefully made 
notes or memoing of the important facts, figures and themes encountered in the reading. 
Themes that were standing out were extracted and ideas that are similar were grouped to 
form categories as a way of initial coding of data. This continued until a saturation point 
where categories that could be applied to the research question was reached, to facilitate 
or enable a proper understanding (Apori-Nkansah, 2008). 
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After the data were coded and meaningful categories formed, interpretation of the 
complex field data was made from the patterns arising from the categorization of data 
(Apori-Nkansah, 2008). The interpretation of data made it possible to draw conclusions, 
make assertions, and descriptions that led to the better understanding of how to formulate 
and implement public policies that will stop the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria. In 
doing the analysis of data for the study, I used the Computer Assisted Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software (CAQDAS) which has been recommended by Miles et al. (2014) for 
the management of data for a qualitative research. Specifically, the Atlas.ti and Microsoft 
Excel software were used in the study for the analysis of data. Reasons for the choice of 
this software are its compatibility with other data analysis tools, handiness, ease of use 
and secure data storage (Ihenacho, 2018). 
Overall, I was guided by the procedure identified by Creswell (2013), which 
includes: data management; reading and memoing; description; classification and 
interpretation; and representation. Use of tables were applied to present information and 
results of the research for easy understanding. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
To ensure that this research is trustworthy, I reported the findings as accurately as 
possible to reflect the magnitude of the violence caused by Boko Haram in Nigeria and 
the need to formulate and implement public policies that will not only stop this violence 
in the immediate or short-term, but also on long-term basis. I ensured that the process is 
rigorous. The methods used were rigorous enough to comprise member checking, peer 
debriefs and results confirmation (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002). These 
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methods were rigorous, and that allowed the findings and conclusions to be considered 
trustworthy (Murphy & Yielder, 2010; Roberts, Priest & Traynor, 2006). 
This approach made it easy for me to handle the data, in view of my 
understanding of the field and research experience. Thematic analysis of patterns in the 
data via a bottom-up process that involves repeatedly reading of the material, the 
generation of initial codes, and subsequent identification of themes, via a process of 
continual review and reflection was undertaken (Apori-Nkansah, 2008). I ensured that the 
findings of the research are in consonance with the perspectives and beliefs of the 
participants, to give room for the research to be reliable and valid, and substantiated by 
credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability (Creswell, 2013). 
To ensure credibility, I used more than one method in line with the advice by 
Patton (2002). The responses of the participants were captured and analyzed to truly 
legitimize the credibility of the outcomes (Ihantola & Kihn, 2011; Trochim, 2001). The 
use of different methods further helped me to substantiate or triangulate the findings of 
the study. Merriam (2014) explained that transferability pertains to the extent that the 
findings of the research can extend beyond the boundary of the study. It requires detailed 
description of what the participants experienced during the study (Apori-Nkansah, 2008). 
I described in detail the experiences of the participants in this study. This will be 
useful in similar studies especially in view of kidnappings, banditry and Fulani 
pastoralists’ attacks that are the other forms of violence also witnessed in Nigeria. I 
ensured that this research is dependable by developing codes and thematic categories in 
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line with the conceptual framework that underlies this study by use of computer assisted 
applications and Excel to determine consistency in all the areas of the study. 
To achieve confirmability of this study, I used a structured and detailed narrative 
report (see Trochim, 2001, as cited in Apori-Nkansah, 2008). This meant a report with 
details that described, with quotes from participants and my interpretation that gave away 
my peculiar insights with respect to public policy measures that could be taken to end the 
Boko Haram violence I also used a structured and detailed narrative report that favor 
substantial analysis, interpretations and conclusions (Merriam, 2014) to further ensure the 
trustworthiness of this study. 
Ethical Procedures 
Creswell (2013) suggested that researchers should envisage likely ethical issues 
that could surface in the course of the study and should plan how to appropriately deal 
with them. To conduct this research, I obtained the IRB approval. The approval code is 
02-20-20-0313086. Consent forms were prepared and each participant was required to 
read and sign it accordingly. The participants were selected based on their understanding, 
knowledge and experience on public policy issues relating to violence prevention; peace, 
security and governance. 
I explained the rationale for the study to the participants. I allowed each 
participant to participate in the study without being deceived or coerced. I established 
good rapport and effective means of communication with the participants so as to achieve 
in-depth discussion. The identities of the respondents were kept anonymous and 
confidential before, during and after the field work, and I undertook to be objective and 
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remained so throughout the research. Data generated were protected through backup 
procedures on daily basis to avoid loss. I, as the researcher, was the only person that had 
access to the data. The research data will be preserved in a locked cabinet only accessible 
to the researcher for a period of five or so years after the approval of the final 
dissertation. 
Summary 
This chapter examined how qualitative case study approach was used to undertake 
a study on how to improve the understanding of public policy measures that are needed to 
prevent insurgent gangs like the Boko Haram group from emerging and wrecking 
violence on the Nigerian people. The research design discussed in the chapter was useful 
in exploring the system of Boko Haram through a detailed and in-depth data gathering 
involving multiple sources of information such as observations, interviews, audio visual 
materials, documents and reports. The lens provided by the research design adopted for 
this study was helpful for the identification of a range of factors that are likely to 
strengthen public policy making and implementation. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to improve the understanding of public policy 
measures that will help address the violence of the Boko Harm insurgency in Nigeria. In 
this study, I discussed how to improve the understanding of the public policies that will 
help end Boko Haram violence and promote cohesion and harmony between decisions 
and actions on peace and security for Nigeria. The study of violence and its management 
should be the central focus of social change efforts within the framework of society 
(IPCR, 2016a). For this study, this framework is about the public policy measures that 
could be implemented to deter Boko Haram from acts of violence unleashed on the 
Nigerian people and residents. 
Research Questions 
Considering the extent of the Boko Haram violence and its far-reaching 
implications for Nigeria’s corporate existence as an indivisible sovereign nation and the 
need to develop alternative courses of action conducive to peaceful resolution of conflicts 
involving terrorist violence, I asked an overarching research question as follows:  
RQ1: What public policy measures are a solution to deal with Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria?  
The following subquestions were asked: 
SQ1: What public policy strategies or measures have been adopted by Nigerian 




SQ2: Why has Boko Haram violence continued despite public policy initiatives 
meant to curtail it? 
SQ3: How can/might future public policy initiatives mitigate the impact of Boko 
Haram violence? 
The Setting 
Abuja and Jos were the cities in Nigeria where interviews for the study were 
conducted. Personal in-depth face-to-face interviews were conducted between February 
25, 2020, and March 31, 2020. Abuja is Nigeria’s federal headquarters and is located in 
the Federal Capital Territory in the north central geopolitical zone of Nigeria. It has a 
population of 776,298 as shown by the 2006 Nigerian population census results. The 
bombing of the United Nations office and the police headquarters were Boko Haram’s 
first two major attacks in Abuja. Boko Haram later carried out other attacks on Abuja that 
led to the death of many people (Dasuki, 2013). Abuja is important to this study because 
as a government seat, many policy measures targeted at addressing the Boko Haram crisis 
have been developed there. 
Jos is the capital of Plateau state, one of the 36 states of Nigeria. Jos has a high 
elevation of 1,280 meters and one of the coolest climates in Nigeria. It is home to 
Nigeria’s National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies. At the National Institute for 
Policy and Strategic Studies, foremost policies are developed by top-class technocrats of 
high intellectual capacity who conceptualize and anchor the development and 




The participants selected for this study were individuals who possess a great deal 
of knowledge and work experience in public policy and have carried out research in 
certain areas of public policy. They have been commentators and analysts on public 
policy issues and taught courses in the field of public policy. They have been exponents 
of great ideas on nuances of public policy making and implementation. As policy experts, 
they proffer ideas that help to shape debate on policies that can impact societies. 
Twelve participants took part in the face-to-face open-ended in-depth interviews. 
The phenomenon of the study was a relatively unexplored area of research and, as such, 
the sampling method used for the recruitment of participants was elitist in nature. In such 
circumstances, emphasis is more on experience with policy issues than representativeness 
(Polkinghorne, 2005). All the participants met the set criteria for participation. 
Data Collection 
The process of data collection began upon receipt of Walden University IRB 
approval. The selected public policy experts were contacted to schedule interview 
appointments. The interview sessions were scheduled to last for 1 hour with each 
participant. However, most of the interviews lasted between 45 and 50 minutes. The 
interviews involved 12 participants in line with the sample size proposed. The purposive 
sampling strategy was adopted. I contacted the participants through telephone and email 
to enable me to send consent forms and schedule appointments for the interviews. The 
participants communicated their consent to participate in the study through telephone. 
Thereafter, an interview was conducted with each participant at locations chosen by 
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them. In this case, the interviews took place in their offices. I enjoyed maximum 
cooperation of the participants throughout the interviews. They all spoke confidently and 
freely. They spoke from experience. 
The interview process was guided by the interview protocol I developed 
(Appendix A). I recorded the interviews with the use of an audio recorder. The 
participants allowed me to record the interviews. I listened to the play back of the 
recordings several times and later transcribed them. I also did member checking to ensure 
that all the participants’ responses during the interviews were correctly captured. The 
transcripts were saved as an MS Word document in a dedicated laptop. To enable the 
participants to confirm the accuracy and correctness of the information recorded, I sent 
the document through email, while hard copies were made available to those participants 
who had difficulty accessing the Internet. The participants were requested to provide 
feedback on the recorded information within 48 hours in case any changes were required. 
There was no complaint from any participant and I thus concluded that they were happy 
with the content of the transcripts. I will keep the saved data for 5 years before discarding 
them. 
Data Analysis 
To analyze the data collected for this study, I adopted the data analysis approach 
outlined in Chapter 3. Yin’s (2014) deductive thematic analysis approach for analyzing 
data was used. Analysis was guided toward a search for ideas that were relevant to 
providing answers to the stated research questions. Semistructured, face-to-face, in-depth 
interviews; field notes from the interview observations; and reviews from archival 
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documents were the instruments used for data collection in this study. These sources of 
data were used to answer the research questions outlined for the study.  
I reflected on the data that were collected to raise questions on issues, create 
categories, and describe and organize data into themes. I then assigned a code to all the 
12 participants; I gave each participant a pseudonym, for example P1, standing for 
Participant 1 through P12, for Participant 12, to ensure they were shielded from any form 
of identification. I asked the participants the questions in Table 4 in an effort to answer 
the research questions on the public policy measures that can be a solution to the 
challenge of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. This task was undertaken to 
demonstrate transparency in the data analysis process specified by Anfara, Brown, and 





Interview Excerpts and the Coding Process 
P1 Response to question on why the use of 
military force is the most prominent public 
policy response to Boko Haram violence 
Code distilled from response 
Because of the massive deaths and destruction of 
properties arising from the Boko Haram 
violence, the use of military force to quell the 
violence will not be out of place. The military 
force itself is an act of violence which aims at 
compelling the Boko Haram to stop its violence. 
However, Nigeria should not mobilize its 
military out of anger. Government should do this 
only when it is beneficial and withdraw the 
military when it is not beneficial. Also, 
government should note that fighting wars 
should be governed by political considerations. 
But I think given the level of violence of Boko 
Haram, using military force is appropriate. 
However, the government should be mindful of 
the intimate connection between force and 
diplomacy. 
 Protection of lives and property 
is the primary purpose of 
government 
 Need to halt human suffering 
 Use of appropriate force is 
necessary 
 Without security, peace and/or 
law and order, all other 
functions of the state cannot be 
carried out 
 Use of military force as policy 
response 
P1 response to question on impact of Boko 
Haram violence 
 
The Boko Haram has caused massive deaths and 
distorted the way of life of many Nigerians and 
affected livelihoods with many businesses and 
schools shut down. The bombings of Churches 
by Boko Haram have pitched Christians against 
Muslims in some states. It has polarized societies 
and negatively impacted on national integration. 
 Public safety has been greatly 
affected 
 Social and economic activities 
reduced to abysmal low levels 
 Education of children in the 
north east greatly jeopardized 
 Killings and massive 
displacement of people 
witnessed 
 Impact of Boko Haram violence on 





Only the first excerpt is shown here because of space, but this coding process was 
performed for all the responses to each of the interview questions given by the 12 
participants. I ensured that all the participants were asked the same set of questions 
during the interviews, although there were instances where the responses provided by 
some participants elicited more probing questions. The probing questions enabled me to 
better clarify and understand the responses of the participants. The participants were 
asked questions that covered all the areas expressed in the research questions. 
Large volume of data was expected to be gathered and managed, therefore a list 
of all the data collected was developed and then organized into files in line with the 
topics and themes. I then created codes using letters and numbers to represent the topics 
and themes and kept them in folders for easy retrieval and analysis. The data was read 
thoroughly and for several times so as to gain new insights until I reached saturation 
stage, where no further meaning or insight emerged. The codes developed were further 
re-grouped to form ideas and new categories. I compared and contrasted the categories to 
develop new perceptions that could be possibly used to form further codes. I did this 
repeatedly until the data got saturated. The categories were applied to the research 
questions on improving the understanding of public policy measures that can be taken to 
stop or end the violent activities of Boko Haram, and ameliorate the negative effects or 
impacts of the insurgency on the citizens. Analysis was guided towards a search for ideas 
that were relevant to providing answers to the stated research questions. 
As such, I drew up relevant codes from terms and ideas contained in the 
transcripts. I did initial categorization after listening to the audio recordings for 5 times 
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and reading through the transcribed interviews, field notes and documents. I also 
compiled and organized all the responses to the interview questions by the interviewees. I 
transcribed the interviews on Microsoft word, and typed them into Excel spreadsheet on 
different files. The typed documents were then stored into a big file, to enable me bring 
out the groups and the themes. 
Data was organized with the use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software (CAQDAS) recommended by Miles et al. (2014). Also, Atlas.ti was used. I 
used this software because of its compatibility with other data analysis tools and its 
handiness and ease of use. This software was used for coding, organization and storage of 
data. Field notes and archival documents on Boko Haram insurgency were reviewed, thus 
making the confirmation of some of the information obtained during the interviews 
possible. With this, issues of trustworthiness and the replication of findings and further 
analysis (Yin, 2014) becomes easily feasible. Sinkovics & Alfodi (2012) also recognized 
the use of CAQDAS in promoting trustworthiness through effective and efficient data 
management and treatment. 
The emerging themes were then separated, identified and categorized. Connection 
was also established between the themes by appropriately wording and phrasing them so 
as to properly understand them. I developed 11 topics based on analysis of the interviews. 
The topics were based on thoughts in terms of responses of the participants to the 
interview questions and their link with the research questions. Table 2 below shows the 
frequency and percentage of the respondents’ responses to the different interview topics 
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that were generated. The topics were derived from the interview transcripts that directly 
addressed the research questions as in table 3 below. 
Table 3 
 
Analysis of Interview Topics Linked to the Research Questions 




Concern over Boko Haram violence in Nigeria 12 10.9% 
Impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on lives and 
property 
12 10.9% 
Need for public policy measures that will mitigate the 
impact of the Boko Haram violence on society 
10 9.1% 
Previous public policy responses to the Boko Haram 
crisis 
8 7.3% 
Successes of the policy responses 5 4.5% 
Failures of the policy responses 8 7.3% 
Use of military force as best public policy response to 
the Boko Haram violence 
10 9.1% 
Making policy responses more effective 12 10.9% 
Critical stakeholders in the development and 
implementation of policy strategies for Boko Haram 
crisis 
8 7.3% 
Implementation challenges of policy responses to the 
Boko Haram insurgency 
6 5.5% 
Public policy responses that will resolve the Boko 
Haram crisis 
12 10.9% 
Required future policy and academic research on Boko 
Haram insurgency in Nigeria 
5 4.5% 
 
I listened again to the audio recordings and tried to gain a broader perspective of 
the participants’ interviews and their expert opinion. Yin (2014) postulated that the 
philosophical and worldview of the participants are very important in research studies. I 
therefore undertook reviews of the transcripts, audio recordings and notes of the 
interviews of the participants and came up with 8 thematic labels (Table 4) that are 
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critical to the overarching research question regarding the public policy measures that can 
be a solution in the efforts to deal with Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. 
Table 4 
 
List of Thematic Labels or Emergent Themes From the Interviews 
SN Emergent themes/thematic labels Corresponding research questions 
1 Impact of Boko Haram violence on 
welfare and public safety 
RQ1 and SQ3 and their related 
follow-up questions 
2 Counterinsurgency policies adopted to 
restrain Boko Haram violence 
SQ1 and its related follow-up 
questions 
3 Assessing the efficacy of the 
counterinsurgency policies 
RQ1 and SQ1 and their related 
follow-up questions 
4 Emphasizing military response 
measures 
RQ1 and SQ2 and their related 
follow-up questions 
5 Key stakeholders in the policy 
development process 
SQ1 and its related follow-up 
questions 
6 Policy implementation challenges SQ2 and its related follow-up 
questions 
7 Identifying effectual public policy 
options 
RQ1 and its related follow-up 
questions 
8 Future policy research SQ3 and its related follow-up 
questions 
 
Though there were some findings from literature and some archival materials on 
the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, data obtained from the research questions for this 
study enabled me to discover relevant themes that significantly contributed to the 
findings on improving the understanding of public policies that will be a solution in the 
efforts to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. There is need to 
tackle the menace of Boko Haram by deployment of comprehensive combination of 
strategic measures that a government can adopt in a conflict situation. 
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Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Although ancillary data was collected through the consultation and review of 
relevant literature and archival documents, main data for this study was obtained through 
face to face open ended in-depth interviews with 12 participants. The interviewees were 
public policy experts who have carried out researches in certain areas of public policy 
and have been exponents of great ideas or views on nuances of public policy making and 
implementation. Yin (2014) observed that interviews provides one of the best approaches 
to data collection in qualitative research. In this study, I adopted various strategies that 
helped to prove that the result of the study is credible, transferable, dependable, and 
confirmable. Trochim (2001) believed that in qualitative research, the findings should be 
evidenced through the processes of credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability. 
Credibility 
In qualitative research, it is important that the researcher establish the credibility 
of the collected data and the phenomenon being studied, to ensure trustworthiness 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Research credibility is a situation where participants in the 
study find the results of the study to be true and credible reflection of what happened in 
the field (Venkatesh et al, 2013). Researchers in qualitative study are therefore required 
to establish that the results of their research are consistent with the beliefs and 
perspectives of the participants.  
Therefore, in this study, I adopted the process of member-checking by requesting 
the participants to review the materials or transcripts to establish the accuracy of the 
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results (Moustakas, 1994). Furthermore, I ensured the credibility of this study by 
adhering to the appropriate steps of maintaining the highest levels of academic standards 
and ethics. I strictly adhered to the Walden University’s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) research guidelines. The study was approved by Walden University IRB through 
the approval number 02-20-20-0313086. The approval expires on February 19, 2021. 
Multiple data sources such as interviews, analyses of documents and reflection field notes 
were used to promote triangulation and thus achieve internal credibility and consistency 
(Copeland & Agosto, 2012). During the interviews, I ensured that I ask probing questions 
to achieve clarity of information provided by the individual participants. Phrases such as: 
Please can you tell me more on this; please what do you mean, were used. Lastly I 
checked with the participants to re-confirm that the analyzed data represents the accuracy 
of views on the understanding of public policy measures that will be a solution to the 
Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. 
Transferability 
To ensure transferability of this study, I carefully documented and described the 
entire research process. Lincoln & Guba (1985) observed that transferability of research 
is possible where the findings of a study can be easily applied in another qualitative 
study. I provided a concise description of the sampling methods adopted for the study, the 
collection and analysis procedures for the data, the research purpose, research design and 
the findings to the participants. I also explained the selection process adopted for the 
participants, including the interview and member-checking procedures employed. The 
use of member-checking assisted me to assess the approval of the participants of how I 
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interpreted the findings and derived meanings from the interviews (Yilmaz, 2013). 
Member-checking was done to allow the participants to confirm the accuracy of their 
experiences that I recorded. I re-stated and summarized the participants’ views and 
statements and requested them to check if they were correct interpretations. I also 
provided the detailed explanation of the subject of the study to give room for external 
assessment on whether or not the findings of the study could be transferred elsewhere. In 
this study, I provided detailed characteristics of the qualitative case study of improving 
the understanding of public policy measures that are a solution in the efforts to deal with 
the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. 
Dependability 
Hesse-Biber & Leavy (2006) noted that dependability in qualitative research is 
part of trustworthiness normally used to show research integrity. In research, 
dependability is shown if the procedure for choosing, validating and applying research 
strategies and methods provide rationalization or the basis for the study (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). In this study, I followed the ethical guidelines of constant review. I developed 
codes and thematic categories in line with the conceptual framework that underlies this 
study by use of computer assisted applications and Excel to determine consistency in all 
the areas of the study. All the recordings, field notes, transcribed documents and the disk 
used for storage will be kept for 5 years after the study to ensure dependability. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability describes the correctness and objectivity of data (Abend, 2013). It 
is the level of neutrality exhibited by the researcher in reporting the findings of the study 
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as arising from the participants’ account without imputing researcher’s biases or interests 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To achieve this, I did a detailed documentation of the 
procedures implemented to corroborate and substantiate the findings (Trochim, 2001). I 
did member-checking and re-checking the data during the process of collection of data. I 
asked the participants to appraise the summary of my interpretation of their responses to 
corroborate whether I accurately reported the real meaning of the statements they made. I 
also carried out a thorough authentication (quality check) in order to de-emphasize 
hunches and deal with concrete issues established in the study (Stake, 2005). I remained 
objective and unbiased and avoided prejudices to allow the findings of the study to reveal 
the views and experiences of each of the participants. I allowed the responses of the 
participants to underpin the study. 
Results 
Eight emergent themes were derived from the coded interview transcript of 
participants’ responses to the interview questions. The themes were generated from the 
analysis of interview topics linked to the research questions (Appendix B). The initial 
hand-coding that was done aided the emergence of the themes. I adopted the deductive 
thematic analysis approach (Yin, 2014) for analyzing the data. Analysis was guided 
towards a search for ideas that were relevant to providing answers to the stated research 
questions. The themes are as presented below. 
Emergent Theme 1: Impact of Boko Haram Violence on Welfare and Public Safety 
Participants expressed concern that Boko Haram violence have had a devastating 
impact on family and daily lives of Nigerians. They stated that public safety has been 
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challenged fundamentally and peaceful inter community relations have broken down. The 
participants explained that Boko Haram activities have resulted in killings of large 
numbers of people in northern Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. It has 
created tension among Christians and Muslims in Nigeria and has significantly reduced 
agricultural and commercial activities in the affected states, leaving negative impacts on 
the economy of those states. It has also seriously affected education of young people, 
particularly girls, in the north east zone of Nigeria. The participants explained that due to 
Boko Haram’s incessant attacks on schools and subsequent abduction of female students, 
many schools in the north east are forced to close down. Many of the participants linked 
the abduction to health issues such as dementia, hypertension, depression and sudden 
death suffered by some parents of some of the abducted school girls. P1 particularly 
observed that education and educational activities came to a total halt in the affected 
states, and that, that was against the backdrop of the doctrine of the insurgents which 
earned them the name, “Boko Haram”, meaning “Western Education is forbidden”.  
P 2 noted that, “the activities of Boko Haram have resulted in massive killings of 
innocent civilians, including worshippers in churches and mosques; school children and 
their teachers; and market men and women in many towns and cities in the north” (P2, 15 
March, 2020). P3, while commenting on the adverse impacts of the Boko Haram violence 
on Nigerians, observed that since the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East escalated 
in 2009, Boko Haram has unleashed systematic terror on Nigerians in the region, 
particularly Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, leading to population displacement of 
people from their homes; deprivation; hunger; and widespread poverty. P4 also affirmed 
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that aside social dislocations and displacement, Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in 
loss of lives of thousands of people and the destruction of property worth millions of US 
dollars, and that there is general atmosphere of distrust; fear and frenzy especially 
between northern Christians and Muslims, and between northerners and southerners that 
are resident in the north. 
One of the problematic developments in urban centers in northern Nigeria arising 
from the Boko Haram insurgency is the increased segregated settlement patterns in 
communities along ethno-religious lines. As P5 remarked: 
The Boko Haram insurgency has forced people to adopt new patterns of segregated 
settlements within towns and cities. Christians moved to Christian dominated areas while 
Muslims moved to Muslim dominated areas. Some families (though on mutual 
arrangement), were forced to exchange houses in apparent bid to move away from areas 
of the city in which they did not feel safe to live. They had to leave because they were 
afraid that in the event of any attack, they will be ready targets (P5, 15 March, 2020). 
P6 stated that “the actions of Boko Haram have increased fear amongst Nigerians; 
interrupted development; frightened investors and alarmed Nigeria’s neighbors ... the 
rise in the violent activities of Boko Haram has brought about adverse effects on 
population, especially on women and children” (P6, 17 March, 2020). This is evident 
in the increased number of widows and orphans in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. 
While the overall impact of the insurgency on the society is devastating, women are 
singled out for the extra burdens they are forced to bear. Women have been brutally 
attacked and killed, right at their door steps. In many instances, women have had to 
flee their homes in search of basic necessities of life like food, shelter and healthcare 
for themselves and their children. 
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P8 observed that thousands of family units have been lost as a result of the 
insurgency. He explained that during attacks on communities, individual family members 
scamper for safety in different directions, and in the event where the head of the family 
dies, the minors in the family are separated because they cannot provide credible 
explanation to link them up with their family members. He stated that such children are 
often registered as unaccompanied children in IDP camps. 
In response to the questions on this theme, all the participants agreed that the 
Boko Haram insurgency has essentially endangered public safety, security and peace of 
the people. They expressed concern that the insurgency has retarded economic growth 
and development, and undermined the Nigerian state and her democracy. They noted that 
the Boko Haram insurgency violates the fundamental human rights to life, human dignity, 
liberty and freedom of religion, conscience and thought. In their view, “the insurgency 
constitutes crime against public order and humanity” (Study Participants, 18 March, 
2020). 
Emergent Theme 2: Counterinsurgency Policies Adopted to Restrain Boko Haram 
Violence 
This theme pertains to the policy measures adopted by the Nigerian authorities 
and community stakeholders to enhance the safety of people and to curtail the threats of 
violence from Boko Haram. Majority of the participants stated that a key measure was 
use of military force. The participants explained that when the Boko Haram insurgency 
started, a special military task force was created, and its area of operation covered the 
three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. The task force had its headquarters in 
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Maiduguri and comprised personnel of the military, Department of State Services (DSS), 
the Immigration and Customs Services and the Police. During the interview, P2 
particularly stated that the “creation of the task force was to put resources together in 
order to prevent the duplication of efforts and give room to free flow of information 
among the security forces” (P2, 20 March, 2020). P3 observed that the government of 
President Goodluck Jonathan, in its attempt to contain the Boko Haram violence, 
established a new military division (7th Division) in Maiduguri. It was this military 
division that supervised the formation of the Civilian Joint Task Force – a volunteer 
group that assisted the military in the fight against Boko Haram. 
All the participants explained that military and police check points were mounted 
in the North East and in many other parts of Northern Nigeria and the Federal Capital 
Territory by the federal government. The government also declared a State of Emergency 
and imposed curfew in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. P1 and P3 particularly 
highlighted the closure of Nigeria’s borders with neighboring countries of Cameroun, 
Niger and Chad. The participants also added that in order to provide legislation upon 
which the fight against the Boko Haram would be based, the government passed into law 
the Terrorism Prevention Acts of 2011 and 2013. 
All the interviewees also referenced the regional cooperation between Nigeria and 
Cameroun, Chad and Niger that gave birth to the establishment of the Multinational Joint 
Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF was formed as a counterinsurgency policy measure to 
enable the countries in the region to jointly contain the threat and violence of Boko 
Haram. P6 and P8 commented that the creation of the program on Countering Violent 
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Extremism (CVE) “was a laudable initiative” (P6 & P8, 20 March, 2020). The CVE 
Program was domiciled in the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). The 
program has key objectives to reduce incidences of radicalization and violent behavior 
especially among young people; modifying the behavior of extremists; and countering the 
narratives of terrorist groups as well as promoting the core values of the Nigerian nation. 
The participants explained that the program has three elements of counter-radicalization, 
de-radicalization and strategic communication. They noted that the counter-radicalization 
focuses on community engagement, education and community-based projects targeted to 
prevent and reduce the recruitment of people for radicalization. De-radicalization seeks to 
reintegrate the repentant Boko Haram fighters back into the society through vocational 
training. The third component of the program is strategic intervention, where the 
government offers a counter narrative to the violent extremism by presenting moderate 
Islamic views or messages to the public based on core values of the Nigerian nation. 
The participants also stated that in 2013, the government of former President 
Goodluck Jonathan adopted a strategy of dialogue and negotiation with the Boko Haram 
group. A committee was set up to engage in discussion with the leadership of the group 
with a view to ending the violence and provide a framework for the disarmament of the 
Boko Haram fighters and adequately compensate the victims of the insurgency. This idea 
to engage in negotiation with the Boko Haram did not receive the support of many 
Nigerians. 
Majority of the participants observed that in 2014, the government of Nigeria 
developed a National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) document. The document 
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provides guidelines on how to address the violent attacks of the Boko Haram. It describes 
the Nigerian government’s counterterrorism strategy in a simple, straight forward, 
achievable and time bound style. The NACTEST is a presidential directive that brings 
about synergy among all the agencies engaged in fighting terrorism. It contains hard and 
soft approaches to fighting terrorism. It defines the responsibilities of the various 
agencies of government and how their activities are to be discharged under the umbrella 
of the Office of the National Security Adviser (Dasuki, 2013). The participants also 
highlighted the establishment of the NEDC in 2017. They stated that the NEDC has 11-
member Board with a Presidential mandate to be the focal organization to assess, 
coordinate, harmonize and report all the intervention programs and initiatives that the 
federal government or any of its ministries and agencies are involved in, in the region. 
P10 observed that “the NEDC is expected to ensure coordination and sustainability of all 
development programs. It is expected that all development programs will put into 
consideration peace and conflict sensitivity in their design and implementation” (P10, 20 
March, 2020). 
Emergent Theme 3: Assessing the Efficacy of the Counterinsurgency Policies  
The participants provided opinion and explanation on the effectiveness of the 
counterinsurgency measures adopted by the federal government to contain the Boko 
Haram violence. The complexities of the Boko Haram crisis compelled the involvement 
of many actors, and this required effective coordination of all stakeholders for a 
successful result. The participants stated that an outstanding success point in the fight 
against the Boko Haram is the creation of Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2011. The members 
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of the JTF were drawn from various security agencies, comprising the Military, Police, 
Customs and the Department of State Security Service (DSS) personnel. The participants 
noted that measures adopted by JTF includes the imposition of dusk to dawn curfew; ban 
the use of Motorcycles; Stop-and-Search Operation along township roads; Cordon-and-
Search Operations on suspected hideouts and Mopping of non-military rifles from the 
communities. P1 particularly remarked that “these measures provided an effective feat 
against Boko Haram terrorists” (P1, 21 March, 2020). P2 sees the Order to relocate the 
Command and Control Center of the JTF from Abuja to Maiduguri as a good measure. At 
inception of President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration in 2015, the Command and 
Control Center of the JTF was ordered to move from Abuja to Maiduguri and this yielded 
tremendous success of military operations. 
In the course of the interviews, many of the participants explained that a landmark 
achievement in the counterinsurgency effort was the implementation of the decision of 
African Union (AU) Peace and Security Committee meeting held on 29th January 2014 in 
Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, in which the Committee ratified the formation of the 
Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) by members of the Lake Chad Basin 
Commission (LCBC), comprising Nigeria, Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Benin Republic. 
The MNJTF is a regional cooperation between Nigeria and her neighboring countries of 
Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republic, established to jointly combat the threat of 
Boko Haram terrorism. The participants noted that the paramilitary component of the 
theater command of the MNJTF played a supportive role in enforcement. The 
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paramilitary component was deployed to overlook liberated communities where they 
discharged some perfunctory roles. 
All the participants also referenced the complementary roles of the Civilian Joint 
Task Force (CJTF) in the containment efforts to the Boko Haram violence. In July 2013, 
a group of spirited youths in Maiduguri organized themselves into a task force to 
complement the military operations. The participants observed that the youths launched a 
fierce resistance against the wanton killings and destruction of property by Boko Haram. 
The Borno state government immediately seized the initiative and coordinated the 
activities of the group, trained them for three weeks and put them on monthly stipend of 
N15,000.00. Armed with local knowledge of the terrain and antecedents of Boko Haram 
in various areas within Maiduguri, the CJTF successfully complemented military 
operations in ending the violence of Boko Haram in Maiduguri metropolis. According to 
the participants, “the CJTF was able to pursue Boko Haram members out of Maiduguri” 
(Study Participants, 21 March, 2020). The CJTF got a legislative backing under the 
Borno State Vigilante and Youth Empowerment Agency Law of 2015. 
Majority of the participants believed that the counterinsurgency measures had a 
significant impact in containing the Boko Haram violence. Specifically, they applauded 
the National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) document developed in 2014. The 
document contains various measures employed to fight the Boko Haram. Most of the 
participants opined that, put together, the various measures outlined in the NACTEST 
document are capable of successfully ending the Boko Haram insurgency. A key 
component of the Strategy is interagency collaboration of all the security agencies 
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involved in the fight against Boko Haram. The participants recognized and maintained 
that interagency collaboration would assist in resolving the challenge of individualistic 
approach of the security agencies, that sadly, affected the counterinsurgency efforts. The 
participants argued that interagency collaboration had the potential of ensuring an all-
encompassing counterinsurgency approach that would prevent the attitude of turf 
protection and rivalry among the security forces – a situation that resulted in little or no 
cumulative success in the fight against Boko Haram. 
On the flip side, the participants explained why the Boko Haram violence have 
continued in spite of the counterinsurgency policies adopted for fighting it. They stated 
that a major weakness of the federal government counterinsurgency operations was the 
blatant disregard for human rights by security forces. P12 particularly stated that the 
security forces are often arbitrary in their operations, which sadly, often led to killing of 
some innocent citizens and destruction of private properties. In his words, “these excesses 
of the security agencies have cost them the good will and cooperation of the people” 
(P12, 21 March, 2020). With the denial of cooperation of the civil populace, the security 
forces are most of the times, groping in the dark, in their fight against Boko Haram. P12 
went further to say that the absence of civil authority backstopping for the military in 
recovered territories is an undoing of the efforts of the security forces.  
All the participants referenced the split of Boko Haram into factions as another 
factor. The Boko Haram had split into factions, and this often altered its operational 
tactics which enabled it to steadily resist a comprehensive attenuation of its capacity to 
cause mayhem. The participants were also unanimous in their view that corruption is a 
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challenge in the counterinsurgency fight against the Boko Haram. They stated that 
necessary funds are often diverted, leaving just a little for the fight of the insurgency. 
Funds that would have been used for procurement of necessary artillery are often diverted 
to private use. Ironically the Boko Haram fighters are often better equipped with more 
sophisticated equipment. The participants also added that acutely corrupt governance aids 
extremist organizations like Boko Haram to not only being able to motivate indignant 
citizens to join them, but also by providing a haven and logistical support for them for a 
fee.  
Another factor most of the participants pointed out as responsible for the seeming 
inability of the government to end the Boko Haram insurgency is the philosophy behind 
the Boko Haram operations. The participants revealed that the Boko Haram philosophy is 
that of, “a people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”. In 
rejecting what it considers to be the corrupting influence of western civilization, Boko 
Haram seeks to restore Nigeria, starting with the Muslim north, to a strict Islamic state, 
and as a result, consider themselves or Muslims who die or lose property in the course of 
this struggle to be making sacrifices for Islam. Boko Haram is preaching to their 
followers that if they die in this struggle, Allah will reward them with paradise. In the 
words of P10, “this philosophy is what is propelling them, and also the reason many of 
them are ready to be killed or operate as suicide bombers” (P10, 21 March, 2020). 
The participants believed that apart from the internal tacit support from some 
wealthy and influential northern politicians (both inside and outside of government), the 
Boko Haram also has series of external linkages and connections through which they 
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receive funding; training; military equipment; and logistics support. P7 specifically stated 
that it is most probable that Boko Haram funding comes from a wide range of sources, 
including donations made by wealthy Nigerians from the north; Governors; Senators; 
Muslim communities in Europe; Monies from drugs and arms trafficking; and foreign 
terror groups within and outside the African continent, mostly in form of Zakat. The 
participants observed that the continuous sources of funding for the Boko Haram is a 
strong reason that it has been difficult for the Nigerian government to decimate them. 
Another problematic area in the counterinsurgency fight is interagency rivalry and 
competition noticeable among the security agencies involved in the fight. All the 
participants observed that rather than operate on joint problem solving collaborations, 
what exist is that the various paramilitary, intelligence and military institutions involved 
in the counterinsurgency fight, often sadly expend more energy on turf protections which 
resulted in open confrontations and institutional rivalries with consequent intelligence 
failures that often gave advantage to the Boko Haram. The participants noted that the 
personnel of the various services lacked knowledge of the processes and cultures of the 
agencies with which they must collaborate while funding and management of budgets 
constitute problems. They stated that this condition has deepened interagency rivalry and 
thus made collaboration toward a common goal difficult. In the words of P11 for 
example: 
The various policing, intelligence, and military institutions expend more energy on 
claims of hierarchical superiority and mandate wars which sometimes resulted in open 
confrontations and institutional rivalries. Instead of a united, virile and formidable 
security community, jurisdictional claims, professional envy, seniority struggle, and 
interagency enmity have whittled the potential gains of energy that should ensure 
effective management of national security challenges (P11, 21 March, 2020). 
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Emergent Theme 4: Emphasizing Military Response Measures 
Majority of the participants stated that the military responses to the threat 
presented by the Boko Haram insurgency is no doubt the best in Nigeria’s circumstance. 
They anchored their argument on the premise that, “given that the Boko Haram regularly 
step its violence beyond accepted norms of conflict, it is therefore required of the 
government counterinsurgency forces to also step beyond their conventional methods of 
managing regular warfare” (Study Participants, 21 March, 2020). P1 particularly stated 
that because of the massive deaths and destruction of properties arising from the Boko 
Haram violence, the use of military force to quell the violence is not only normal but very 
appropriate. He noted that the protection of lives and property is the primary purpose of 
government, and reasoned that there is need to put a stop to human suffering being 
experienced. P1 concluded by saying that, “without security and peace, or law and order, 
all other functions of the State cannot be carried out” (P1, 21 March, 2020). 
P5 applauded the military measures the Buhari administration took immediately it 
came to power in 2015. He noted that President Buhari took series of military offensives 
that included the transfer of Command headquarters from Abuja to Maiduguri; increased 
deployment of military troops; change of military commanders; increased defense 
budget; increased air power; partial deployment of the Multinational Joint Task Force 
(MNJTF); and tackled the corrupt practices that had brought low morale to the military. 




In his response, P10 argued in favor of military response and postulated that 
insurgency and counterinsurgency should reflect a reciprocal relationship. He stated that 
given the style and magnitude of Boko Haram violence, there is need for Nigerian 
government to do what is called, “balance of terror” by deploying appropriate military 
force. The Boko Haram fighters in Nigeria are known to have less conventional military 
capacity than the federal government forces and so tend to use guerilla tactics to inflict 
damage without allowing their fighters to be engaged by equal or larger government 
forces. Tactics such as bombing, use of IEDs; raids; ambushes; assassinations and 
sabotage are at the forefront of their methods. They take advantage of mobility, stealth, 
deception and surprise to weaken, discredit or paralyze government forces. Boko Haram 
try to manage the tempo and intensity of their activities to permit a level of effort they 
can sustain indefinitely (see Osake & Umoh, 2013). 
Most of the participants indicated their support for use of military force against 
the Boko Haram, while P12 went further to identify three doctrines upon which 
counterinsurgency operations could be based, for maximum results. The doctrines are 
Confrontation, Building and Transfer, which he said, “are to be carried out by a 
combination of an assault force, a support force and a security force” (P12, 21 March, 
2020). P12 reasoned that since the JTF counterinsurgency force draws forces from the 
Police, State Security Service, Navy, Air Force, and the Army, it is required that they 
should be organized under an Assault Force (1st squad), Support Force (2nd squad) and 
Security Force (3rd squad) for strategic and tactical operations with a special uniform 
irrespective of the security unit they represent. In his words: 
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The Military Assault Force is required to confront secured bases and deny Boko Haram 
their sanctuaries. The Support Force is required to build the host community, Thereafter 
the transfer would be made to the civil Security Forces to checkmate criminality. A 
combination of these three holds the possibility of frustrating the Boko Haram (P12, 21 
March, 2020). 
Emergent Theme 5: Key Stakeholders in the Public Policy Development Process 
Participants were requested to share information on their knowledge of the critical 
stakeholders that participated in the development and adoption of the various public 
policy measures that were outlined over time, to address the Boko Haram crisis. Their 
responses showed that some persons in the executive and legislative arms of government 
took part in the development and implementation of many of the various measures 
outlined to resolve the Boko Haram crisis by the Nigerian government. The interviewees 
reported that stakeholders in the executive arm of government were made up of high 
caliber personnel from Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defense; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs. According to the 
participants, experts from other critical Agencies and Departments such as the Armed 
Forces, Intelligence, Judiciary, the Police, Office of the National Security Adviser 
(ONSA), and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) were brought 
together as experts on the basis of their experience, knowledge and specific task to be 
performed in the course of the development and implementation of the policy measures. 
The participants explained that the stakeholders from the legislature were made 
up of legislators from the Senate and the House of Representatives. Stakeholders from 
this group were “specifically the members of the Security and Intelligence Committees of 
both the Senate and the House of Representatives who made useful inputs into the 
Terrorism Prevention Bills at the Committee and Plenary stages” (Study Participants, 25 
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March, 2020). The participants also revealed that other groups of critical stakeholders in 
the Boko Haram Counterinsurgency Policy Development Process included traditional 
rulers, members of Professional bodies, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs), Faith Based Organizations, Women and Youth 
groups, who also made inputs during the drafting and subsequent amendment of the 
Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011 and 2013. 
Emergent Theme 6: Policy Implementation Challenges 
The participants identified a number of challenges in the efforts to implement the 
various public policy measures that were outlined to deal with the Boko Haram crisis. A 
first major challenge the participants identified is the prevalence of poverty and 
unemployment in Nigeria. The participants argued that while there is no empirical 
evidence to show a direct relationship between poverty and extreme violent conflict, 
poverty exacerbates violent conflict in the sense that disenfranchised youths, who are 
jobless and hungry will naturally fill the ranks of Boko Haram in search for food and 
fulfilment. They explained that the same is true of high rate of unemployment. In their 
view, while unemployment does not automatically result in insurgency, evidence from 
history suggests that the existence of this segment of society provides a veritable 
manpower for insurgency (see Kwanashie, 2013). Specifically, P1 noted that “Boko 
Haram members are largely drawn from disaffected youths, frustrated university students 
and jobless or unemployed graduates among them” (P1, 25 March, 2020). 
Closely related to poverty and unemployment is the issue of corruption that has 
become so endemic in the public life of many people in Nigeria. The participants 
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observed that corruption in Nigeria has led to tacit acceptance, collusion or indifference 
by a sizeable segment of the society to issues of Boko Haram insurgency. They expressed 
that this segment of the society believes that the outcome of the Boko Haram insurgency 
will, one way or the other, be to their advantage or that the process of the 
counterinsurgency will benefit them. In the words of P 2 for example, “there is always a 
constituency that benefits or expect to benefit from the insurgency, and when this 
constituency is large, the efforts to combat the insurgency is often difficult” (P2, 25 
March, 2020). He noted that sadly, this is the case with the counterinsurgency efforts 
against the Boko Haram. There have been very grave allegations of corruption against 
government officials conniving with military authorities to siphon or divert into private 
pockets, the funds meant for fighting the insurgency. 
Another major challenge mentioned by most of the participants is the less than 
adequate equipment and training of the personnel involved in the counterinsurgency 
operations. The participants stated that the JTF tends more to carry on the fight as if they 
were battling conventional enemies. They explained that the psychology of suicide-
driven terrorism (as with Boko Haram), aided by advancements in technology such as use 
of Improvised Explosive Devices, present a rather different equation of asymmetrical 
warfare, and that this demands a new line of operational training, equipment, and 
military-public relations policy. The participants stated that suicide bombing makes a 
new decade of terrorism too deadly as the actors are mind-set to destroy, kill and even 
kill themselves. That, it is in a sharp contrast with professional soldiers in battle, who 
“fight, run away, and live to fight again”. The government and its security forces need to 
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understand the psychology of the Boko Haram fighters. They need to understand that 
suicide-driven terrorism in Nigeria is a vicious warfare, advertised and perpetuated by 
extreme violence. Attempts to counter it by brute force and violence alone will only serve 
the purpose of its perpetrators (see Akpuru-Aja & Ibebunjo, 2013). 
Majority of the participants also highlighted the fluid nature of the Boko Haram 
insurgency, which makes it difficult to differentiate the sect members from the civilian 
population in their immediate areas of operation as another challenge to the 
counterinsurgency measures. P4 noted that the fluid nature of the Boko Haram often 
makes it difficult to track and arrest them or even to combat them without inflicting sort 
of collateral damage on the communities. The attacks by the Boko Haram are usually 
carried out by small cells, using hit and run operational strategy which tends more to 
frustrate the Nigerian security forces, who are usually not professionals in 
counterinsurgency combat. Again, the Boko Haram do not have uniforms or any 
distinguishing dress code or easily identifiable members. Boko Haram members launch 
attack and run easily to mix with civil population in the communities. In the words of P4, 
“it remains a challenge on how the armed forces would confront the Boko Haram with 
force in built up areas, without unacceptable damage on the civilian population” (P4, 25 
March, 2020). P6 observed that Boko Haram have infiltrated the rank and file of 
government officials, the intelligentsia, religious scholars and leaders, politicians and 
sadly, security agencies, making confronting them to be difficult due largely to leaked 
strategies and sabotage. P6 stated that, “there is problem of human shield” (P6, 25 March, 
2020). The human shield nature of the insurgency is the fluid nature of the Boko Haram 
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that makes it difficult to distinguish them from the other civilian population made up of 
politicians, government workers, Islamic religious leaders and the masses who may also 
be apologetic to the Boko Haram or afraid to take action against members of the group 
for larger religious and political considerations. Most times, it is not easy for the security 
forces to fight the Boko Haram without recording casualties among the civilian 
population. 
The participants also expressed the possibility of very strong external links or 
networks between Boko Haram and terrorist Islamic groups in Mali, Libya, Somalia, 
Yemen, Sudan and Afghanistan as another challenge in the containment efforts of the 
Nigerian government. P8 specifically indicated that: 
The link between Boko Haram and Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is rumored 
to be very strong. According to a statement purportedly signed by one of its leaders 
named Abu Mus’ab Abdel Wadoud (which appeared on Islamic websites that often carry 
statements from groups using the Al Qaida name around the world), AQIM had offered 
to give Muslims in Nigeria training and weapons to fight their Christian counterparts. 
Abu Mus’ab Abdel Wadoud was quoted to have said, “we are ready to train your people 
in weapons, and give you whatever support we can, in men, arms and ammunitions to 
enable you defend our people in Nigeria” (P8, 25 March, 2020). 
It is worthwhile to note here that in 2008, Reuters reported that Al Qaida Islamist 
militants renewed their threat to bomb targets in Nigeria (Reuters, 2008). Also it was 
reported that Osama Bin Laden stated that Nigeria, one of the world’s biggest exporters 
of Crude Oil, was as ripe for Jihad (see Akpuru-Aja & Ibebunjo, 2013). 
Most of the participants also reported the highly explosive mix of ethnocentrism, 
religion and politics as another major challenge to tackling Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria. The participants explained that Nigeria is divided along ethnic and religious 
lines, and this has resulted to a situation where highly placed northern leaders, Islamic 
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clerics, politicians and the intelligentsia often work at cross-purposes, and rather than act 
as proactive National Security Vanguards, they unfortunately often act as ethno-religious 
crusaders and bigots. The participants noted that officials at various tiers of government 
are usually afraid to take any action against the Boko Haram for reasons of religious and 
political considerations. P11 stated, “indeed, political leaders often use religion as a pivot 
to project themselves into political offices and prominence” (P11, 25 March, 2020). 
Emergent Theme 7: Identifying Effectual Public Policy Options 
The participants identified a number of public policy measures that will most 
effectively address the challenge of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, given the 
measures so far taken and the myriad of challenges experienced in the course of 
implementation of those measures. Most of the participants advocated for use of 
enhanced technology in the fight against Boko Haram. They explained that enhanced 
technology could assist Nigeria’s counterinsurgency operations to overcome Boko Haram 
and other terrorist groups in the country. They suggested that technology in the areas of 
criminal records and identification systems, Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
Technology, Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking, Noise Sensors that detect 
explosives, Fingerprint Scanning and Continuous Information Gathering and Sharing 
among others, could be deployed for counterinsurgency efforts.  
The participants advised the Nigerian government to accelerate the pace of 
technological development of the country through engineering and technology 
acquisition from countries such as China, Israel, United States of America and Germany 
among others. Efforts to enhance technology needs to effectively integrate the private 
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sector participation in technology acquisition. In this regard, it is important for the 
Nigerian government to encourage private sector involvement in funding of technology 
(see Udeh, 2013). 
The participants identified Increased International Cooperation as another policy 
measure that will resolve the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. They stated that Boko Haram 
is a major potential terrorist threat affecting Nigeria and other countries in view of its 
affiliation with Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. It is on record that Nigeria’s 
National Security Adviser (NSA) has been working with other African governments, 
European and Middle Eastern governments to build cooperation against Boko Haram (see 
Udeh, 2013). P11 observed that “increased international cooperation against terrorism 
generally and Boko Haram in particular, is a good prospect for Nigeria’s 
counterinsurgency efforts” (P11, 25 March, 2020). P2 and P4 advocated for the 
strengthening of UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CTS). In their opinion, “the 
CTS promotes democracy, dialogue and good governance that will tackle the root causes 
of radicalization” (P2 & P4, 25 March, 2020). The UN CTS has a Plan of Action (PoA) 
including measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; 
measures to prevent and combat terrorism; and measures to ensure respect for human 
rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism. The 
participants noted that the UN CTS gives hope for a united global commitment to fight 
and defeat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations committed by whomever, 
wherever and for whatever purposes.  
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All the participants expressed desire for good governance in Nigeria. They 
explained that good governance is an important factor in the fight against the Boko 
Haram in Nigeria. They expressed concern that the root causes driving the Boko Haram 
membership will be better addressed through good governance. In their view, “good 
governance in all tiers of government in Nigeria will promote socio-economic 
development, national cohesion and integration, achieve poverty reduction, employment 
generation and youth empowerment” (Study Participants, 25 March, 2020). P12 added 
that good governance will encourage peaceful resolution of conflict, promote dialogue 
and inclusiveness, and enhance service delivery. 
Most of the participants emphasized the establishment or creation of what they 
called “Infrastructure for Peace” as one effectual measure that could be deployed to 
address the Boko Haram crisis. Infrastructure for Peace is a network of interdependent 
systems, resources, values and skills held by government, civil society and community 
institutions that promote dialogue and consultation; prevent conflict and enable peaceful 
mediation when violence occurs in a society. The participants explained that societies 
with strong Infrastructure for Peace are resilient, and has different groups of people that 
are able to engage constructively to address potential causes of conflict as in the case of 
Boko Haram. They stated that Infrastructure for Peace entails establishing effective local, 
community and national institutions that can engage and collaborate to deal with conflict 
challenges in an inclusive and peaceful manner. P12 specifically explained key 
components of Infrastructure for Peace to include “Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions, Ceasefire and Peace Agreement Monitoring, Peace Education, Insider and 
159 
 
Third-Party Mediation; and Conciliation, Donor Support and Technical Assistance; and 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Restorative Programs” (P12, 30 March, 2020).  
P7 advocated an All Stakeholders Approach that involves the public, security 
agencies, international community, private sector and civil society working together to 
combat Boko Haram and enhance Counter Terrorism efforts in Nigeria. He stated that 
“political will, broad leadership and policy commitment towards building a strong 
network and consensus around peace and conflict management will yield desired results 
in the efforts to fight Boko Haram” (P7, 30 March, 2020). 
 P11 advocated for the policy of continuous intelligence gathering as part of 
frantic efforts to contend with the challenge of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. That 
government and relevant security agencies should increase covert operations in strategic 
spots like schools, motor parks, markets and all similar spots across the country. He 
claimed that technology led intelligence has not been accorded the needed attention and 
stated that “the establishment of Strategic Command Centers that include all network 
service providers and security agencies be stationed in all police posts including borders 
and roadblocks in the country” (P11, 30 March, 2020). 
Emergent Theme 8: Future Policy Research 
The participants observed that there was need to provide policy makers with 
pragmatic, action-oriented policy options that will most effectively address the problem 
of the current insurgency and any future armed insurgency in Nigeria. Most of them 
claimed that the counterinsurgency policy of the federal government failed to recognize 
the significant role of intellectuals and members of the academia. They believed that 
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policy research could provide complementary role of analysis and research support in 
addressing the threat of Boko Haram and to develop theories as well as making 
suggestions that will give better results. In the words of P12 for example, “policy 
research has the potential of ensuring an all-encompassing counterinsurgency approach 
that would prevent the preference of military approach, that so far seem not to have 
achieved desired results” (P12, 30 March,2020). 
The participants explained that making policy decisions on Boko Haram requires 
the understanding of many inputs such as the views and wishes of people in the affected 
constituency, stories or experiences of people, and the existing policies. They claimed 
that policy research will make counterinsurgency towards Boko Haram active and will 
result in distinct collaborative responsibilities of intelligence gathering, analysis and 
dissemination. The participants expressed that policy research will determine how to 
properly mitigate the negative impacts of the insurgency both in the immediate and long 
terms as it relates to the provision of the necessary conducive environment for 
humanitarian intervention like reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration programs 
for the victims of the insurgency. 
Summary of the Results 
The violence arising from the Boko Haram insurgency underscores the need to 
improve the understanding of the public policy interventions that should address the root 
causes of the insurgency, as well as ameliorate its consequences or impacts on the 
citizens. As with most terrorist groups, Boko Haram has been adept at evolving its 
strategies as well as developing justifications for its actions. It continues to kill and maim. 
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Its actions have shattered communities, displaced thousands and caused mass migration, 
putting areas with limited resources under immense pressure. 
The violent disposition of the Boko Haram has resulted in wanton destruction of 
innocent lives and the efforts of the government to address the situation appears not to be 
yielding the desired results (Botha et al., 2017; Aderonke, 2015). Also, the Boko Haram 
violence has presented one of the greatest threats to the internal security of Nigeria 
(Onuoha, 2014). The sect is guided by extreme ideology and is focused on establishing an 
absolute Islamic state in some parts of the northern states of Nigeria (Osuji, 2013). A 
genuine foundation for effective public policy must therefore seek to facilitate and 
sustain, amongst other measures, a culture of proactive alert system which is a veritable 
tool to proactively sensitize, caution and protect the people (Ozumba, 2014). 
The spiraling of domestic and societal violence in Nigeria needs to be stopped 
through public policy that envisages a comprehensive multi-actor engagement framework 
(Ojelade, 2018). The more a society is able to control the spiral of violence, the higher 
the level of peace, social harmony and development (IPCR, 2016a). Public policy thrust 
is therefore expected to balance the objectives of efficiency, effectiveness and equity in 
order to ensure harmonious coexistence and socioeconomic and political advancement. 
Providing security in a violence prone society like Nigeria requires a locale-specific 
definition and understanding of policies that enables security and address the fears, 
anxieties and aspirations of the people (IPCR, 2016a). Thus, improving the understanding 
of the Boko Haram counterinsurgency policy development and implementation will 
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provide a lead to policy direction that can facilitate better approaches for dealing with 
Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.  
From the lens of the participants, the public policy measures that have been 
adopted by the Nigerian government are embodied in emergent themes 2, and 6, while 
the impact of the Boko Haram violence is covered in theme 1. The participants explained 
that in order to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency, the federal 
government of Nigeria embarked on series of measures like use of military force; 
formation of MNJTF; development of National Counterterrorism Strategy; amendment of 
Anti-Terrorism Act; and border closure with neighboring countries. Other measures, 
according to the participants, are declaration of state of emergency; establishment of the 
North East Development Commission; and mounting of security check points on major 
roads and strategic locations across the country. 
A key issue is the role of the military in the counterinsurgency. The participants 
noted that a purely military means is bound to be counterproductive. It is the view of the 
participants that there is need to foster closer cooperation among the military, police and 
civil government especially for gathering and sharing of intelligence. They believed that 
a political solution will be ideal, but that the political and economic irritants must be first 
identified and removed. However, some of the participants are of the view that 
counterinsurgency measures should be strict and brute because the Boko Haram do not 
also value the lives of the people they unleash violence on. 
The participants also noted that apart from lives that have been lost and properties 
destroyed due to the violence of Boko Haram, economic activities have been stalled in 
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the affected areas. Banks in some of those areas have been forced to close. Petrol/gas 
stations and day to day economic activities of law abiding citizens in places like 
Maiduguri and Damaturu among others, have been adversely affected. There is a glaring 
lack of development.  
Emergent Themes 3 and 6 embodies the reasons for the seeming inability of the 
federal government to end the Boko Haram violence. The participants believed that 
governance crisis in Nigeria over the years especially since the return to civil rule in 1999 
has led to failure of government to deliver quality service to the people, thus precipitating 
high level of discontent, poor infrastructure, poverty and unemployment. They argued 
that bad governance constitutes a big challenge to combating Boko Haram. The 
participants stated that corruption is a big threat to counterinsurgency fight against Boko 
Haram. They also noted that the guerilla tactics often used by Boko Haram is a drawback 
to counterinsurgency efforts because guerilla tactics is not easily amenable to 
conventional military engagements.  
Other drawbacks to the counterinsurgency efforts explained by the participants 
are, under-funding of insurgency fight; inadequate fighting equipment; lack of training 
for personnel involved in the fight against Boko Haram; support to the Boko Haram by 
wealthy and influential people both within and outside the government; Boko Haram’s 
many sources of funding and wide network including external links with other Islamic 
terrorist organizations like AQIM and Al Shabab; interagency rivalry and competition 
among security agencies involved in the counterinsurgency fight; and the Boko Haram 
philosophy, which seeks the imposition of its interpretation of Islam and desire to purge 
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Islam of outside influences. Boko Haram treats anything western as completely un-
Islamic. It considers western influence on Islamic society as the basis of the religion’s 
weakness. Hence Boko Haram’s declaration that conventional banking, taxation, 
jurisprudence, western education and indeed all western institutions are infidel and as 
such must be avoided by true Muslims, even at the expense of their lives (see Onuoha, 
2013).  
Participants’ perspectives on the policy measures that they believe to be potential 
solutions to containing the challenge of Boko Haram insurgency are embodied in 
emergent themes 5, 7 and 8. The participants were unanimous on the need to apply the 
cardinal principle of good governance at all tiers of government in Nigeria. They 
expressed that government at all levels should perform their social contract with the 
people through the rights-based approach to governance. That government must pursue 
balanced development based on the principles of equality of all citizens and communities, 
and prevent manipulation of power by officials for pecuniary gains. The participants 
enthused that good governance will involve all such concrete steps as the formulation of 
appropriate policies and their implementation; accountability and transparency; 
adherence to democratic principles and practices and the rule of law.  
Closely related to good governance is the establishment of national Infrastructure 
for Peace, that provides a holistic framework for coordinating and channeling national 
institutions, structures, mechanisms and resources towards effective and sustainable 
peacebuilding and conflict management. The participants explained that Infrastructure for 
Peace is an initiative for an overarching framework for understanding, enabling, 
165 
 
empowering and coordinating appropriate policies, institutions and structures that are 
necessary to support peace in Nigeria. Other measures under these themes include 
deployment of technological infrastructure like CCTV, GPS tracking, Noise Sensors and 
Finger Scanning; Continuous Intelligence Gathering; De-radicalization programs for 
youths; Increased International Cooperation and the institution of an All-Stakeholder 
Approach to counterinsurgency operations. The participants suggested that Policy 
Research should be encouraged in all institutions of higher learning and relevant research 
institutes, where people will read, research and report policies, the outcome of which 
should feed into policy making for future engagements that seeks to mitigate the negative 
impacts of the insurgency. 
Summary 
Chapter 4 is an account of how I conducted the research. It contains the context of 
the study as well as the findings with respect to the research questions. The findings of 
the study are from the data that was gathered from interviews with 12 participants. The 
purpose of the study was to improve the understanding of the public policy measures that 
will be a solution in the efforts to address the challenges of Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria. Eight themes emerged from the data analysis, including 1. Impact of Boko 
Haram violence on welfare and public safety.  2.Counterinsurgency policies adopted to 
restrain Boko Haram violence.  3. Assessing the efficacy of counterinsurgency policies.  
4.Emphasizing military response measures.  5.Key stakeholders in the public policy 
development process.  6.Policy implementation challenges.  7.Identifying effectual public 
policy options, and 8. Future policy research. 
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Significant finding mirrors the favor of good governance as a pivotal policy to 
contain Boko Haram in Nigeria. The findings point to the fact that the solution to the 
continuing spate of Boko Haram violence in Nigeria cannot be solely by use of military 
force. Force can only quell the violent insurgency but will not address the fundamental 
forces that propel it in the first place. The Nigerian state by its present nature and form is 
weak. It has been weakened over the years by corruption, nepotism, sectionalism, 
tribalism and gross ineptitude in the management of national resources (Kwanashie, 
2012). Weak institutions, self-centered political class, religious fanaticism, greed and 
crass materialism has undermined the ability of Nigeria to address the basic needs of the 
people and further undermined its ability to end the Boko Haram insurgency.  
In Chapter 5, I explained the findings of the study and discussed how the themes 
support literature. Also, included in Chapter 5 are the identified limitations of the study, 





Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to aid in better understanding the 
public policy measures that will help to address the violence of the Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria. The study was based on the proposition that having a better 
understanding of public policy measures targeted at resolving the Boko Haram crisis will 
not only help end the Boko Haram violence, but will also promote cohesion and harmony 
between decisions and actions on peace and security for all people in Nigeria. I used the 
qualitative case study approach. I considered the case study approach suitable based on 
the purpose of the study and the type of research data involved. Again, this approach was 
adopted because it allowed room for use of multiple sources of data for the building of a 
comprehensive representation of the views and statements of the public policy experts on 
the violence of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Hoon (2013) observed that a case 
study approach makes it convenient for researchers to examine phenomena in an in-depth 
and holistic way, using a few cases or a single case. 
I used three major sources of data for the research, which included participant 
interviews, archival documents, and my observational field notes. I selected the 
participants specifically for their experience and knowledge of the subject of the research. 
Semistructured, open-ended interviews were used to capture the views and statements of 
the participants. Findings of the study are in relation to (a) the impact of Boko Haram 
violence on welfare and public safety, (b) counterinsurgency policies adopted to restrain 
Boko Haram violence, (c) assessing the efficacy of counterinsurgency policies, (d) 
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emphasizing military response measures, (e) key stakeholders in the public policy 
development process, (f) policy implementation challenges, (g) identifying effectual 
public policy options, and (h) future policy research. 
Overview of Emergent Themes 
Eight themes emerged from the study after a careful analysis of the data. I used 
the themes to derive meaning to the findings as follows: 
 The impact of the violence of Boko Haram was a high concern. The themes that 
emerged from several responses from the participants in the study showed 
resultant death of many innocent people, including women and children; 
disruption of academic, social, and economic activities; destruction of property 
and internal displacement of people; and the undermining of religious harmony 
between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, but particularly in the north. 
 Due to the disastrous impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on the people in 
Nigeria, the federal government adopted a number of public policy measures not 
only to contain the violence but also to mitigate the negative impacts of the 
violence through strategic programmatic interventions like food, shelter, 
medicals, and other forms of humanitarian assistance to victims in various IDP 
camps across the northeast. 
 The efficacy of several public policy measures that have been adopted by the 
Nigerian government to curtail the violence of the Boko Haram remain a great 
concern. The participants expressed that much still needs to be done. 
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 Use of military force as a policy of containment to the Boko Haram violence 
deserves a boost that should come with some reform such that citizens’ human 
rights are respected and efforts are ensured to minimize or avoid collateral 
damage during military operations. 
 Analysis of the responses of the research participants revealed that certain critical 
stakeholders were involved in the Boko Haram counterinsurgency policy 
development process. The themes that emerged from the responses of the 
participants revealed a collaborative framework of critical stakeholders that 
included senior government officials from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the National Emergency Management Agency, members of the 
armed forces, the Office of the National Security Adviser, members of the 
legislature, traditional and religious leaders, and members of civil society 
organizations. 
 The counterinsurgency policies against the Boko Haram experienced many 
implementation challenges. The themes derived from the participants’ responses 
revealed that these challenges account for the Boko Haram violence continuing 
despite the public policy measures taken by the government to end it. The 
challenges include governmental corruption, ethnicity and religion, lack of 
adequate funding of the counterinsurgency operations, and Boko Haram’s many 
sources of funding. 
 Good governance and the adoption of a holistic framework for peace, conflict 
resolution, and national reconciliation were derived from the analysis of themes 
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from the various interview discussions on the public policy measures that have the 
greater chances of ending the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Many other 
significant statements of the participants with respect to effectual public policy 
measures include continuous intelligence gathering and the use of modern 
technology to fight Boko Haram. 
 There is a need for future policy research. This theme emerged from the 
statements of the study participants who believe that research plays an 
indispensable role in the development of policy. In addressing issues of terrorist 
violence, studies that inform policy on the nature, types, dynamics, and drivers of 
terrorist actions and their interrelationships are vital. 
Theoretical Background to Findings 
The Boko Haram insurgency has led to a humanitarian crisis comparable to the 
one experienced during the Nigeria-Biafra civil war of 1967–1970 (Botha et al., 2017; 
Madu & Madu, 2013). Boko Haram have attacked churches, mosques, schools, 
government offices, police and military barracks, markets, and other public places. With 
these attacks, communities have been severely stressed by the increasing threats to 
security, causing daily physical and psychological shock. Many women have been killed, 
widowed, raped, or kidnapped by Boko Haram to become sex slaves, cooks, and 
conveyors of munitions. A few women rescued from Boko Haram camps returned 
pregnant, traumatized, disoriented, and generally unwell (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). 
Given the counterinsurgency operations, the concept of national security has 
come under two schools of thought, namely, the state-centric school of thought and the 
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human needs school of thought (Burton, 1990; Imobighe, 2010). The State-centric school 
looks at national security simply as military and related responses to the threats against 
the nation. For this school, national security entails a formidable military build-up for the 
protection of the nation and defense of its territorial integrity (Imobighe, 2010). 
Furthermore, this school is of the view that national security is the capability of the state 
to deter potential aggressors, or should deterrence fail, bring any conflict to a conclusion 
favorable to the state (Imobighe, 2010).  
The Human needs school, on the other hand, holds the view that national security 
should go beyond the management of military threats to accommodate human related 
problems (Adedoyin, 2013). Thus, this school posits that non-military issues such as 
poverty; unemployment; safety from hunger; diseases; repression, harmful disruption of 
daily life, food security, personal security, community, political and environmental 
security are within the domains of national security (Ewa, 2017). This thought is in 
concert with the idea of the United Nations, which sees human needs centered security as 
paramount to the concept of the overall national security (Ewa, 2017). National security 
is inherently dynamic and selective. Outside its traditional focus on the safety of the 
nation, it could, at any given time, bring into its domain for ad hoc attention, any human 
problem adjudged through threat analysis to be real or potential threat to the nation. The 
violence of the Boko Haram insurgency falls into the category of human made problems 
that constitutes threat to security of the Nigerian state and its residents. 
Human-made problems devolve to human security. The broad concept of human 
security was first outlined in the 1994 HDR from the United Nations Development 
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Program (UNDP). The Report argued that human security rests on two pillars: freedom 
from want and freedom from fear (UNDP, 1994). The broader view of human security 
includes food security, adequate shelter, security from poverty and threats to human 
dignity. It is in this context that the findings of the study should promote better 
understanding of the public policy measures that will be a solution in the efforts to end 
the Boko Haram crisis. 
Interpretation of Findings 
Impact of Boko Haram Violence on Welfare and Public Safety 
Many participants during the study research interviews described the outbreak of 
Boko Haram insurgency in 2009 as the worst kind of security challenge to the Nigerian 
nation. The data confirmed the literature that the attacks by the Boko Haram in the north 
east region continue to cause deaths, displacements, destruction of livelihoods and 
violation of human rights. Many of the victims, mostly women and girls, have been 
raped, abducted and forcibly married, while basic services, notably schools and health 
facilities are being systematically destroyed in the region (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). 
In relation to the literature review, it is conceivable that the views and experiences of the 
participants affirm what Nwolise (2013) observed when he stated that Boko Haram 
violence is destroying lives and property; increasing the North-South schism; killing 
commerce and education in the North; and sending the North back to the dark ages. It 
will be recalled that in July 2013, the Boko Haram massacred several Ibadan traders who 
went to Monguno area of Borno state to buy wares, stealing their N25 million naira to 
finance their insurgency. They also set a school hostel ablaze in Yobe state, heartlessly 
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roasting tens of innocent school children and their teachers in the same month (Nwolise, 
2013). 
On May 18, 2020, Boko Haram insurgents attacked Dapchi, a town in Busari 
local government area of Yobe state. Reports has it that Boko Haram burnt down many 
houses and thereby causing a high displacement of people. Dapchi first came into 
national light on February 19, 2018, when Boko Haram abducted 117 female students 
from a secondary school in the town. While a few of the students died in captivity, the 
others have been released except Leah Sharibu, the only Christian girl who refused to 
renounce her faith and is still being held till date (The Cable News, May 2020). It is 
expected that many of the negative impacts of the Boko Haram insurgency can be 
effectively tackled through sound policy making involving planning and implementation 
(Ozumba, 2014). Dealing with challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency in a haphazard 
and unsystematic manner has proved ineffective and costly, and this was well pointed out 
by the participants. 
Counterinsurgency Policies Adopted to Restrain Boko Haram Violence 
Counterinsurgency measures occurred in response to the attacks from the Boko 
Haram. As pointed out by the participants, the federal government of Nigeria adopted 
several strategies to fight Boko Haram, confirming the literature that counterinsurgency 
policy was initiated in response to Boko Haram attacks (Ojelade, 2018; Osakwe & 
Umoh, 2013; Udeh, 2013). The Boko Haram attacks delineates the character of the 
security question, which determines the dynamics of defense strategy. It therefore 
remains an obligation for authorities in Nigeria to adopt policies or take measures to 
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prevent aggression by protecting the state, its core values and interests from internal and 
external threats. For Nigeria to wage a successful war against Boko Haram violence, it 
must define a policy that will meet political purposes, and credible enough to alter 
positions of the targets in the long run. 
Such a policy would be a combination of both counter and anti-terrorism 
strategies (Ochoeche, 2013). This include the operationalization of the National 
Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) as a working template for countering terrorism. 
The NACTEST contains 7 sections including forestalling terrorism, securing the public 
and key national infrastructure, and identifying terrorists and their sponsors. 
Assessing the Efficacy of the Counterinsurgency Policies 
From the perspectives of the participants, although much still needs to be done, 
the counterinsurgency policy towards Boko Haram has to some extent impacted the fight 
positively. Boko Haram no longer place claim to any territory in Nigeria. The findings 
confirm the literature that many of the Boko Haram members have been killed and some 
of them have been arrested and tried in courts (Adibe, 2014; Onuoha, 2014). It must 
however be emphasized that Boko Haram has not been decimated as claimed in certain 
quarters by some government officials in Nigeria. The security forces are still having a 
hard time in the containment efforts against the Boko Haram. The military continues to 
suffer heavy casualties while Boko Haram attacks on villages or communities in the 
affected states of the north east is yet unabated. No one knows the next port of call for the 
Boko Haram members and when they would strike. There is palpable fear and the 
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economic activities in the area is still near absent, as investors continue to stay away from 
the area (Botha et al., 2017). 
Emphasizing Military Response Measures 
The findings were that the use of military intervention as a policy is warranted, 
given the large-scale loss of lives and human suffering occasioned by the Boko Haram 
insurgency. Military force is one critical instrument that provides the sword for policy 
makers, and the military itself is an instrument of conflict resolution and foreign policies 
of nations. More often than not, the use of military force is required to tackle, prevent, 
preempt and deter through force, the Boko Haram from achieving their premeditated 
violent attacks on soft targets. Some of the study participants argued that military 
operations required to be strict and brute because the Boko Haram do not value the lives 
of the people they often inflict violence on. 
As noted by Opukri and Etekpe (2013), coercive power and military force play 
fundamental roles in the management of insurgency. They ensure maintenance of 
national security by reinforcing adequacy of military capability and mobility. However, 
concern exists that heavy-handed use of military power is likely to be counterproductive 
(Osakwe & Umoh, 2013). A direct relationship should exist between the appropriate use 
of force and successful counterinsurgency. Thus, when military force is used, it must be 
precise, discriminating and accurate. Osakwe and Umoh (2013) noted that the military 
role in counterinsurgency in Nigeria has resulted in heavy but avoidable collateral 
damage made possible by the overwhelming preponderance of military force and poor 
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intelligence. Experience has shown that the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is 
sustained by good intelligence, high morale, secure bases and outside assistance. 
Key Stakeholders in the Policy Development Process 
The study result showed that a number of critical stakeholders engaged in 
collective security duty to develop and adopt some public policy measures targeted at 
ending the Boko Haram violence. Membership of these stakeholders were drawn from 
the Nigerian public, legislature, security agencies, international community, private 
sector operators, traditional institutions and civil society, working in synergy to fight the 
Boko Haram and enhance counterinsurgency efforts in Nigeria. This collaborative effort 
was evidenced in the literature review where Akpuru-Aja and Ibebunjo (2013) remarked 
that with collaborative spirit, there is need for the National Security Adviser (NSA) 
Office to liaise with other stakeholders in lieu of security duties to develop modalities on 
central Coordinating Intelligence Fusion Center. With this, each agency will be at liberty 
to access peculiar intelligence related to duty performance, and willing to collaborate 
with other relevant agencies. 
Policy Implementation Challenges 
In spite of the different public policy measures that have been adopted to fight 
Boko Haram, its attacks are still continuing due largely to challenges experienced in the 
course of implementation. The study confirmed that the general failure of effective and 
coordinated intelligence gathering and its deployment to forestall attacks was a high point 
in the implementation challenges to counterinsurgency fight against Boko Haram. 
Closely linked to weak intelligence gathering are poverty and illiteracy in the North East 
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Nigeria; massive unemployment of youths; existence of private militias established and 
used by politicians who later dump them; presence of large numbers of almajeri children 
(traditional Quranic education pupils) who are easily used to ignite and sustain violence; 
influx of illegal aliens resulting from porous borders and unmanned borders; and corrupt 
government characterized by weak social contract with the people. All these, in the view 
of Opukri and Etekpe (2013), “have made terrorism fashionable” (p.385). 
Literature review alludes to the fact that the modus operandi of the Boko Haram 
sect has led some people to conclude that there have emerged Political Boko Haram, 
Religious Boko Haram, and Criminal Boko Haram (Udeh, 2013). Effective and properly 
coordinated intelligence should easily find out the people in the various groups and 
develop mechanisms that will prevent persons in any of the groups to execute their 
subversive agenda. 
Nigeria, like most nations of the world, has both foreign and domestic intelligence 
outfits: The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the State Security Service (SSS), 
respectively. Elsewhere in the world, and like in Nigeria, most nations have their 
intelligence outfits, but the nature of each agency varies according to the political 
cultures, legal systems and bureaucratic styles of each country (Akpan, 2013). The UK 
has the Secret Intelligence Service (M16) as its foreign intelligence arm and the Security 
Service (M15) as the domestic intelligence. The US has the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) as its foreign intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the 
domestic intelligence. Russia has the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) as its foreign 
intelligence and the Federal Security Service as its domestic intelligence. France has the 
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General Directorate for External Security (GDES) as its foreign intelligence and the 
General Intelligence (RG) as its domestic intelligence. Germany has the Federal 
Intelligence Service (BND) as its foreign intelligence and the Federal Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution (BFV) as its domestic intelligence. All these services have 
to be very efficient in order to safeguard the national security of the various states 
(Akpan, 2013). 
The participants in the study also pointed out that the bourgeois (ruling political 
elites) have not helped the counterinsurgency fight against Boko Haram by resorting to 
the ethnic and or religious sentiments in keeping their hold on political power and 
allowing Boko Haram terrorism to flourish in Nigeria. For example, it took some 
northern leaders a long time to speak out in condemnation of the activities of Boko 
Haram. The leaders spoke out, only when it became obvious that Boko Haram did not 
mean well for anybody irrespective of religious, ethnic, social, and political affiliation. 
Others kept mute because they fear reprisal attacks or failure to continue to gain or enjoy 
whatever advantage (Nweze, 2012). Instead of condemning the criminal acts of Boko 
Haram in unequivocal terms, many of the Islamic religious leaders and political elites 
from the north tacitly supports the activities of Boko Haram,  
Identifying Effectual Public Policy Options 
From the perspectives of the participants’ responses, the study discovered the 
public policy measures that are capable of ending the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, 
if implemented. The public policy measures are Good Governance; Mechanism of an 
Infrastructure for Peace; Use of Modern Technology; Continuous Intelligence Gathering; 
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Increased International Cooperation; and the Cooperation of all Stakeholders in the fight 
against Boko Haram. Critical among these measures, is the policy of good governance. 
Good governance involves concrete steps like the formulation of appropriate policies and 
their implementation; accountability and transparency; adherence to democratic 
principles and practices; and adherence to the rule of law The participants stressed that 
good governance is an important element in the fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria. 
Good governance in Nigeria will facilitate peaceful resolution of conflicts and promote 
socio-economic development, national cohesion and integration. Enthronement of good 
governance in all tiers of government will facilitate poverty reduction, employment 
generation and youth empowerment. As observed by Udeh (2013), governance deficits 
over the years in Nigeria and particularly in the north east has generated high 
unemployment among the youths, and poverty in the midst of plenty. The lack of good 
governance has led to failure of government to deliver quality service to the people, 
thereby precipitating high level of discontent, poor infrastructure and unemployment. 
The Mo Ibrahim African Governance Index Report for the year 2018 ranked 
Nigeria 33 position out of 54 countries in Africa. The Report in its assessment of Nigeria 
on transparency and accountability, rule of law and human rights, human development 
and health infrastructure had a poor verdict on the overall quality of governance and 
leadership. Nigeria was also ranked 14 out of 178 countries, in the 2019 Global Failed 
State Index Survey released by the Fund for Peace – a US based organization. The 
countries worse than Nigeria are Zimbabwe, Guinea and Chad. Out of the 120 negative 
marks evaluated, Nigeria scored 98.5. Areas of poor performance include mass 
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movement of refugees and internally displaced people; chronic and sustained human 
flight; uneven economic development; poverty; sharp or severe economic decline, 
progressive deterioration of public services; and violation of human rights and rule of 
law. It should be expected that when a state fails, there would be a number of internal 
forces contesting to replace the state in some aspects. When a state is incapable of 
protecting its citizens, groups would emerge to offer such protection. When a state is 
perceived by its people as being unjust, forces will emerge to challenge perceived 
injustices. The Nigerian state has failed to drive society and the economy in a progressive 
manner towards a just and egalitarian trajectory (Kwanashie, 2012) 
Given the lens of good governance, such critical issues often requiring to be 
checked, like poverty, unemployment, and corruption are a common sight. Reduction of 
poverty is a fundamental principle of governance that should be addressed. This is 
because poverty has been identified as a cross-cutting issue in most conflicts. Poverty is 
the foundation of insecurity dilemma in Nigeria, and as Adam Smith, one of the 
architects of capitalism, once said, “no society can surely be flourishing and happy, of 
which by far the greater part of the numbers are poor and miserable” (Akpan, 2013, 
p.37). 
More than three quarters of Nigerians are poor and miserable. These are reflected 
in short life span, malnutrition, low literacy rate, social insecurity and uncertain future. 
Millions suffer from conditions of absolute poverty and poverty trap (Akpan, 2013). The 
World Poverty Clock gave an insight into the state of poverty in Nigeria. In June 2018, it 
named Nigeria as the world’s poverty capital. With an estimated Nigerian population of 
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over 206 million, more than half of the people live on less than $1 per day (Sahara 
Reporters, June 5, 2019). The exploitation of poverty situations by political and economic 
actors and community leaders have triggered, escalated and sustained many crisis, 
including insurgency and terrorism. 
Unemployment is a source of conflict, especially in the context of rising cost of 
living and large array of unemployed young people. Good governance should be able to 
resolve it through, the promotion of job-creating enterprises and opportunities by 
government and private sector; skills acquisition programs of government, civil society 
and the private sector; and the provision of accessible quality education, rather than 
certificate allocation. 
Transparency at all levels of governance will reduce corruption-induced violent 
conflicts in Nigeria, including the Boko Haram insurgency. Transparency International 
(the global anticorruption watch dog) in its 2019 Report, ranked Nigeria 146 out of 180 
countries with a score of 26 out of 100. The Report placed Nigeria as the second most 
corrupt country after Equatorial Guinea in the West African Region. The unprecedented 
levels of corruption in Nigeria have permeated into the fabrics of national lives of many 
people. Records of misappropriation and embezzlement of common wealth by custodians 
of public offices in the country, that have been exposed are mind-boggling. Imobighe 
(2013) saw corruption as a big security problem, because it robs the country of huge 
developmental resources it could put to good use, like providing industries or starting 
unemployment benefit to mitigate the discontent spreading across the country. 
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The study participants also saw the instrumentality of a National Infrastructure for 
Peace as capable of resolving the Boko Haram crisis. The Infrastructure for Peace is a 
new approach in peacebuilding which gained momentum after locally led and 
participatory peacebuilding practices tended to yield effective results in some countries 
beset by violent conflicts. It underpins the ideas of conflict transformation and 
emphasizes on under-girding the politically negotiated settlements at top level by 
peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots (Adimula, 2019). Reducing the likelihood of 
violence requires adopting a strategic approach, strengthening local and national 
institutionalized processes, and the building of dialogue and mediation skills.  
Thus, Infrastructure for Peace engages all levels of society and connects 
peacebuilding tracks to form a platform for constructive relationship between relevant 
stakeholders. It reflects an inclusivity that challenges the traditional notions of official 
peace actors, incorporating local and grassroots actors in addition to conflict parties and 
other state actors. By linking these stakeholders, Infrastructure for Peace facilitates 
greater communication, collaboration and coordination between diverse stakeholders to 
increase collective action (Adimula, 2019). Available literature revealed that many 
Nigerians believe that Boko Haram crisis is best addressed at the community or local 
level, rather than at the national or federal level (Botha et al., 2017). 
It thus can be said that the mechanism of an Infrastructure for Peace readily 
provides a platform for discussion on Boko Haram as it pertains to mediation, dialogue, 
negotiation and reconciliation, which can happen at both the community and national 
levels. There is no doubt that the state of governance determines the degree to which a 
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country could be safe from terrorism. As argued in the 2006 National Security Strategy 
document of the United States, “weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are 
not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also 
susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants and international criminals” (Alli, 2013, 
p.478). 
Organized Intelligence has been a 21st century growth industry, and most 
governments now have it as a permanent institution. It is a significant part of the modern 
state and a factor in government’s success and failure. It is part of the power of 
information rooted in the belief that to be forewarned is to be forearmed. Responses from 
the study participants confirmed that security agencies in Nigeria are portrayed as 
inefficient and incapable of handling the Boko Haram crisis because of poor intelligence 
collection and analysis techniques. Good democratic governance prioritizes and engage 
in several intelligence collection disciplines aimed at providing support for policy makers 
in their choice of response mechanism. 
As noted by Opukri and Etekpe (2013), the Intelligence Collection Disciplines 
(ICD) are normally divided into two technical and non-technical means. The technical 
forms of intelligence disciplines include Signal Intelligence (SIGNIT), Image Intelligence 
(IMINT) and Measurement and Signatories Intelligence (MASINT). The non-technical 
intelligence disciplines on the other hand, include Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and 
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). The participants observed that the security agencies 
in Nigeria have abandoned these disciplines, including analyzing intelligence reports and 
rather relying more on stop-and-search device that is yielding no positive results. There is 
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a huge disconnect between national security decision making and the actual feedback 
from intelligence. This inability of the Nigerian government to win the fight against Boko 
Haram over the years has eroded the confidence of the people in the government, and 
again, this reinforces the perception that the Nigerian state has failed. The inability of the 
Nigerian state through its security sector, to have a central database on vital registration 
and information of citizens makes it difficult to track people within the country. 
Future Policy Research 
Issues and cases of terrorism have been on the increase in many countries of the 
world. Africa has been particularly vulnerable to terrorism, which in the past decade, 
have resulted in unimaginable casualties and human misery, and contributed mostly to 
the spread of poverty, disease, malnutrition, starvation, socioeconomic decline and moral 
deterioration (IPCR,2016a). From the responses of the study participants, it was found 
out that research and analysis in public policy making is paramount to the sub-regional 
security and collective defense arrangements in Africa and particularly Nigeria, 
especially given the dimensions and shadowy nature of the Boko Haram insurgency. The 
participants agreed that policy research is needed both now and in the future, in view of 
the Boko Haram threats and the repertoire of approaches and techniques available for 
assisting policy makers in effective policy making process. 
It is believed that Nigeria can improve on her performance through more in-depth 
study of the nature of human conflicts, leading to a sound understanding of conflict 
situations, including terrorism and insurgencies, their historical causes as well as the 
dynamics and social forces that trigger them. To this end, policy research provides 
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guidance about how particular techniques or measures can be explored to assist decision 
makers in the task of public policy making and implementation. In fact, research has 
remained the fulcrum of exploits in all spheres of human endeavors recorded in the 
developed world. It has contributed immensely in shaping and sharpening 
counterinsurgency strategies and has equally helped to keep the operations well focused. 
(Okafor, 2015). This is why the US government, for example, attach importance to the 
works of RAND Corporation, USA, and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies in 
the University of Massachusetts. These agencies provide counterterrorism policy 
recommendations that are derived from empirical research (Okafor, 2015). 
Limitations of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to improve the understanding of 
public policy making and implementation in order to effectively address the crisis of the 
Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The study employed the use of a semi-structured 
open-ended questions to collect and analyze data obtained from the individuals who 
provided expert opinion and statements on the public policy measures that could be used 
to address the Boko Haram menace. A sample of 12 public policy experts was used to 
obtain rich data and in-depth information about their opinion of the phenomenon of the 
study. 
A first limitation was the limitations that could be attributed to research 
methodology adopted for the case study method, which made the researcher the primary 
instrument of data collection, analysis and interpretation (Creswell, 2013). Given this 
circumstance, there is the tendency of bias by the researcher. However, I struggled to 
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remain neutral throughout the study, thus putting a check on such limitation (Apori –
Nkansah, 2008). 
A second limitation was that the sample size was small, which did not make it 
easily feasible to engage the population of public policy experts in the various agencies, 
establishments and universities across Nigeria. The sample size appeared to be restrictive 
due to the purpose of the study. However, emphasis was on participants’ experience and 
knowledge of the subject matter. Boko Haram’s activities have resulted in the deaths and 
displacements of many people and the focus was on the public policy measures that could 
be adopted to end the carnage. 
Also, further limitations were imposed, due to the sensitive nature of the study. 
Policy measures were regarded as intelligence or security issues and information on them 
tend to be classified. I was able to navigate this challenge by relying on the open source 
information and interviews with the public policy experts. 
Recommendations 
This study is an effort to aid better understanding of the public policy measures 
that will be a solution to the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. The study critically examined 
the various public policy measures that have been adopted by the Nigerian government to 
address the Boko Haram insurgency and identified important gaps in the responses, given 
the extent of the violence and the fact that the violence is yet unabated in spite of the 
many measures adopted by government to end it.  
My findings from the study showed democratic good governance directly linked 
to the provision of public goods and utilities, accountability, transparency, supremacy of 
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the rule of law, a diminution of corruption in governments at all levels, egalitarian 
economic arrangements, and effective protection of human rights as key elements 
underlying policy measures that will most effectively address the menace of Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria. Good governance is an important element in combating terrorism 
in Nigeria. Good governance at all levels of government would therefore need to be 
deliberately enthroned and practiced. Future research in this area could explore how good 
governance will guarantee coherence and harmony between decisions and actions on 
peace, conflict management and resolution, and other official policies of Nigeria in the 
light of continuing threats from Boko Haram. 
Counterinsurgency should not be seen as a blunt military effort that focuses solely 
on capturing and killing high value targets. An important part of counterinsurgency in 
Nigeria demands a greater reliance on non-military force. My findings revealed that the 
exercise of military power should be used to create the space for political progress. While 
tackling armed insurgents, increasing efforts should also be channeled to economic, 
social and infrastructural development in the affected areas, in the bid to win the hearts 
and minds of the local people.  
A good example to borrow from, is the one that involved the use of an 
international level of analysis, as in the case of Iraq during the Bush Administration. The 
Bush Administration recognized, “that non-military issues were important and that 
infrastructure mattered” (Spear,2008, p.398). This led the United States to an intended 
reconstruction as a marshal plan for Iraq by providing clean water, communications, 
sanitation and power, with intention of winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people 
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(Osakwe & Umoh, 2013). Future research will reveal mechanisms for specific 
reconstruction programs for the communities in the north east and how to create 
acceptability and common ownership in view of the massive destruction of infrastructure 
by the Boko Haram and also by the security forces during the counterinsurgency fight. 
A significant issue that the study brought to the fore was the issue of interagency 
collaboration among the security agencies in the counterinsurgency fight against Boko 
Haram. It is obvious from the findings that every security agency is important in the 
counterinsurgency, in its own way. Every agency is required to play its role very well 
before counterinsurgency could succeed in its objectives. Understanding the relationships 
between the various agencies is important as it could bring about better productivity and 
high morale at work. These healthy relationships are crucial to the success of 
counterinsurgency operations, and attention should be paid to it. There is need for 
research to explore whether there are healthy relationships among the security agencies 
involved in the counterinsurgency efforts and any new findings could help to improve the 
working relationships among the agencies. 
The study found out that counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram is not 
accorded the deserved attention by the Nigerian government. Maintaining a functional 
security sector for counterinsurgency in Nigeria will require specialized training and 
adequate and timely release of funds for maintenance of men, materials and equipment. 
This must be given priority attention. My findings showed that the security sector 
involved in the counterinsurgency should be insulated from whatever economic, political 
and social problem the country is going through as only then can the combat readiness of 
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the security agencies in times of emergency can be guaranteed. The findings of this study 
will be useful to the Nigerian government in the area of resource allocation, terrorism 
combat preparedness and exigency planning. 
Implications for Social Change 
A better understanding of public policy making and implementation has the 
potential to end the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency and contribute to positive 
social change in Nigeria. The potential implications for social change of this qualitative 
case study is that the critical examination of the various public policy measures that have 
been adopted by the Nigerian government to address the Boko Haram insurgency can 
lead to the creation of the foundation for good governance, national stability and 
development in Nigeria. It can lead to improvement in service delivery, enhanced de-
radicalization and reduction of violent extremism among Muslim youths; and reduction 
of interagency quarrels and turf protection among the security forces. The study has the 
potential to lead to a policy direction that can facilitate greater effectiveness in 
responding to the threat of Boko Haram insurgency. 
Findings from the study also underscore the need for authorities in Nigeria to 
adopt a collaborative approach in policy implementation. Results from the study provided 
evidence of how a collaborative approach is required to regularly identify and respond to 
emerging threats to peace. This can be achieved by working with both formal and 
informal entities. Usually, a top-bottom approach where the state makes policies on peace 
and security and excludes informal, civil society and private entities is ineffective. 
Findings from the research will potentially enhance the understanding and effective 
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collaboration between the state and non- state actors. Non-state actors and the private 
sector need to be engaged and given the opportunity to articulate their concerns with 
government and should be involved in the planning and implementation of identified 
responses. By bringing together a wide range of actors to find practicable solutions to the 
problem of threats, and working jointly to address them, long lasting peace partnerships 
will be established and advanced across the country. 
Further, the findings in this study could be applied to support the needed reforms 
in the on-going fight against corruption in Nigeria. The results from the study offered 
evidence of how the Boko Haram sect espouses an ideology that is receptive to most 
Muslim youths, given the widespread public corruption and the dire socioeconomic 
situation in Nigeria. Pervasive malfeasance, especially in the public sector, provides a 
key around which Boko Haram ideologues have framed their anti-secular ideology. The 
Nigerian government must therefore demonstrate strong commitment and political will in 
the fight against corruption by repositioning institutions such as the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and 
Related Offenses Commission (ICPC) to wage a more vigorous fight against corruption. 
This will contribute to neutralizing and deconstructing the appeal of Boko Haram violent 
ideology. This way, this research will contribute to alignment of policy and practice and 
create a more enabling environment for good governance tasked with delivery of social 
services that removes the vulnerabilities of citizens. 
The study filled an important gap in literature in the search for solutions to the 
Boko Haram insurgency by offering empirically informed public policy 
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recommendations to the Nigerian government and other stakeholders that have been 
involved in the fight against Boko Haram. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to improve the understanding of the public policy 
measures that will be a solution in the efforts to address the violence of the Boko Haram 
insurgency. I adopted a qualitative research approach for the study. Purposive sampling 
technique was used. 12 participants were recruited for the study. The participants were 
sampled and selected based on their experience and knowledge on policy issues relevant 
to the study. Data collection was carried out in Abuja and Jos, Nigeria, by means of 
interviews and observational field notes. 
In this research, I critically examined the various public policy measures that have 
been adopted by the Nigerian government as a response to the challenges of Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria. The outcome of this study would be of benefit to the efforts to 
improve understanding of the policy measures that could be used to combat Boko Haram 
terrorism. This study revealed that the strategies that Nigeria, like any other country, 
could adopt for fighting terrorism should be flexible and innovative to respond to the 
constantly changing challenges. The findings showed that for Nigeria to succeed in 
fighting insurgency at any level, it has to have a policy on counterinsurgency. A well-
articulated counterinsurgency policy for Nigeria should have conceptual clarity, and 
fashioned to involve both the use of security components of the country as well as the use 
of political, legal, economic, civil society and other peacebuilding instruments 
(Ochoeche,2013). The focus of such a policy is attainment of the vital security interests 
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of the country through the creation and existence of a safer environment. It should be 
dynamic enough to read future trends in terrorism. 
The study also included the need to mainstream research and intelligence in all 
counterinsurgency operations. Research and intelligence will provide the needed data and 
informed recommendations that would make counterinsurgency operations effective and 
efficient. There is need to undertake a critical evaluation of the content of the particular 
policy responses with emphasis on substantially relying on special operations which are 
always based on good, credible and timely intelligence. Also, research should be able to 
add value to intelligence especially in providing empirical analysis of the various facets 
of the Boko Haram such as the background, motivations, operational environment and 
sustenance factors, among others. 
It is based on good and timely intelligence that the Nigerian state will be able to 
disrupt and destroy the Boko Haram by attacking their leadership command, control and 
communication structures; and material support and finances. Furthermore, the battle of 
winning hearts and minds will be made easier in counterinsurgency operation when 
policies, programs and interventions are based and developed on intelligence (Okafor, 
2015). The findings of the study also showed that the military operations have attracted 
mixed reactions with some stakeholders, who emphasized the need for the Nigerian 
government to combine the operations with an enhanced efforts and initiatives to 
addressing the root causes of Islamic extremism and radicalism especially in the North 
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol 
Central Research Question 
What public policy measures are a solution to deal with Boko Haram insurgency 
in Nigeria? 
Sub questions 
What Public policy strategies or measures have been adopted by Nigerian 
government or authorities to address the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria? 
Why has Boko Haram violence continued despite public policy initiatives meant 
to curtail it? 
How can/might future public policy initiatives mitigate the impact of Boko Haram 
violence on the people in Nigeria? 
Interview Questions with Research Questions 
Research Questions Interview Questions 
Central Research Question 
What public policy measures 
are a solution to deal with Boko 
Haram insurgency in Nigeria? 
 
1. How has the violence of the Boko Haram 
insurgency impacted on people in Nigeria? 
2. How concerned are you about the impacts of the 
violence of the Boko Haram insurgency on lives 
and property in Nigeria? 
3. From your experience, how do you think the 
challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency should 
be addressed? 
4. One of the most prominent public policy 
response to the Boko Haram violence is the use 
of the military. What in your opinion make the 
use of the military so common? 
5. If you could identify one public policy measure 
that you think will most effectively address the 




Sub Question 1 
What policy strategies or 
measures have been adopted by 
Nigerian government or 
authorities to address the 
violence of the Boko Haram 
insurgency in Nigeria? 
1. The crisis of the Boko Haram has had 
devastating effects on Nigeria, what in your 
opinion has been the efforts or measures taken 
by the government and stakeholders to resolve 
it? 
2. What do you consider to be the factors that 
influenced the adoption of the public policy 
measures you have identified? 
3. Who, in terms of individuals, agencies and 
organizations, were the critical stakeholders that 
participated in the development and adoption of 
the policy strategies or measures for addressing 
the Boko Haram crisis? 
4. What would you say the government of Nigeria 
has done to implement some of the 
counterinsurgency measures you identified? 
Sub Question 2Why has Boko 
Haram violence continued 
despite public policy initiatives 
meant to curtail it? 
1. In your opinion, would you say that the various 
measures taken by the Nigerian government to 
address the Boko Haram challenge has been 
generally effective or ineffective, and why? 
2. What in your view, are the implementation 
challenges of the various policy measures you 
have identified? 
3. What are your suggestions for making public 
policy response to Boko Haram violence more 
effective? 
Sub Question 3 
How can/might future public 
policy initiatives mitigate the 
impact of Boko Haram violence 
on the people in Nigeria? 
 
1. In what ways will the implementation of the 
various public policy measures recommended for 
dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency reduce 
the negative impacts of the Boko Haram 
violence on the people? 
2. If you are the President of Nigeria and given the 
myriad of responses so far deployed to 
addressing the Boko Haram insurgency, what 
would you do differently to assuage the Nigerian 






Appendix B: Interview Questions 
1. How have you been impacted by the Boko Haram violence/insurgency in your 
family, and how about the general society? 
2. Could you identify the impacts of the violence of the Boko Haram insurgency 
on lives and properties? 
3. From your experience, how do you think the challenges of the Boko Haram 
insurgency should be addressed? 
4. One of the most prominent public policy response to the Boko Haram violence 
is the use of the military. What in your opinion make the use of the military so 
common? 
5. If you could identify one public policy measure that you think will most 
effectively address the Boko Haram violence, what would it be and why? 
6. The crisis of the Boko Haram has had devastating effects on Nigeria, what in 
your opinion has been the efforts or measures taken by the government and 
stakeholders to resolve it? 
7. What do you consider to be the factors that influenced the adoption of the 
public policy measures you have identified? 
8. Who, in terms of individuals, agencies and organizations, were the critical 
stakeholders that participated in the development and adoption of the policy 
strategies or measures for addressing the Boko Haram crisis? 
9. What would you say the government of Nigeria has done to implement some of 
the counterinsurgency measures you identified? 
10. In your opinion, would you say that the various measures taken by the Nigerian 
government to address the Boko Haram challenge has been generally effective, 
and why, or ineffective, and why? 
11. What in your view, are the implementation challenges of the various policy 
measures you have identified? 
12. What are your suggestions for making public policy response to Boko Haram 
violence more effective? 
13. In what ways will the implementation of the various public policy measures 
recommended for dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency reduce the negative 
impacts of the Boko Haram violence on the people? 
14. If you are the President of Nigeria and given the myriad of responses so far 
deployed to addressing the Boko Haram insurgency, what would you do 
differently to assuage the Nigerian people over the negative effects of the Boko 
Haram crisis? 
 
